Hold the Debate, Then Take a Vote : A special session of Congress is needed on Iraq

Before it adjourned last month, Congress, in an extraordinary action, passed a resolution giving its leaders the power to summon the membership back into session “whenever, in their opinion, the public interest shall warrant it.” The public interest warrants such a step now. The congressional leadership should reconvene Congress for the specific purpose of debating and voting on a resolution approving the use of military force, if necessary, to deal with Iraqi aggression. If the leadership fails to act quickly, the President should recall Congress and put the same issue before it.

It’s time to reach at least a tentative accommodation on the vexing matter of whether Congress and the President are required to share power when it comes to committing the armed forces to war. The Constitution is far from being an illuminating guide on this matter, and its ambiguities have long fueled competitive claims between Congress and President. Congress is empowered to declare war and raise and support the armed forces. The President is given broad authority as commander-in-chief of those forces and as chief diplomat--”the sole organ of the nation in its external relations, and its sole representative with foreign nations,” as John Marshall said nearly two centuries ago. Who, then, has the determining voice in deciding when and where Americans might be sent into combat? The argument goes on. It is alternately passionate and contemplative, legalistic and practical. But it is also--given the demonstrated reluctance of the courts to take up the issue--probably ultimately unresolvable by the usual means.

Leaders of Congress insist that they must be “consulted” before the President takes the nation into war. It has never been quite clear what “consultation” means. Wars can erupt very quickly, surprise is often of vital importance, and the first few hours of combat can be decisive. How far in advance is the President expected to seek the advice and consent of Congress--of its senior leaders, if not of the entire 535-member body? And if circumstances have made military operations imminent, while Congress prefers to take time for reflection before giving the President its opinion, what then? Like the Constitution’s enumeration of war powers, here, too, ambiguity prevails.

Far less murky is Congress’ claim to be much more closely in touch with the mood of the people than is the President. That is an important point, not least to those military leaders who concluded in the aftermath of Vietnam that consistent domestic support was vital to the success of future wars. Right now the intensity of public backing for U.S. policy in the Persian Gulf seems uncertain, in no small part because Bush has not clearly enough articulated its objectives. Granted, too much can be made of wide and deep public support as a necessary precondition. From the Revolution--which John Adams calculated was backed by no more than one-third of the people--through Vietnam, America’s wars and their preludes have almost always provoked controversy and division. We are not a war-seeking people. All the more reason why the President must aim to build the broadest consensus for the contingency he faces.

Let Congress reconvene, let the President and his advisers give the best justifications they can for possibly going to war, let the debate proceed, and then let an up-or-down vote be taken. Approval for the war option would not automatically make war inevitable; on the contrary, it could finally move Saddam Hussein to get out of Kuwait without a shot having to be fired. Nor would such a full-dress debate necessarily undercut the President’s efforts to out-maneuver the resourceful and unprincipled Hussein; on the contrary, domestic debate of some kind is certain in any event. Congress demands to be “consulted.” Here is its chance; let the leadership seize it.