U.S. to Reassess Its Moscow Policy : Diplomacy: Officials fear a crackdown and repression but acknowledge that ‘we don’t have much leverage.’

The Bush Administration, alarmed by the dramatic resignation of Soviet Foreign Minister Eduard A. Shevardnadze, Friday launched a reassessment of its policy toward Moscow despite mounting evidence that the United States has very little room to maneuver.

“It is a tough situation for the U.S. government,” a State Department official said. “We can only do so much in the Soviet Union--it is a big place. It is not like Poland,” which is of more manageable size.

At this point, the greatest concern in Washington is that Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev may be elbowed aside by hard-liners in the military or the KGB or--probably more likely--may stage his own crackdown on dissent. That could produce the “dictatorship” situation that Shevardnadze warned about in his resignation speech.

But a senior Administration official said the U.S. government can do little more than send clear messages to Moscow, warning that such a development would severely damage Soviet relations with the rest of the world.

“I don’t have any illusions about our ability to stop it if it’s going to take place,” the official said. “When it comes right down to it, we don’t have much leverage.”

U.S. experts on the Soviet Union, both in and out of government, believe that repression, if it comes, will be relatively benign by Russian standards. These experts say that Gorbachev’s reforms have gone too far to permit a return to Stalinist methods.

“If they do crack down, there may well be resistance, maybe violent resistance but almost certainly strikes and slowdowns,” said Helmut Sonnenfeldt, a former State Department and National Security Council specialist on Soviet policy. “A crackdown would not produce peace and quiet very quickly.”

In the end, said Sonnenfeldt, now a senior fellow of the Brookings Institution in Washington, the crisis “may bring about the situation that Europeans are so concerned about--that Soviet citizens may pick up and leave for Western Europe.”

Most U.S. officials believe that even under the worst possible scenario, the U.S.-Soviet relationship would not return to the confrontational status of recent decades. On the other hand, even the optimists in Washington admit that the warm and cooperative relationship of recent years is unlikely to continue.

Even if the relationship cools substantially, the advances of the past few years are not likely to be reversed. For instance, the U.N. Security Council resolution authorizing the use of force in the Persian Gulf could not have been passed without Soviet support. But under U.N. rules, there is no way the resolution could be repealed, so continuing Soviet support, while highly desirable, is no longer essential.

The same can be said for German reunification and democratization in Eastern Europe. They would never have happened without Soviet support, but they can be expected to continue regardless of what happens in Moscow.

For the time being, Administration officials and most nongovernment experts agree, the United States must continue to do business as usual with Gorbachev’s government.

The Administration has begun a tentative effort to reach out to radicals and regional leaders who are impatient with the pace of reform in Moscow. But with Gorbachev now threatened by hard-liners who would like to stop reform in its tracks, U.S. officials say privately that it is in Washington’s interest to strengthen Gorbachev’s hand.

U.S. officials say they do not plan to cultivate a relationship with the hard-liners. But Sonnenfeldt noted that the Pentagon already has established relations with top officials of the Soviet military who certainly would be involved in any crackdown.

“In terms of giving them a political buildup, I am sure that is not the right thing to attempt,” Sonnenfeldt said. “In the current mood with Soviet conservatives, this would produce a backlash anyway.”

It seems clear that the Administration will go ahead with its cautious program of food and medical aid to the Soviet Union.

But officials say that the program is unlikely to be expanded because the tight U.S. budget rules out massive aid to Moscow.

Besides, a State Department official said, there is no certainty that an aid program would guarantee Gorbachev’s survival or even help the beleaguered Soviet economy very much.

“I would question how valuable a massive aid program would be in the Soviet Union,” the official said. “The Germans (who have begun substantial aid shipments) will learn that fast.”

A senior Administration official said that Gorbachev’s recent rightward tilt seems to be more of a tactical maneuver than a change in approach.

“Gorbachev seems to have decided that he needs to regain control over the situation--the place has been pretty much in free-fall,” the official said, adding that Gorbachev himself “doesn’t seem to see this as a strategic shift . . . he’s very tactical, he’s dealing with the immediate problem.”

Times staff writer David Lauter contributed to this story.