PACIFIC PERSPECTIVE : Extend the Thaw Toward Vietnam

It has been 15 years since the fall of Saigon to Communist forces--long enough to start rethinking U.S. policy toward Vietnam.

Our cold-shoulder policy--diplomatic recognition coupled with an embargo on private- and public-sector economic dealings with the Socialist Republic of Vietnam--was born out of understandable American anger with Hanoi on several counts: Its disregard for the provisions of U.S.-Vietnamese diplomatic agreements that led to the withdrawal of American forces; a callous and cynical manipulation of America’s anguish over its missing in action, and Hanoi’s support first for a bloody Communist takeover in neighboring Cambodia, followed by a 1978 invasion and occupation.

In the last year, however, Hanoi has given indications that it has begun to change course. Most, if not all, Vietnamese forces have been withdrawn fromCambodia. Although the pace is still unacceptably slow, Hanoi has gradually become more cooperative on the painful issue of American prisoners of war and missing in action. Finally, there have been tentative and contradictory signals suggesting a possible curtailment of Vietnam’s military relationship with the Soviet Union.

It is not yet appropriate for Washington to normalize relations with Vietnam. We should, however, consider whether a more positive approach to Vietnam might be more effective in promoting the changes that we want to see in Vietnam’s foreign and domestic policies.

In particular, there are steps we could take regarding the economic aspects of our relationship with Vietnam that would benefit our own citizens while acknowledging that some progress has been made toward a more normal relationship between our two countries. As the Cold War fades, we can begin to put the Vietnam War behind us as well.

As a first step, I have joined with Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) in sponsoring legislation to compensate Americans who lost property in South Vietnam in 1975. Hundreds of U.S. citizens and businesses remained in that country, many at the urging of our government, long after it had ceased to be prudent. With the fall of Saigon, these people lost millions of dollars worth of property to the Communist regime. There has never been any compensation for this confiscated property. An agency of the Justice Department has adjudicated outstanding claims and has declared that 192 have merit. These claims have been on the books far too long. As a matter of fairness, they should be settled.

At the same time that the former Saigon government fell, Washington blocked South Vietnamese government assets in this country, mostly in the form of funds on deposit in U.S. banks. Those remain blocked to this day. They constitute more than enough accumulated funds to cover the adjudicated claims.

Obviously, the principal beneficiaries of the legislation would be the claimants, but American foreign policy would benefit as well. The legislation concludes some long overdue business from the Vietnam War. It signals Hanoi that Washington is losing patience with the dilatory pace by which other outstanding issues, notably MIAs and Cambodia, are being resolved. It is a reassertion of control over our own policy agenda.

The proposed legislation need not offend Vietnam. It contains a provision that, in effect, gives Hanoi credit for any vested funds in any future bilateral negotiations with the United States leading up to normalization--where all outstanding claims will be resolved. In addition, it includes a provision giving the President the authority to defer the vesting if, in his judgment, it should in any way threaten progress on humanitarian issues that are being discussed by our two countries.

As a second step I urge the Administration to review the prohibition on trade and investment in Vietnam by American firms. Americans are complaining, with increasing urgency, of their inability to compete with the Thai, Japanese, Singaporean, Taiwanese, French and others who are actively pursuing commercial ventures in Vietnam. I believe it is time to unshackle American enterprises and allow them to join the competition for opportunities in Vietnam. Such a step is entirely separate from normalization. Until full normalization, the barriers on government bilateral and multilateral assistance to Vietnam will remain. But if Washington relaxes the trade ban, it will then be up to Hanoi to respond--in Cambodia and on MIA/POWs--in a way that demonstrates a comparable desire to leave the past behind and move forward.