Where Are the Spoils of Peace? : Nicaragua: People are taking to the streets to demand economic relief, not to bring back the Sandinistas.

During this month’s strikes in Nicaragua, the paving-stone barricades, the handkerchief masks and the gunshots all looked like a reprise of the 1979 Sandinista insurrection that overthrew the Somoza dictatorship. But this was not a Sandinista attempt against the coalition government elected earlier this year. It was merely a logical expression of frustration that the government, chosen in an election that was conducted under the shadow of U.S. power, has not addressed major national problems.

The American people, their Congress and the Nicaraguan people were all affected by the Reagan Administration policy, a puerile anti-communism whose roots reached deep into an illegal, subterranean world. Then the Bush Administration converted the 10 years of military and economic punishment into a bribe: The United States would ease up on the war and end the economic embargo if Washington’s preferred candidate, Violeta Barrios de Chamorro, won the election. The Sandinistas had agreed to call the election earlier than required by Nicaragua’s constitution, believing that the Contras would be demobilized before the voting, as the Central American presidents’ agreement had stipulated. But, with the Administration’s support, the Contras did not demobilize, which made it difficult for the Sandinistas to campaign on ending the draft.

When the voters rejected the Sandinistas, they were seeking--and expecting--relief from the economic hardships they suffered as well as an end to the U.S.-sponsored Contra war. President Chamorro’s devotion to reconciliation, with United Nations help, has brought the war to a close. But, instead of the jobs and economic reactivation she promised, the population has seen austerity, “structural adjustment,” “privatization,” currency devaluation and other measures that leave the poor worse off while new government bureaucrats collect fat salaries, reportedly paid in dollars.

The recent disturbances challenged neo-liberal policies that will indefinitely postpone long awaited relief. Although Sandinista-organized, the strikes tapped such profound discontent that the Sandinista leadership began urging an end to the barricades and seizures of buildings. The military and police, still largely Sandinista, performed professionally during the strikes and obeyed presidential orders, Politically, the Sandinistas’ complaint is not with the election’s outcome, but with their historic contribution’s being erased by the schemers behind Violeta’s throne, like Vice President Virgilio Godoy’s supporters who called for U.S. intervention.

Given the Bush Administration’s emphasis on democracy, the Nicaraguan election outcome should be hailed as a great success. A peaceful transition, a depoliticized civilian-controlled army, (in strong contrast to El Salvador’s), multiparty pluralism, vigorous civic-interest groups--these have all been applauded in Eastern Europe. But, having achieved “democracy” in Nicaragua after the election, the U.S. agenda is far from complete; it hasn’t achieved public acceptance of a private-sector-driven, “trickle down” development model. Achieving this seems less likely than ever in light of the widespread strikes and other protests. Washington’s options have dangerously narrowed. Will another U.S. invasion be necessary to seal the Nicaraguan election of 1990?

Perhaps the strongest voice against intervention was that of Chamorro. While it may get her in trouble with Washington, she has made it clear that she will deal with the Sandinistas realistically and seek to reach a negotiated modus vivendi with them. The reaction of the Godoy faction during the strikes also suggests that it’s not in the Sandinistas’ interests to destabilize the Chamorro government and give an opening to the interventionists.

Thus, the recent events, chaotic as they may seem to us, are an effort to create rules of the game that reflect the post-election realities.

If this process is allowed to continue, a far more solid and meaningful national consensus may emerge. It could serve as a bellwether for other Central American countries, particularly El Salvador, where, despite several elections, national tensions may be resolved only through the present round of U.N.-mediated negotiations.

Negotiations--in the street or around the bargaining table--are crucial for the groups battered by years of war and repression. Failure to support this process will lead to more war and intervention. Many wonder if Washington is finally able to appreciate this.