PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION : He Raises Many Eyebrows by Standing Lenin on His Head : Boris Yeltsin and his backers think they can take control of the Communist Party. They may be right.

Who is Boris Yeltsin? In an age when highbrow intellectuals have flooded into East European politics, Yeltsin is a genuine blue-collar figure who fought his way up through the ranks in the gritty city of Sverdlovsk. Even as a local party leader, however, he rejected the dachas, limousines and other perquisites of office. As Moscow’s mayor he championed the forgotten consumer and drove party hacks from office.

Mikhail Gorbachev was quick to sense in Yeltsin a formidable rival. With only the slightest pretext, Gorbachev fired him from the post of mayor of Moscow. In doing so, he went out of his way to humiliate the popular leader from the Urals. Far from crushing Yeltsin, however, this shock catalyzed his energies.

The firing had the opposite effect on Gorbachev, who began shying away from the public at large, even while preaching democracy. Twice in the past six months he has sidestepped elections, refusing to submit both his additional presidential powers and his reform program as a whole to public referendum.

What is Yeltsin’s program? To Moscow intellectuals and others not accustomed to elective politics, it is frustratingly vague. In economics, he supports “all forms of ownership,” implying a mixed economy. He wants “a market mechanism in its pure form,” yet speaks of a safety net for those most adversely affected by reform. Above all, he wants thoroughgoing economic reform now, fearing a collapse into anarchy.

Yeltsin’s politics are more radical than his economics. He champions “a democratic and civil society” with political pluralism and the separation of powers. He rejects Russia’s authoritarian tradition, supporting instead both radical administrative decentralization and the devolution of state powers to the public. Standing Lenin on his head, he argues that “everything must proceed from the bottom up and not the other way around.”

Yeltsin’s views on the empire have raised many eyebrows. He opposes both military and economic sanctions against Lithuania and other dissenting republics and favors immediate negotiations with those wishing to secede. Rather than impose a union that no longer exists, he believes that Moscow must recognize at the outset the “full-blooded sovereignty” of each republic, including Russia. This done, negotiations could then stress the living links of common interest that unite the various republics, rather than the problems that separate them. As in Central Europe, however, trade among the republics would henceforth be conducted at world prices. This would enable Russia and other republics to gain control of their resources, as well as encourage them to get their own banking systems, foreign relations, flags and national anthems.

Yeltsin has borrowed much of this program from the very separatists in the Baltic region whom Gorbachev is trying to intimidate. Unlike Gorbachev, however, Yeltsin realizes that even if independent, seceding republics would seek close ties with Russia. Yeltsin’s program has the psychological advantage of accentuating the positive rather than the negative.

By no means are all points of this “Yeltsin program” Yeltsin’s invention, but it is increasingly being associated with this charismatic figure. Those supporting most or all of it now constitute a majority in the city councils of Moscow, Leningrad and many capitals of the non-Russian republics. Within the Communist Party it is championed in milder form by the Democratic Platform group, of which Yeltsin is a member. A single national party built around the sweeping Yeltsin program has yet to form, however. Some hope that the Democratic Platform faction can take over at the Communist Party Congress in July, transform the party into a parliamentary force and drive out the traditionalists. Other radicals are prepared to walk out after the congress and set up a non-Communist opposition. Still others remain undecided.

For now, Yeltsin and his backers think they can take control of the party. They may be right. A survey of party professionals by the Central Committee’s own staff revealed that 51% would like to see the traditionalists driven out while 35% think the Democratic Platform group should leave. Where does this leave Gorbachev? He faces a genuine crisis that his outbursts of anger and condescension toward Yeltsin have only made worse. For a year Gorbachev has tried in vain to maneuver between the Yeltsin radicals and the hard-line traditionalists. Yeltsin’s recent victory as president of the Russian republic erodes the middle ground on which Gorbachev has been dancing. But as Yeltsin gleefully reminds Gorbachev, it is not too late for the Soviet leader to adopt the radicals’ program and thereby save himself politically.

This may not be likely but it is at least possible. In spite of Yeltsin’s bluster, the chief differences between him and Gorbachev are of degree, not kind. Gorbachev is leading the country to collapse, Yeltsin argues, not by taking the wrong road but by proceeding haltingly and indecisively. Neither wants complete privatization of the economy and both favor a strong safety net. They are not even so far apart on whether and how to preserve the Soviet Union. “Deep down,” Yeltsin affirms, “I am in favor of the union not crumbling.”

Much evidence suggests that Gorbachev already accepts the need to move toward Yeltsin and the Democratic Platform group. In recent weeks, he has spoken of the “radicalization of reform” and of the need for more thoroughgoing “democratization.” He has accepted the secession of a number of republics from the union as unavoidable. He has even called for the consolidation of pro-reform forces, as if he believes that he himself could still be at the head of such a party.

Whether or not this proves possible, Americans must be concerned about the future of Soviet reform, not just the fate of Gorbachev. Clearly, the possibility of gradual reform from within the system is fading, just as it faded earlier in Central Europe. But Yeltsin’s Lazarus-like return from political oblivion shows that the impetus for radical reform continues to mount, as it did in Central Europe.

In Czechoslovakia and East Germany the democratic forces coalesced so quickly that Communist traditionalists had no chance to regroup, let alone make common cause with the forces of chauvinism in their countries, as occurred in Romania. The possibility of such a counter-revolutionary alliance in the Soviet Union is by no means ruled out. However, local and national elections, as well as countless opinion polls, indicate that the loose coalition of radical reformers--the Democratic Platform group, independent labor organizations and other newly formed regional parties--are still ascendant.

Yeltsin’s politics of inclusion may strengthen this current of radical reform and hold its parts together during the crucial transition before and after the party congress next month. It would be well for Gorbachev to swim hard with this current and not resist it. Otherwise, he might drown.