Takakazu Kuriyama : Overcoming Japan’s Past to Get On With Its Future

For the first time since the end of World War II, Japan is debating whether to send armed forces overseas to perform noncombat missions.

Article 9 of Japan’s constitution, adopted during the postwar U.S. occupation, declares that “land, sea, and air forces, as well as any other war potential, will never be maintained.” But the Japanese government has claimed that a clause renouncing “the use of force as a means of settling international disputes” allows the country to establish “Self Defense Forces” for deployment in Japanese territory only.

Now, in submitting a “U.N. Peace Cooperation Bill” to Parliament, Prime Minister Toshiki Kaifu’s government has broadened that interpretation--without admitting it. It claims the bill’s noncombat limitation upholds the spirit of Article 9.

The bill, if approved, would enable Japan to send troops for noncombat missions to the Middle East and to such trouble spots as Cambodia, if a U.N. peacekeeping mission is dispatched there in the future.

So controversial is the bill that debate inside the government and the ruling party over its contents consumed even more time than Japan’s decision to approve $4 billion in aid to the U.S.-led multinational forces and front-line countries in the Middle East.

Many Asian countries, victims of Japan’s past aggression, have raised cries that the move would resurrect Japanese militarism. Many Japanese have expressed fears that it represents a step toward Japan assuming a role as a military giant that it has shirked for the last 45 years.

But to some Americans, the bill, even if enacted, would still leave Japan with a privileged position in the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty--the United States burdened not only with an obligation to defend Japan but also with the task of providing combat troops to deal with such conflicts as the Middle East crisis with no reciprocity from Japan.

Lacking a majority in the upper house of Parliament, Kaifu may fail to get the bill approved. Whatever the outcome, the debate has raised fundamental questions about the role of Japan in a world no longer dominated by the United States and the Soviet Union.

Vice Foreign Minister Takakazu Kuriyama, 59, Japan’s senior career diplomat, has been in the eye of the typhoon of debate that has raged within the government over the gulf crisis.

A former ambassador to Malaysia, Kuriyama has been in Japan’s foreign service since 1954. He headed the Foreign Ministry’s North American Division, and, as deputy vice foreign minister, led Japan’s negotiations seeking a long-delayed peace treaty with the Soviet Union before assuming his current post in May, 1989.

His late father, Shigeru, also was a career diplomat and a Supreme Court judge.

Question: What kind of structure does Japan see for a new international order?

Answer: The structure itself must be of a rather evolutionary nature. . . . We would certainly like to broaden the kind of trilateral political consultations (conducted by Japan, the United States and Western Europe) that have been gradually evolving over the past year or so.

Previously, we had only the economic summit and consultations at the political directors’ level in preparation for the G-7 summit. . . . (Now) political consultations (are being) conducted informally at similar levels not necessarily in connection with preparations for G-7 summits. . . . I think these informal consultations may eventually grow into a more institutionalized structure. . . .

Q: The trouble your government has had in finalizing a bill to dispatch overseas personnel to make non-military contributions in the gulf crisis suggests it may be difficult for you to make a contribution to a new political order.

A: First, let me emphasize there is widespread recognition among the Japanese that we . . . have to play a more active and responsible economic and political role in close cooperation with other industrial democracies.

Secondly, there is also a solid consensus among the Japanese that our contributions should not be of a military nature. . . . In the foreseeable future, it is not possible for Japan to share international responsibility in playing a regional or global military role.

This is because of the constitution. I wouldn’t call it constitutional constraint--because it’s not the kind of thing that is imposed on us. It is self-imposed. But this is the restriction the Japanese people would like to continue to support.

Looking at Japan from outside, that Japan is not going to play an international military role may be perceived as inaction in response to an international crisis, such as the gulf crisis.

(Rejection of any international military role) is the basic position we have maintained over the postwar years and that we will be maintaining in the foreseeable future. . . . That’s (why) we have to pursue a foreign policy with an unassuring posture.

In a situation where military power plays a decisive role, or a major role--such as the gulf--it’s obvious we will not be a major player, even though we can be a useful supporting player. And this is a role we think we should play in the gulf crisis.

But we also believe that, in the coming decade, there will a number of critical areas . . . economic, financial, technological and political . . . in which military power does not necessarily play a decisive role. We think we can be a more positive, a more active player, in cooperation with other friends.

Q: But what about the trouble you have had over the bill to dispatch personnel overseas?

A: Well, this bill . . . will be our first experiment in trying to set up a legal framework by which the government can dispatch personnel to have a physical presence in international activities for the purpose of defending, restoring and maintaining peace. And because it is the first experiment ever undertaken by Japan in the postwar years, it has to go through a wide public debate . . . . We are a democracy and we can’t decide major policy decisions simply by fiat. . . .

Q: Has there been sufficient debate about constitutional constraints on the military--not merely whether the Self Defense Forces should change their uniforms or not?

A: . . . . There is a solid consensus among the Japanese people that they like Article 9 of the constitution and they don’t want to change it. Of course, you could say the language in Article 9 is somewhat ambiguous. But I think there has been an established interpretation of Article 9, supported by the public, that the article prohibits Japan from participating in international arrangements for the defense of third countries; the reason why is that most Japanese believe maintaining Article 9 demonstrates our national commitment never to go back to prewar Japanese militarism--which wrought havoc not only to the Japanese but to other countries in the Asia-Pacific region.

Most Japanese people believe this past mistake should never be repeated and maintaining Article 9 of the constitution is an integral part of that commitment for the future of Japan.

Q: Japan’s youths don’t want to perform work that they consider “kiken, kitanai, and kitsui”--dangerous, dirty, and drudgery--but those are also the tasks you don’t want to perform in your security relationship with the United States. Under Japanese law, “assisting homicide” is a crime subject to the same punishment as homicide--so when you ask the United States to defend you, you have a common responsibility. Your statement presumes the Japanese have a natural propensity toward violence that can only be controlled by doing nothing at all. Is that correct?

A: . . . . Our argument is that military (aid) is not the only factor by which Japan’s international contributions--or for that matter, any country’s contributions--(should) be assessed or evaluated. We certainly believe we can be a useful player, a constructive player in international issues involving peace and security even though we will not be playing a military role.

I do not agree with the statement that a military role is the only kind of dirty role.

Q: But you seem to want to play the “clean” diplomatic role of giving foreign aid and then ask the United States to have its soldiers die in the dirty part. Why are the Japanese privileged to avoid the military responsibility other nations assume?

A: That’s one way to view it.

I think the kind of commitment we made after the war--that we will never be a major military power--is important not only in terms of maintaining domestic political cohesion but also it is critical for Japan to play an increasingly important political role in the Asia-Pacific region.

There is no doubt about the fact . . . that there is strong sensitivity on the part of our Asia-Pacific neighbors (about) whether or not Japan will maintain the commitment she has kept during the postwar years. Because of the memory of the past--the atrocities and all the other things committed by Japanese militarism, and the past colonialism--that sensitivity should be respected and taken into account by Japan in our foreign policy, our domestic policy and our defense policy.

Only by doing so do we believe that Japan’s foreign policy or Japan’s international posture can have acceptability and legitimacy in the Asia-Pacific region.

If we don’t have that kind of legitimacy and acceptability, we can play no significant role in this part of the world. Our influence will be seriously constrained. Our voice will not be heard. And consequently our role will be much diminished.

If we can’t play a larger political role in our geographical area, I don’t think we can play any better role in the region outside Asia and the Pacific. And I don’t think such a constrained Japan would be a useful partner for the United States.

When you talk about global partnership between the United States and Japan or the trilateral concept, we all assume that Japan’s role is accepted and respected by our neighbors.

If we can’t maintain domestic political cohesion, this will be exploited by some other countries. Our foreign policy will not be effective.

So, we think . . . our national commitment not to become a military power . . . has to be accepted by our friends and partners; and we don’t accept an argument that the Japanese people are unwilling to take up what is dangerous, dirty and drudgery.

Q: One role that does seem to have taken shape for Japan is “banker to the world.” Do you feel people are making unreasonable demands on you without consulting you?

A: This is a difficult process--this consultation. . . .

We have for some time argued with our American friends we don’t like the term, “burden-sharing,” and we much prefer “responsibility-sharing.”

Responsibility-sharing or policy consultations is a reciprocal process. One cannot simply decide a policy and ask your friends to share the cost. We think we . . . have to (get rid of) our postwar mentality and become more active.

At the same time, the United States must also grow out of the mentality to which they have become accustomed over the postwar years when the United States was the supreme actor on the international political and economic scene. The United States also has to learn the difficulties of responsibility-sharing with other countries. . . .

Sometimes, there is frustration on the part of the United States that Japan is foot-dragging. Sometimes, there is frustration on the part of Japan that we are simply being asked to foot the bill without being consulted.

I think this kind of frustration is quite natural because of the kind of process we have to go through--and which we are going through--to get both of us adjusted to roles different from what we had become used to for many years.

Q: You wrote that Japan’s “economic and technological power may be perceived as a new threat that could topple the United States from its leading role in the world.” Even if that may not be a conscious target of Japan, is that not the result of Japanese economic endeavor?

A: I think this perception that Japan has suddenly become an economic giant that threatens America and the American people is really an over-estimation or exaggeration of Japan’s economic power and also an under-estimation of the American power.

We still have a very strong appreciation of the overall strength of American economic power and we, for the moment, do not believe that in a real sense our economic and financial power has become a threat to the United States.

No doubt about it--the relative positions of the two countries have changed quite dramatically over the past decade or five years. That is true. But still that does not change the basic fact that you are, in overall terms, far, far stronger economically than Japan.

Of course, in many areas, we have become just as strong and as competitive as the United States. In a number of areas, perhaps, our competitiveness has gone ahead of you. But still, in overall terms, I think the Japanese people’s understanding is that you are still No. 1.

. . . . There is a sort of over-reaction on the part of a number of Americans that we are about to swallow you.

Q: What would the consequences be for Japan and Asia if the United States withdraws its troops in the future?

A: As the Soviet threat recedes, there is an argument that the United States should not and will not be playing a significant security role in the Asia-Pacific--let the Japanese and others take care of themselves. And as a result, our relationship will be more and more focused on economic problems, rather than political security.

I don’t think that is right. In the foreseeable future, even though East-West relations have undergone a dramatic change, . . . I think the political-security role the United States will play in this area will remain substantial. . . .

One reason is Japan will not be replacing the kind of role the United States has played. But also, in the interest of the United States, I strongly believe (your) . . . role should not be simply confined to defending your trade and economic interests . . . even though the Soviet threat is not so ominous as it used to be. If the United States thinks it is in its interest to remain a Pacific power, as well as an Atlantic power, and play a global role, then I don’t think there is any option but to continue to play a significant political and security role in Asia and the Pacific.