Negotiating Phased Withdrawal from Philippine Bases Is Easy Part : Security: The country’s political and economic problems, plus Aquino’s sliding popularity, could make any agreement academic.

Both Manila and Washington now agree that a sharp reduction of the U.S. military presence in the Philippines is inevitable. The central issues are: How fast the scale-down will occur; whether, as U.S. negotiator Richard Armitage has suggested, “some measure of U.S. presence on Philippine bases” will remain, and the “price.” Senior U.S. officials are confident some “access” to Philippine facilities can be negotiated. But a host of technical and legal issues, and uncertainty about President Corazon Aquino’s ability to mobilize political support for an agreement, leave uncertain whether the two sides will reach that point.

As tensions with the Soviet Union have diminished and regional crises have become more critical, the United States has been rethinking its security requirements in the Asia-Pacific region. One preliminary result is that the military importance attached to the Philippine facilities has declined, even though access to some of them will remain useful for some time.

The U.S. military is, however, anxious that changes be implemented gradually. Aquino seemed to accept as much last week, when she said she supported an “orderly withdrawal.” For Washington, that means at least 10-12 years; for Filipinos, most likely three to eight years, with Clark Air Base coming fully under hilippine control even sooner. But the difference seems clearly negotiable.

Washington intensified its search for alternative military bases in the region at the end of 1989, when Singapore offered to provide limited air and naval access. Negotiations are nearly complete, delayed only by delicate bargaining over how rigorously the country’s draconian narcotics laws are applied to U.S. servicemen. Brunei wants to discuss similar arrangements, as does Malaysia.

None of these possible facilities would offer the flexibility, size, convenience orfreedom of use that the United States has had in the Philippines. Collectively, however, the foreign bases could, with relatively small forces and at relatively low cost, help sustain U.S. presence, influence and prestige in the region.

The United States currently favors turning to facilities in Japan and Hawaii for its major bases and home ports. For some purposes, however, a few bases in the Philippines--the Subic Bay shipyards for repair, the Cubi Point and Crow Valley training and exercise facilities--are either much cheaper or simply irreplaceable. Many Philippine officials privately say they would like to work out some mutually acceptable arrangements. But agreement on conditions and compensation may be difficult. The rapidly deteriorating economy adds to the obstacles.

In this environment, efforts to extract the highest possible price from the United States are politically almost irresistible. Philippine negotiators seek a firm compensation commitment, not U.S. “best efforts” on aid levels, as in the past. But members of the U.S. Congress are unlikely to want to pay more for declining access in the Philippines.

Manila has told Washington it would like a new, more comprehensive treaty with the United States, in which defense cooperation is one aspect of a broad range of relationships. Washington has tried to avoid such portmanteau arrangements, preferring separate bilateral pacts on specific issues.

Nor is the Philippine bargaining position strong. The country’s domestic problems--political and security--are as grim as its economic health. During the last year, a series of bombings in Manila have unnerved the public; the government has been unable to track down and arrest renegade military officers and troops; violence and threats to U.S. civilians and servicemen have forced a withdrawal of the Peace Corps, some military personnel and their families, and put Philippine “hospitality” facilities outside U.S. bases off limits after dark. Aquino’s popularity, meantime, has plummeted, and she is engaged in trench warfare over a wide range of policies with her own party supporters in the legislature.

A visiting Philippine Cabinet member and close colleague of Aquino insisted earlier this month that Philippine democratic institutions could easily handle these challenges. Few in the Philippines agree with him. There is a broad consensus that the risk of a successful military coup remains uncomfortably high and that there are other threats to democracy in the Philippines that could paralyze not only base negotiations but the whole gamut of U.S.-Philippine relationships.

In this confusing murk, agreement on a phased withdrawal of U.S. forces from specific facilities, starting in 1991 and culminating in the late 1990s, seems the easy part. Most U.S. military personnel might then be replaced by Defense Department civilians or contract personnel who, along with Filipinos, could manage the facilities where access by U.S. military forces might continue. There would have to be agreement on what kind of access and for what purposes, but this should be manageable.

Compensation would be by contract rather than by ill-favored “best efforts” arrangements, with the level directly related to the value of the access. The United States would try to detach economic assistance and related programs from basing access, although political reality makes it certain that this would be taken into serious account by the Congress in calculating aid levels. U.S. and Philippine military forces, and those of a number of other Asian countries, would exercise cooperatively in areas like Crow Valley. The United States would provide substantial military assistance to the Philippines, and the U.S.-Philippine Defense Treaty would remain intact. There is every reason to believe such a solution would meet U.S. needs.

Could the Philippines accept it? The government, probably. But Philippine congressional opinion is even harder to calculate than American. It would require some intellectual slight-of-hand to rationalize the understanding with the 1986 Philippine Constitution’s requirement for a “treaty” to be concluded with the United States if there are any U.S. troops or facilities in the Philippines after 1991. Even that is conceivable.

But only the people and leaders of the Philippines can determine whether there will be an effectively functioning political and economic system and a strong government capable of implementing and abiding by such an agreement. That is what is increasingly uncertain.