NEWS ANALYSIS : Hussein Misjudged Invasion Response, Arab Observers Say : Diplomacy: The Iraqi leader expected a “toothless condemnation” from the West, and banked on a misperception of Arab unity.

As Iraq’s strongman Saddam Hussein puts out feelers for peace talks, Arab observers here have begun to second-guess their neighbor and suggest that he has miscalculated, not only on the Western response to his invasion of Kuwait but on Arab reaction as well.

There is, however, a deep split in opinion over whether Hussein, who views his reputation as a man of action as being at stake, can go so far as to sacrifice the ultimate prize of his invasion, the tiny, oil-rich emirate. While some Arab observers see hints that Hussein could withdraw from Kuwait given the right face-saving gestures, others say that he is willing to give in only on peripheral issues.

In the pessimistic view, Hussein is clinging to his initial perception that the West and the world at large will not risk war in order to reinstate a toppled royal family of desert sheiks. Instead, he believes, the West will be satisfied with guarantees that oil will flow smoothly from the Persian Gulf and that other gulf states, especially Saudi Arabia, need not fear an invasion. This view holds, however, that Hussein if pressed will go to war rather than give up Kuwait.

“Saddam, I am sure, was caught off guard by the response of the West. If anything, he only expected a toothless condemnation. Clearly, there has been a big miscalculation,” said a prominent historian and expert on Iraqi affairs.

No one interviewed for this article was willing to let his name be published. And some openly said that they feared reprisals if they spoke critically of Hussein.

The analysts say that Hussein failed to understand the significance of vast changes in Europe and the Soviet Union over the past year. Even after the invasion, he thought that Moscow and perhaps China would turn against their old adversary, the United States.

“He was still operating on outdated information,” said an expert on Iraq who has visited Baghdad in recent days.

Last week, Hussein sent an emissary to Moscow to try to dissuade the Soviet leadership from backing U.N. trade sanctions. Jordan’s foreign minister, Marwan Kassem, made a similar appeal to China on Iraq’s behalf, Jordanian officials say. The results of both trips seem to have gone against Iraq; China and the Soviet Union voted with the United States and other countries to support the use of military force to block trade with Baghdad and bar the shipment of weapons to Iraq.

Hussein also appeared to have misjudged the willingness of President Bush to take the lead in opposing the invasion, experts say. “It did not occur to him that Bush would make this a personal campaign. I’m sure he was surprised at the verbal insults,” said the recent traveler to Baghdad in reference to Bush’s description of Hussein as a liar.

In addition to the strategic misperceptions, Hussein seems to have misplayed certain tactical maneuvers, notably by taking hostages.

Hussein has tried to apply tribal politics to a sophisticated world crisis and caused unexpected negative reactions, one former high-ranking Jordanian official said.

“In traditional Arab and Muslim culture, making someone a ‘forced guest’ is an acceptable norm of behavior. It is not considered aggressive, but an invitation to talk,” the former official said. “Saddam would not have done it if he thought it was wrong.

“Instead of getting a soft response, his image in the West has been further shattered, especially after his use of children in a televised appearance to promote a benign image. I would not have done it myself,” said the retired official, shaking his head forlornly.

Arab observers believe that in Hussein’s mind, the textbook example of how the West is supposed to respond to the detention of foreigners was provided by Austria’s President Kurt Waldheim, who visited Baghdad on Saturday. Waldheim made a pitch for a diplomatic solution to the crisis and came away from Iraq with a planeload of about 90 Austrian citizens who were stranded there.

Hussein’s direct knowledge of the West is limited, Jordanians who have been in contact with him say, and they are not surprised that his handling of diplomacy has been clumsy. Hussein has visited only one Western country, France.

“He is neither well-versed nor well-advised. He knows nothing about the corridors of power in the West,” said a prominent newspaper columnist.

The Iraqi leader’s perspective on Arab countries may also be defective because of a relative lack of travel. He was exiled in Syria many years ago and studied law in Cairo, but in power, he rarely leaves Iraq for fear that his government might be toppled by a coup in his absence. Even for Arab summits, Hussein frequently sends underlings to represent him.

In public relations, Hussein has banked on feelings of Arab unity and Islamic solidarity to gain popular support in the Arab world. Some analysts believe he has an unrealistic idea of how much backing he will receive from Muslim fundamentalists. Moreover, he has ignored another trend in Arab political life--local patriotism.

The concept of Arab unity--the notion that Arabs form a single people from the Atlantic to the Persian Gulf--is held dear by Arab intellectuals and common people, who are taught in school about the glories of past Arab empires. But even before the creation of 20th-Century states, whose boundaries were carved out of the desert by Western powers, local loyalties often competed with the ideal of pan-Arab unity.

On a tribal level, in the desert vastness of Arabia and among the great civilizations along the Nile and Euphrates rivers and in the fertile crescent that includes historic Syria and Palestine, the tension between the two conceptions of peoplehood is being put to the test by Hussein’s invasion. In the gulf states, patriotism is being revived as recruits for military service in the rich oil emirates drive up in Mercedes-Benzes to join the army.

Jordanians are betting that pan-Arab unity will win out, especially if Iraq is under attack by Western armies.

“If Arabs have to choose, they will eventually choose Iraq,” a Palestinian businessman declared.

Hussein’s appeal to Islam is undermined by his attack on Iran a decade ago and by his long record as an unreligious, socialist ideologue. Islam differs from the pan-Arab ideal in that it encompasses not only the Arab world, but Muslim believers as far away as Malaysia and Indonesia.

“On the one hand, Muslims are with Hussein because he fights the infidel,” said the Jordanian historian. “But on the other hand, they hold a grudge against him for his war with Iran.”

In that context, his surrender of territory won in the long and bloody war with Iran can be seen as a concession not only to free his own troops from duty on the Iranian front, but also as a gesture to fundamentalists.

Most observers say that Hussein will keep Kuwait not only because it offers him instant new oil wealth, but because to let it go would undermine his pan-Arab ideological platform.

Others see signs of a compromise in his offer to discuss all problems in the gulf with the United States and other countries. He might be able to relax his control of Kuwait through some device, such as withdrawing not in favor of the deposed Sabah royal family, but in favor of someone else of his choosing. Or he might offer Kuwait a special status that would provide the illusion of autonomy but give Baghdad effective control over the property--and oil.

These are the kinds of solutions that Jordanians inside government and out hint at when they speak of an Arab solution.

In Jordan, at least, even these ideas depend on the withdrawal of foreign forces first. “We define the presence of foreign troops in Saudi Arabia as the primary problem, and nothing can happen without their withdrawal,” said a political scientist.

So far, the Bush Administration and the United Nations have insisted on the one thing that Hussein refuses to do. He must withdraw from Kuwait and restore what President Bush calls the legitimate government of Kuwait in order to end the crisis.