The Enemy of My Friend Is a Friend : U.S. struggles to arm Saudis, not alienate Israel

The United States has given firm assurances that it will stand by its commitment to Israel’s security, even being prepared--according to State Department sources--to respond militarily to any Iraqi attack on Israel. The immediate cause for this pledge was Baghdad’s threat to move against Israel if Iraq finds itself at war because of its aggression against Kuwait.

In the face of such belligerence it’s inevitable that Israelis would look to their defenses and weigh the option of striking first rather than waiting to be struck. It’s this possibility of a preemptive response, which would make a shambles of U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf, that Washington wants to forestall.

Israel has also been made fidgety by the Bush Adminis- tration’s plans to sell $20 billion in armaments to Saudi Arabia, including advanced ground and air weapons. Saudi Arabia--like Iraq, Jordan, Syria and virtually every other Arab state except Egypt--remains technically in a state of war with Israel and therefore a country Israelis eye with a certain wariness. As a practical matter, those in charge of Israel’s security don’t waste a lot of time worrying about being attacked by today’s Saudi regime. But they do worry about what a future Saudi regime might do, especially one impelled by religious or political fanaticism to pursue a far more aggressive course. Many in Congress share that worry.

That’s why the Administration is cutting up its proposed arms-sales package to Saudi Arabia into different pieces. It will ask for about $7 billion worth of weapons right now, waiting until next year to request close to twice that amount. This makes sense. The Saudis have certain clear and compelling military requirements brought on by Iraq’s aggression and the need to expand their armed forces. Congress shouldn’t sign any contract without reading it, but the Saudis’ immediate needs merit sympathy.

But much more questioning scrutiny has to be given to Saudi Arabia’s longer-term weapons plans, including buying large quantities of the best that U.S. arms makers have to offer. The Saudis, three or four years hence, may indeed still be under threat from Iraq or Iran. It’s also possible that three or four years from now internal upheaval will have put their country into the hands of radicals who would pose an entirely new regional danger, not least to Israel. The lesson of what happened in Iran in 1979 must never be forgotten. A year, five years, 10 years from now, it’s a good bet that Israel will still be a friend of the United States. The same can’t necessarily be said of its neighbors.

The United States is committed to maintaining Israel’s qualitative military superiority, its technological edge over hostile Arab states armed with more planes, tanks, guns and missiles. That qualitative advantage is the first line of Israel’s security, to which the United States has just recommitted itself. High among Congress’ tasks, as it considers the Saudi arms deal, is to weigh whether this edge could be jeopardized if Israel’s unfriendly neighbors are given access to the best that U.S. arsenals contain.