DANGER: Arabian Quicksand : Long-Term Intervention Runs a Risk of Stalemate

As the danger of a full-scale confrontation between Iraq and the United States diminishes each strategic hour that Saddam Hussein lets slip by, the Bush Administration may be getting into a far more precarious position in the Middle East.

The powerful combination of U.S. land, sea and air forces being deployed in Saudi Arabia and the Persian Gulf would almost certainly win a war--and international acclaim for preventing the bully of Baghdad from seizing oil fields vital to both the industrialized and developing worlds. But U.S. policy is vulnerable to failure in a protracted war of attrition that turns into a popularity contest. Hussein has already attempted to transform his aggression into a fight for the Arab soul, pitting Arab nationalism against foreign intervention.

A stalemate could be more costly to U.S. credibility and reputation in the region than outright conflict. The precedents established in the world’s first post-Cold War crisis could shape the pattern of diplomacy and military response for decades. After taking the lead in deploying containment forces, if the world’s only remaining superpower is unable to counter the aggression of a tin-pot dictator, the way opens for a new arms race. Third World countries will almost certainly feel forced to scramble for arms--especially comparatively cheap chemical and biological weapons--to protect themselves. Without a superpower shield, everyone may feel vulnerable.

Long-term intervention to strengthen Saudi Arabia and the other vulnerable gulf sheikdoms could ultimately weaken them. Their legitimacy will be undermined as they are perceived, at home and in the region, as dependent on or dictated to by Washington. The Arab League voted on Friday to join the Western-led effort. But the vote--with three opposed and two abstentions--leaves open the danger of further polarization in the Arab world. The decision to dispatch U.S. forces included an implicit change of agenda. The unprecedented international unity displayed at the United Nations was aimed at condemning aggression in the post-Cold War era and protecting the sovereignty and territorial integrity of today’s nations. But, in the positioning of tens of thousands of U.S. soldiers in the desert kingdom, the Bush Administration quantitatively upped the stakes to include a third goal: ousting Saddam Hussein.

Whatever the official position, the U.S. deployment makes a realistic compromise on anything less virtually impossible.

Even if Hussein withdraws from all or most of Kuwait, under pressure from the outside world and his Arab “brothers,” he would remain president-for-life at home. Retreating might cost Hussein the booty of his conquest, notably access to rich Kuwaiti oil fields and a vital gulf port. But he would still have accomplished his underlying goal: creating and leading a regional superpower with control over oil pricing, borders and Arab political direction. Under those circumstances, a U.S. withdrawal would leave the nervous gulf states--and the oil-guzzling outside world--effectively captive to his unpredictable whims.

In other words, once mired in the crisis, the United States will find it difficult to pull out completely unless Hussein is removed. There are no other easy escape routes. Even with a massive purchase of sophisticated arms and war planes, as now seems likely, vast but sparsely populated Saudi Arabia is unlikely to be able to deter Iraq for the foreseeable future.

By late last week, Bush Administration officials were reluctantly conceding the deployment could last months and perhaps more than a year. Meanwhile, Arab leaders from both ends of the political spectrum were issuing warnings about the political consequences of an indefinite U.S. presence. A prolonged war of nerves could be in the offing.

Even for Arabs who fear or loathe Hussein because of his thuggery--as many do--there is a subtle but important distinction between drawing a “line in the sand” and trespassing--as U.S. Marines learned painfully in Beirut between 1982 and 1984.

The majority of Arab governments appear to have supported the initial two-pronged diplomatic and economic squeeze that might have ultimately included the Iraqi leader’s ouster. Most recognize that unless Hussein is checked, he may engage in military or political misadventures elsewhere.

But the added component of a foreign military presence with an open-ended mandate seems to rub the wrong way--especially at a critical political juncture.

As with the rest of the world, the 22-member Arab bloc is undergoing a major transition. Frustrated by the failure to solve a deepening morass of economic and political problems, Arabs are now in quest of new ideas and strong leadership to provide alternatives. The political spectrum is in the process of being reshaped.

For the past three years, a handful of regimes have begun testing the waters of pluralism. Other quarters have been flirting with various forms of Islamic fundamentalism, most far tamer than the version in Tehran and not necessarily incompatible with democracy. Ironically, Hussein’s totalitarian vision of radical confrontation was on the decline--until last week.

As was evident at the Arab League summit in Cairo on Friday, Hussein is now trying to shift the focus from his aggression to the intrusion of a foreign military; to paint the crisis as a confrontation between the United States and the Arab world instead of one between Iraq and an Arab neighbor.

Refusing even to address the basic issues, Hussein, in his broadcast address from Baghdad, instead inflamed passions and called on the Arab world to wage a jihad (holy war) against Western forces in the gulf. He urged uprising against “agents of foreigners” and called for overthrow of the Saudi royal family. In a part of the world that only won independence from colonial masters after World War II, this remains a volatile issue that strikes deep.

Although the invasion of Kuwait was clearly aimed at expanding his personal power, Saddam is appealing to Arab brothers on the grounds that the emirs, kings and sultans of the Arabian peninsula sold out to Western interests. Keeping the price of oil low benefitted only the West, he argues, which in turn is responsible for keeping Israel alive and blocking the Palestinian right to a homeland. He may actually win some support by arguing that the multinational “effort” to squeeze him arises not from world outrage over his conquest of Kuwait, but instead from the West’s loss of Kuwait as a pliable ally.

The danger of this appeal is two-fold. First it replants the seeds of extremism that the West had slowly begun to counter through diplomatic pressure--most notably in Palestine Liberation Organization chief Yasser Arafat’s 1988 renunciation of terrorism. In 1982, Iraq was taken off the U.S. list of “state sponsors of terrorism.” Within a year, the notorious Palestinian renegade, Abu Nidal, was expelled from his Iraqi headquarters. But today he is rumored to be back in business in Baghdad. And Arafat was among the three Arab League members to vote against dispatching Arab forces against Hussein.

Any conflict involving the United States and Iraq is now less likely to be fought in the Saudi oil fields and more likely to be played out anonymously against Western airplanes or in Arab streets--actions against which tens of thousands of U.S. troops will find it difficult to respond.

Second, even small leakage in the Arab world jeopardizes the effectiveness of the political isolation and economic sanctions aimed to force Hussein into retreat. At the moment, Iraq could survive economic sanctions between three and six months, according to U.S. estimates.

That was roughly the same projection made about Rhodesia, the only other country universally sanctioned by both East and West, in 1967. It survived 13 years--in large part because of a lone ally, South Africa. But in the interim, the white minority government transformed an economy 95% dependent on imports to 95% self-sufficiency--while also enduring a civil war. And Rhodesia didn’t have any oil.

A predominantly agricultural country, it did have abundant sources of food--which may be arid Iraq’s greatest short-term vulnerability. Baghdad imports 70% of its food. Although the Bush Administration has officially included foodstuffs in the cutoff, the U.N. resolution does provide for humanitarian aid.

“Down the road, pictures of starving women and children could become a problem for us,” a State Department official said last week.

Hussein clearly miscalculated in invading Kuwait. And the United States may still achieve its ultimate goal. Despite his Draconian grip on the country, the sudden and swift toppling of Eastern Europe’s communist despots underscores the vulnerability of even Saddam Hussein. Many believe his long-repressed people may indeed react to prolonged isolation and hardships. Iraqis, who have a literacy rate of 89%, may be repressed, but they are not unaware of what is going on elsewhere in the world.

But even the best-case scenario may come at a cost for the United States. Although other nations are now signing on to the military presence in the Gulf, it will still be seen as U.S.-orchestrated.

More important, it could distract and even undermine the Arab world from the vital long-term process of moving toward moderation--what the United States needs to secure peace and stability in the Middle East.

The Bush Administration quantitatively upped the stakes to include a third goal: ousting Saddam Hussein.