Richard A. Gephardt : Devising a Foreign Policy to Ensure an American Role

Rep. Richard A. Gephardt of Missouri is no stranger to controversy. As a candidate for the Democratic presidential nomination in 1988, he staked out a get-tough policy on foreign trade that won him fervent admirers--and caustic critics. Gephardt’s call for tough penalties against countries that violate U.S. standards of fair trade was denounced as protectionist by many economists in the United States and abroad. Others, including many in the Democratic Party and the AFL-CIO, argued that Gephardt’s brand of “economic nationalism” would benefit both the United States and the Democrats.

Today, Gephardt is the majority leader of the House of Representatives, and the controversy continues. At a time when President George Bush is riding high in the polls, and with communism on the run from Nicaragua to Moscow, Gephardt is taking the lead in a Democratic assault on Bush’s foreign policy.

Protectionist or economic nationalist, Gephardt has an important role in the politics of the ‘90s. His position in the House leadership gives him a national audience; his willingness to attack Bush when many Democrats seem unnerved by the President’s approval ratings makes him even more conspicuous.

This does not necessarily mean Gephardt is running for President. At age 49, Gephardt can afford to spend the next few years collecting political IOUs and building a national image.

Meanwhile, the upheavals in Eastern Europe are reflected in a growing U.S. debate over future foreign policy. What role--if any--does the United States have in a post-Cold War Europe? What are U.S. foreign-policy priorities if the fight against communism is over?

Ever since the Vietnam War broke up Lyndon B. Johnson’s Great Society, foreign policy has divided the Democrats. Whether the end of the Cold War means the end of Democratic division and weakness in foreign affairs remains to be seen. Gephardt’s voice will be one of the most important as the Democratic Party attempts to express a vision for America’s future.

Question: We hear a lot about “the vision thing” in foreign policy and you have criticized President Bush for lack of vision. What is your vision for American foreign policy in this new era?

Answer: America in the next 20 to 30 years has to assert a policy that will give us the kind of leadership in the world and engagement in the world that we have had over the last 40 years. But our policy will have to be adapted for a world that is very different from what it has been.

The primary difference will be that the issues will be much more economic than military--although we have to remain engaged militarily. We have to learn to be a leader in a world that is dominated by economics.

We are the symbol today for dozens of countries that want to move in our direction--both in terms of political structure and of economic structure. We have to put substance behind this symbol, and if we can do that, as we have in the past, then I think our foreign policy will be a success.

Part of my criticism of the President was that this vision needs to be explained to the American people so that they can be galvanized to do a whole range of things that have to be done to give us the economic stature and strength we need.

Q: Is there anything else wrong with the President’s vision of foreign policy?

A: I think he’s stuck in the past. I think the President basically believes that what worked the last 40 years will continue to work; that we’re still No. 1 the way we were in the ‘50s, and that we just need to continue doing the same thing. I don’t think he sees a new set of challenges or a different set of challenges. And he would be satisfied with continuing the status quo, believing that going in the directions we’ve been going is satisfactory.

Q: Is the Cold War over?

A: It’s over as we have known it. Hopefully we will move rapidly away from military competition to an economic competition and to a more normalized relationship. Obviously there could be changes in the Soviet Union that would be somewhat negative or very negative; the jury is still out. But I think that the kind of frosty and difficult relationship that we had in many of the last 45 years would be impossible to see again quickly.

Q: If you were a citizen of the Soviet Union, would you be hoping that the whole country would stay together?

A: Well it’s an interesting problem. I can see why people would want their own ethnic identity and their own culture to be better recognized and not have the Russian influence be so much a part of their life. I think if democracy continues in the Soviet Union, over time that can achieved. People, though, are impatient.

It’s interesting that as the Soviet Union seems to be moving toward some kind of dissolution, Western Europe is moving toward amalgamation. It may become clear before too long to people in the Soviet Union that while they may want a greater amount of regional political freedom, they may want to continue a good deal of economic cooperation. I can see a time far down the road that you could have an economic union of all of these Soviet republics and even have them tied into the Eastern and Central European countries, and even ultimately into the Western European economic alliance.

Q: Does the North Atlantic Treaty Organization have a future?

A: I think there must be and will be a security alliance in Europe, and it could well be NATO. It might be something different, might have a different name. It might ultimately include the Central European countries and it might ultimately even include the Soviet Union. But I hope that we would remain involved in it to whatever reasonable extent was necessary. I think our presence is desired and it is important for everybody’s security and safety.

Q: By presence, do you mean troops?

A: Yes. A continuing presence of American troops--it may be far less than there are today.

Q: Do you have a number in mind?

A: I don’t. I think you have to deal with that as you go along. It could be very small . . . . Right now we’re thinking . . . 50,000. But that, too, could change. I don’t think you have to have a preset notion of this. It is conceivable that you could wind up some day with an all-European security force, including even the Soviets. That also includes the United States.

Q:. Does this mean that the United States would guarantee the borders of every country in Europe?

A: Not the United States, but the European security force.

Q: But we would have signed some sort of a treaty. And say the Hungarians tried to take Transylvania from the Romanians. Does this mean U.S. troops could wind up involved?

A: It could be possible if you had this common security relationship. It would be a version of what we have had in the United Nations--which has been a peacekeeping force that has involved troops from all kinds of different countries.

Q: And U.S. taxpayers should pay for these troops?

A: We would and should be part of the economic maintenance of this organization, just as we are of the United Nations. And again I believe it is in the best interest of the American taxpayer that America have a part in the stabilization of Europe because it will be a major market for American products.

Q: On the economic side of things, do you think that Germany and Japan will now believe that they have less need of U.S. military protection and so feel free to compete more vigorously in other fields?

A: Well, they are competing with us very well in the economic sphere. Some would even say that we are parallel with the Japanese or even falling behind, although their stock market is not doing too well.

Q: Does that make you happy?

A: Not at all, because it could have bad consequences for them and us and everybody else. The competition will be economic and will be very intense, but I think our political relationship will be good and strong. Japan, Germany and the United States right now are the three most successful and important powers and, as such, we have a tremendous responsibility for close cooperation and for concerted action. I do not believe that either Japan or Germany is going to be in a position to increase their military strength tremendously, and I don’t see any military competition between us.

Q: Do you think the structural impediment initiative talks with Japan are going to work?

A: I don’t know if they will work. I hope they do work. I’m skeptical that they will, because what the talks are trying to do is so extremely difficult. They are addressing deep-seated economic structures and relationships that have been created over a long period of time and these are very hard to change. But it’s wrong to assume that we cannot do it and to have a self-fulfilling prophecy. We’ve got to see what the talks produce . . . .

As you know, from the Gephardt amendment (to impose high trade tariffs on nations that post barriers to U.S. goods) my belief has been for a long time that there has to be another alternative solution to this problem that has a greater chance of near-term and medium-term success. This means putting out goals for reduction in the trade deficit so that if the trade barriers don’t come down we can still get the trade deficit down in some incremental but modest way.

Q: We’ve heard a lot about supporting democracy as the basis for U.S. foreign policy in this new post-Cold War era, but in many countries, such as Haiti, the Philippines and Argentina, economic setbacks undermine democracy. Is democracy possible without economic growth?

A: I don’t see how you can have political freedom unless there is economic success underpinning it. I don’t think everybody has to be just like America in terms of economic success to have democracy, but I do think the two go hand-in-hand.

Q: We’ve had a program of supporting market-oriented reforms for 10 years in countries like Mexico, Argentina and Brazil, but these countries have not had much luck with them. Do you think our approach will work better in Eastern Europe?

A: Eastern Europe is a very different case from Mexico or Brazil and some other countries that do not have a developed infrastructure, or where the populations are not as universally educated. So Eastern Europe will find an easier road toward political democracy and political reform than some of the other countries. I do think that we should not try to impose on everyone some, set economic ideology that we believe is the perfect way to have private enterprise and capitalism. There are different ways to do this--some with more government involvement, some with less. And different models are going to work better in different places, and people have to choose what kind of an economy they want. I would suspect some of the countries in Eastern Europe are going to have a fair amount of government involvement; some may even call it socialism. But they are still going to have private enterprise alongside--a mixed economy.

The key is that there would be political democracy and freedom. People should have the right to choose the kind and type of government and who should serve in it. They should have the basic freedoms of our Bill of Rights and have the ability to choose the kind of economic structure they want to live under. And if you do that, even the most underdeveloped countries over time can be successfully developed and create a high standard of living.

Q: Roughly 50% of America’s foreign aid budget goes to Israel and Egypt. Does this reflect our real foreign-policy priorities and is it a good allocation of scarce resources?

A: I think we’ve got to find more room in the budget for foreign aid. As defense comes down, we’ve got to reinvest some of that money in areas where we’re trying to foster democracy and economic reform; that is the sensible thing to do with part of the so-called peace dividend.

Over time, our hope is that the amount of foreign aid we put into Egypt and Israel can be coming down. But we have a huge stake in their success. We were a major participant in bringing about the move toward peace in the Middle East that is represented by the Camp David accords, and we don’t want to cut our foreign aid and see that success fall apart.

I think our foreign aid was the critical element to bring about the Camp David progress--and that progress is the ultimate and most important reality in the region today.

Q: In this hemisphere, U.S. attention and money have been concentrated on Central America for the last decade. Was this a wise use of our attention and energy?

A: I think the Reagan policy was really far too heavily concentrated on Central America. He had a fixation with Nicaragua that cost us millions and millions of dollars and that could have either been used somewhere else or not used in foreign aid. That huge concentration of money on El Salvador, Nicaragua and some of the others kept us from giving more attention to Brazil and Argentina and other countries in South America.

I still think we pay too little attention to South America . . . . We have looked at all of Central and South America as being important only if there is a crisis, if there is some horrible problem. And we have not had, in my view, the kind of long-term, patient and consistent attention to these countries that they deserve and that I think is in our deepest self-interest.

You asked me earlier what my vision for American foreign policy is. My vision is an engaged United States everywhere in the world, and that means not just fixating on the Soviet Union or Eastern Europe but having a balanced policy of engagement everywhere in the world, and I don’t think we’ve had that.

Q: The Democratic Party has had trouble articulating a clear platform for itself in foreign policy. What should they be saying?

A: I think the most important thing to do is to try to create a vision for the American people of the kind of foreign policy that we think we should have. We should assert that foreign policy and urge President Bush to adopt it on behalf of the country. I think we should show the capacity and the willingness to truly lead the country, especially in a time of great change. And we should be willing to say to the American people that their direct self-interest is related to this kind of more aggressive, engaged foreign policy. And if we can do that--as Harry Truman did, as, I think, Jack Kennedy did--I think it will be exciting to the American people and attractive to them.

Q: Are you running for President in 1992?

A: No.

Q: Do you have any travel plans for Iowa in the next couple of years?

A: I don’t. I’m sure I’ll be there and many other places helping candidates in 1990, but I don’t have any specific plans.