PERSPECTIVE ON THE SUMMIT : A Partnership Has Its First Test : Moscow has value as a bridge to Baghdad, and Bush needs Gorbachev’s cooperation--but check the price tag carefully.

The Sunday summit in Helsinki is both a symbol of the new superpowers relationship and its first serious test. So far, the Persian Gulf crisis has seen the United States and the Soviet Union acting in concert, pursuing different but overlapping goals. The Bush-Gorbachev meeting will show how much their differences limit their cooperation.

The superpowers need each other to achieve their regional goals. Without at least tacit Soviet support, the United States cannot isolate Iraq, deter further aggression and compel Saddam Hussein to restore the status quo in Kuwait. The image of “Saddam against the world”--key to U.S. policy--can be advanced only with Soviet cooperation. For the Soviets, such collaboration could secure what 30 years of costly involvement in the Middle East did not: the role of coequal.

But continued Soviet cooperation should not be taken for granted. The superpowers’ interests are mutually supportive; they are not identical. To avoid surprise and costly mistakes, Soviet goals must be factored into the U.S. strategy at the summit and beyond.

First, it is worth noting that the Soviets had little choice but to condemn Iraq. The invasion and annexation destroyed a growing relationship with Kuwait from which Moscow intended to draw significant dividends. It also, as one Soviet spokesman noted, “gave the United States a pretext to get both feet firmly planted in the gulf, thus securing for itself enduring presence and influence in this strategic region”--a change in the balance of power that is clearly not beneficial to Moscow.

A keen sense of strategic priorities determines Moscow’s stand. On the global chessboard, the relationship with the West is dominant; Iraq is merely a pawn. The economic, political and military benefits accruing to Moscow from its alliance with Baghdad are dwarfed by the expected advantages of siding with the West and such key Arab nations as Saudi Arabia, Egypt and Syria. As Pravda succinctly put it: “Saddam Hussein owes Moscow $20 billion, but the Soviet Union could obtain considerably more from the West.”

Money is not the only consideration. The Soviets expect other tangible rewards, from relaxed technology transfers to arms-control concessions. This “linkage” is likely to be raised at the summit. If so, the Soviets will be reminded that supporting international sanctions against Iraq was not only the right thing to do; it was also in their interest.

The economic calculus is anything but clear-cut. As the world’s largest oil producer, the Soviet Union can expect an initial windfall from soaring oil prices, even if export quotas remain unchanged. According to one Soviet analysis, “at $30 a barrel, the Soviet Union would increase its oil revenue by $7.25 billion--the equivalent of its entire trade deficit for 1989.” A similar jump in the price of gold--at 300 tons a year, another key export--could also bring a handsome profit and a much-needed economic boost. But an oil-driven recession in the West is hardly in Moscow’s long-term interest. To quote Pravda : “The Soviet Union does not want the collapse of Western economies, as it is trying to obtain economic assistance from them.”

At the summit, both superpowers will need to reconcile these conflicting considerations.

Operation Desert Shield requires an even more complex balancing act. The Soviets do not want to see the United States firmly entrenched--or bogged down--in the Persian Gulf. To put their house in order, they need a stable international environment, reduced Western defense spending and ready access to international credits, investment and technology. War in the Persian Gulf would diminish these prospects, forcing the Soviets to make some hard choices. Hence Moscow’s preference for a diplomatic solution, particularly one allowing it to share the glory but avoid blame.

A Soviet bid for a political settlement might be forthcoming. Soviet commentators maintain that a permanent channel of communication, consultation and even influence with Iraq remains open. They say that the Soviet Union “enjoys authority with all sides to the conflict, retains the Iraqi leadership’s trust, and has a solid experience of contacts with all regional players. This guarantees that any Soviet initiative will be favorably received.” If so, the Soviets might be in a position to help Hussein back off from the brink--provided he is ready.

The issue of Soviet military advisers in Iraq should be viewed in a similar light. Western analysts have asserted that the advisers remain against Gorbachev’s better judgment and only because troglodytes are circumventing official policy. That is nonsense.

The very nature of Soviet politics leaves little room for rogue operations. Most important, removing the advisers from Iraq may not be in the West’s best interest. The 193 acknowledged “military specialists” are unlikely to have a significant operational impact, even if hostilities were to break out. Conversely, the advisers--and thousands of Soviet-educated Iraqi officers--could serve as an important bridge to the Iraqi military, both for now and with an eye to a post-Hussein regime. This could be the dowry the Soviets bring to Helsinki.