Arms Pacts Still Key Aim Despite Cold War Thaw

For months, President Bush has been referring to next week’s meeting with Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev as the “arms control summit.” Its goal: to surmount remaining obstacles to a nuclear weapons treaty and move forward on a pact to cut conventional forces in Europe.

Now, just as the two sides are verging on an agreement, critics are questioning whether what the negotiators have on the table is very meaningful--or even necessary--anymore.

With the Soviet Bloc disintegrating, and Moscow already pulling its troops out of Eastern Europe on its own, the arms control negotiations are being overtaken by events, these critics contend. What is likely to result from the summit, they say, will be too little, too late.

“This will be arms control without pain or sacrifice,” complained Robert S. Norris, an analyst for the Natural Resources Defense Council, a Washington-based pro-disarmament group, referring to the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START), which now are expected to yield an agreement calling for reductions smaller than had been advertised.

At the same time, conservatives argue that in view of the Soviets’ weakened economic and military position, Moscow should be forced to make bigger concessions.

But officials of the Bush Administration, hardly prepared to scrap the arms control talks just as they seem ready to bear fruit, contend that the formal accords still are needed. Their reasoning:

* Reductions are more certain to be carried out if they are written into a legal treaty--particularly if Gorbachev is forced to step down and another leader takes the reins. “We want any successor . . . to be as legally bound to reductions and to limits on remaining weapons as Gorbachev himself will be,” a senior Administration official explained. “If he wants to renege, he will be forced to abrogate a legal pledge--in the full glare of international opinion. That will be harder to do.”

* Only a treaty can provide for on-site verification that both sides actually are carrying out the arms reductions they have promised. Although unilateral cutbacks may be faster, they provide for no formal policing systems. But with a treaty in force, if the Soviets were to renege on a promise, U.S. inspectors probably would spot the reversal earlier, allowing more time for Washington to react.

* A treaty would guarantee that both sides would destroy their outlawed weapons rather than place them in mothballs or sell them to the Third World at cut-rate prices.

Jack Mendelsohn, deputy director of the Arms Control Assn., another group favoring disarmament, said, “Arms treaties also provide each side with greater predictability. You know better what the future will look like, and in that way you can mitigate worst-case scenarios that the military sometimes concocts to get more weapons.”

Indeed, with the Soviet Union already strapped for cash, the danger that Moscow will offer its surplus weapons to Third World nations is real. While a discarded tank may bring about $3,000 if it is peddled as scrap steel, it is worth 10 times that or more if it is sold as a used tank.

Gorbachev has promised to unilaterally withdraw 10,000 tanks, 8,500 artillery systems and 800 combat aircraft from Eastern Europe by 1991, and U.S. analysts predict that many will end up in the hands of Moscow’s old friends--or in the arsenals of new Third World customers around the globe.

“The Soviets are hard up for hard currency,” according to one official who monitors such arms movements. “They get it mainly from guns and oil.”

And the arms reductions mandated by the Conventional Forces in Europe treaty, now being negotiated, are staggering. For Warsaw Pact countries, the pact would require the destruction of more than 110,000 tanks, artillery, armored combat vehicles, aircraft and helicopters--enough to equip several full armies.

But the Soviets may not be the only country flooding the market with cut-rate weapons if such sales aren’t prohibited by a formal treaty. Some West European governments are paring back their arsenals now--at least on paper--so the weapons will not be targeted for destruction, and thus taken off the world market, if a force-reduction accord is signed.

Even the United States is transferring 700 surplus M-60 tanks from Europe to Egypt. Under the CFE accord, members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization would have to destroy about 10,000 weapons.

To help head off such an arms-sale race, the CFE treaty would require countries to destroy any weapons that they agree to eliminate--by slicing them in half, filling them with concrete, blowing them up or modifying them for peaceful use.

Moreover, it would prescribe painstakingly detailed rules to discourage countries from cheating. For example, in cases where a tank is converted to a bulldozer, the country’s engineers must fix it so that it would take longer to reconvert the bulldozer back into a tank than to build a new tank from scratch.

Some arms control skeptics also complain that the treaties could backfire by setting ceilings on arms levels that ultimately end up as floors. For example, the CFE accord would permit the Soviets to keep up to 195,000 troops in Eastern Europe. Could Moscow then contend that this gives it legal authority to maintain those troop levels no matter what--even if the East European governments want them to go home?

But State Department officials note that most of the emerging Eastern European democracies--particularly Czechoslovakia and Poland--strongly favor having such limits established by treaty rather than leaving the timetable up to the Soviets alone.

The Eastern Europeans “have more to lose than we do,” one well-placed U.S. official said. “If they want it that way, it’s good enough for us.”

The suggestion that the Soviets already are disarming more rapidly than any treaty would provide does not apply to offensive nuclear weapons, which are to be covered by the START treaty. By all accounts, the Kremlin is improving its strategic missiles and bombers faster than the Pentagon.

The Soviets are continuing to produce three new kinds of intercontinental land-based missiles, two new types of submarine-based missiles and three new models of bombers. By contrast, the United States has sharply cut production of the B-2 Stealth bomber, and its missile-makers are manufacturing only spares.

“Moscow may not be able to start a conventional war anymore, but it sure can still devastate us in a nuclear war,” one senior U.S. official said. “They clearly intend to remain a superpower in terms of nuclear weapons.”

Bush Administration strategists argue that only a U.S.-Soviet treaty will eliminate the Soviets’ current superiority in key categories of nuclear weapons--particularly those designed for surprise attack--and will equalize the nuclear arsenals of both sides.

The question is, however, does the proposed START treaty go far enough? Some critics complain that the real reduction is not as deep as successive Administrations have contended. Others argue that the United States should hold out for far more cuts than the Soviets have pledged.

But Bush Administration officials defend the accords as more significant than critics say. Under the agreements, ballistic missile warheads--considered the most dangerous and destabilizing weapons in both arsenals--would be slashed by half, to 4,900 on each side. Best suited of all for launching a surprise attack, they are fast, impossible to ward off and not recallable once they have been launched.

By comparison, bomber-carried weapons are less dangerous: The bombers must fly at least eight hours before firing air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs)--or even farther, if they are being sent to drop bombs--and the target country can defend itself against them. In short, bombers are not likely to be the delivery vehicle that would be used to start a nuclear war.

Because of this, the START accord effectively “discounts” bombs and bombers--by charging them (against the 6,000-weapon ceiling that the START accord would set) for fewer weapons than the actual maximum that can be carried. Each ALCM counts only as half a warhead; 20 ALCMs on a B-52 bomber count as 10. Bombs and short-range missiles would not be counted at all; 20 on a B-1 bomber would not be charged against the ceiling.

Paul H. Nitze, chief arms adviser during the Ronald Reagan Administration, uses another rationale for contending that the START accord does not go far enough: He argues that the newer Soviet SS-18s, currently Moscow’s largest missile, are so much more accurate than those that existed in 1982, when the START targets first were set, that deeper cuts are necessary to accomplish the same goals.

Under Nitze’s calculations, the 10 warheads on an older-model SS-18 Soviet missile were capable of destroying only five U.S. missiles in a surprise attack; today’s versions can knock out 10 of them. As a result, Nitze argues that the total Soviet force of 304 such SS-18s should be slashed by 75%, not half--to 77 rather than 154, as currently is being agreed.

Building on Nitze’s criticisms, some conservatives have called for exploiting the Kremlin’s current weakness more forcefully to wring additional concessions from Gorbachev. But the Administration has resisted this advice.

“It’s not so much squeezing,” Nitze says. “My point is that we have not been asking enough of Gorbachev and ourselves.”

Nitze would want the Soviets to give up all their SS-18s; in return, he would cancel plans for America’s railroad-based MX program. He also would limit total weapons, “including missile warheads, bombs and everything else,” to between 4,000 and 5,000, rather than the 9,000 to 10,000 START would allow.

“I suggested this two years ago, and no one really opposed it,” he added, “but no one really backed it, either. At 4,000 or 5,000 weapons, someone would have to decide how many the Air Force would have in bombers and land-based missiles and how many the Navy would have in subs. But they (the early Bush White House) didn’t want to take it on.”

Bush did try to raise the stakes two months ago by proposing that the START treaty also eliminate mobile land-based missiles that carry multiple warheads. (The Soviets have such missiles, but the United States has only paper plans for a comparable force in the rail-mobile MX system, and those face significant opposition in Congress.)

Not surprisingly, the Soviets said no. But Marshal Sergei F. Akhromeyev, Gorbachev’s chief arms control adviser, told Congress two weeks ago that moving toward the elimination of all multiple-warhead missiles, fixed as well as mobile, “is the core of future negotiations between our two countries.”

At next week’s summit, the two sides are expected to commit themselves to begin such follow-on talks, already termed START II, soon after the START I agreement is ratified. Besides the multiple-warhead issue, the new talks are likely to aim at deeper reductions--perhaps as low as 3,000 warheads--with far fewer loopholes for bombers, much as Nitze had suggested.

Meanwhile, despite some last-minute hitches, the odds are that next week’s summit will move the START and CFE agreements forward significantly. And despite their imperfections, the treaties will be neither too little nor too late for most of the world, many argue. Arms control no longer carries the entire burden of managing U.S.-Soviet relations, the way it did during the depths of the Cold War. Rather, to many onlookers, its successes remain the most palpable and reassuring sign that the specter of world war is receding.

KEY ISSUES IN U.S.-SOVIET ARMS TALKS STRATEGIC ARMS

The United States and Soviet Union have conducted extensive negotiations on a Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) that would halve ballistic missile warheads and trim overall long-range offensive nuclear weapons by about 30%. President Bush and Soviet leader Mikhail S. Gorbachev hope to approve outlines of a 15-year agreement at this summit.

ALREADY AGREED

Reduction of about 50% in strategic nuclear offensive arms over seven-year period to ceilings of 6,000 warheads each, carried by 1,600 delivery vehicles.

4,900 of those warheads could be on land-based and submarine-based missiles, leaving at least 1,100 for bombers and air-launched cruise missiles.

Each warhead on ballistic missiles would count as one against the 6,000 ceiling. Weapons on bombers would count for less because bombers are slower-flying than missiles and can be recalled, making them less dangerous.

All air-launched cruise missiles (ALCMs) with a range of more than 375 miles will be counted. The agreement reflects a compromise by the United States, which had sought to protect the option of developing a short-range ALCM for tactical use in Europe.

Each side will be permitted 880 sea-launched cruise missiles (SLCMs) with nuclear warheads, but there will be no verification of compliance and limits will be self-imposed through “political declaration.” The agreement is excluded from the START treaty. It is to be covered in a separate, parallel pact.

OUTSTANDING ISSUE

Mobile land-based missiles:

U.S. Position: Prohibit those carrying multiple warheads, specifically the Soviet SS-24 and the U.S. MX, both of which carry 10 warheads. Eventually ban all multiple-warhead land-based missiles.

Soviet Position: Limit number of mobile missiles and their warheads now. Defer consideration of ban until the next START negotiation.

Comment: Soviets already deploy mobile missiles including SS-24s on railroad cars and SS-25s on truck-like vehicles. U.S. is developing both kinds.

CONVENTIONAL FORCES

Negotiators from 16 NATO nations and seven Warsaw Pact nations have begun the seventh round of talks to reduce conventional forces in Europe (from the Atlantic to the Ural Mountains). They are seeking large reductions in five categories of ground and air weapons, as well as manpower, to equal levels for both sides. Since World War II, the Soviet-led pact enjoyed an overwhelming advantage in conventional forces on the Continent. ALREADY AGREED

Reduction of U.S. and Soviet troops in European “central zone” to 195,000 each, with 30,000 additional for U.S. on periphery. Reduction in tanks to 20,000, helicopters to 1,900, for each alliance.

Steep reductions in artillery and armored personnel carriers, but slightly different ceilings proposed. NATO offer: 16,500 and 30,000, respectively. Warsaw Pact offer: 20,000 and 28,000, respectively.

Verification of reductions through exchange of data, on-site inspections and monitoring destruction of weapons or conversion to non-weapon use. Total weapons to be eliminated: more than 100,000 from pact; about 9,500 from NATO (by NATO count).

OUTSTANDING ISSUES

Manpower:

NATO Position: Setting total number of troops in each alliance should be put off to subsequent CFE negotiations.

Pact Position: Overall troop limit for both alliances would be between 700,000 and 750,000 each, apparently aimed at putting ceiling on German army before German unification. Target figures could be reached by each NATO nation cutting 40% to 50% of present strengths.

Aircraft:

NATO Position: 5,200 fixed-wing, land-based, combat-capable aircraft, including 4,700 attack planes and 500 defense interceptors, for both sides.

Pact Position: 7,700 combat aircraft, including 4,700 combat-capable aircraft, 1,500 interceptors and 1,500 advanced trainers.

National maximums:

NATO Position: No one country could have more than 60% of the overall complement in each weapon category. Various ceilings would limit how many of a nation’s weapons could be stationed outside its territory.

Pact Position: No one country could have more than 70% to 80% of overall limits. Higher ceilings on foreign-stationed forces.

Sources: U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Arms Control Assn.