From Tightrope to Tripwire : Avoid temptation to veer off the present course

The hardest part will be staying on course. Saddam Hussein is a master of the verbal taunt and we Americans are not that good at keeping our emotions under control. If we are not careful, that aspect of our character could lead us far astray in the Persian Gulf, unraveling the fabric of the international effort, playing into Iraq’s hands and leading to a bad end for the U.S. mission.

Saddam Hussein would dearly love to turn the tables on the United States and have this country, not he, viewed as the aggressor. That would allow him to pose as the protector of Islamic holy places in Saudi Arabia from the Western infidels and chip away at the Arab coalition that supports the United States’ unprecedented military involvement in the Persian Gulf area.

U.S. diplomacy--and willpower--will need to be strong if the nation is to persevere for whatever time period it is going to take to see this thing through. The temptation is to seize on some incident to justify a military escalation--indeed, to use some pretext as a tripwire and have it out with Iraq once and for all. That temptation must be resisted; it would be a grave mistake.

U.S. policy must not aim to provoke Baghdad. It must be to defend Saudi Arabia, to protect U.S. oil supplies and to deter aggression. Iraq’s withdrawal from Kuwait needs to be achieved through the persistent pressure of the international embargo--notched up by a U.N. Security Council resolution calling for an embargo by air in addition to the one by land and sea.

That route, though slow and perhaps frustrating, is to be preferred over a disproportionate response to an incident that by all logic should call for nothing more than a diplomatic tongue-lashing. An irrational escalation would do little to keep the international coalition together and do much to erode the moral basis of the U.S. involvement.

It’s a mistake to underestimate the embargo’s potential. Its dimensions are virtually unprecedented, so predictions that it will prove ineffective may be nothing more than an attempt at a self-fulfilling prophecy. And, if we require a reason to launch a direct attack--say a massive air strike--against Iraq, a tripwire incident would be redundant. The brutal Iraqi occupation of Kuwait would be reason enough.

In fact, the United States responded to that provocation quickly but cautiously. It’s only reasonable to approach this mean and ugly crisis with a policy that appeals to those nations that haven’t been our close allies, as well as to those who have, and that seeks to minimize the loss of life. A direct attack on Iraq, or Kuwait for that matter, would run a high risk of many thousands of casualties.

Of course a direct attack by Iraq on U.S. forces would be something else. That act of war would have to be dealt with. And there could be other Iraqi provocations--an invasion elsewhere, a terrorist operation--that would require a military response. But otherwise, U.S. policy needs to stay its slow, steady, incremental, careful and ultimately wise course. It’s not an emotionally satisfying response to the reprehensible Hussein, but it may be a winning one.