Iraqi Retreat From Kuwait No Solution Unless ‘Linked’ to Other Mideast Issues : Gulf: In Arab eyes, there are plenty of negotiating options short of war to assure honor. But can the U.S. separate Hussein from his cause?

In the uncertain theater of gulf politics, the signals sent by both sides are confusing and difficult to interpret. They will become more so. Should war prove unavoidable, efforts now to seek a negotiated settlement will diminish the chances that Saddam Hussein will be seen as an Arab martyr rather than an isolated, self-aggrandizing tyrant.

President Bush’s willingness to send Secretary of State James A. Baker III to Baghdad for talks with Hussein and to meet Iraq’s foreign minister in the White House still offers a major opportunity to create new outcomes to the crisis. Yet it is no longer possible to see just Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait as a real solution. There must be linkages to other festering issues in the Middle East, even if these links are formally denied. In the eyes of Hussein’s Arab friends and foes, the offer to talk is the first public sign that the White House is serious about exploring alternatives to war.

Allowing Hussein an exit at this point would be neither appeasement nor a reward for aggression. The words and actions of both Bush and Hussein have become charged with symbolic meanings and practical consequences beyond the issue of Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait. Even Hussein’s enemies concede his enhanced stature: He has stood up to the United States, whose vacillating policies (including those involving Iraq) are viewed with suspicion by many in the region; rekindled debate over the future of Israel’s occupied territories (an outcome that even Hussein’s Arab enemies welcome), and focused attention on the instability caused by vast inequalities between rich and poor Arab states.

For Bush, the confrontation with Iraq defines the practical limits of America’s role in the post-Cold War era. The United States and its allies can “win” any confrontation with Iraq but only at the price of sustained future political losses--unless the Arab public is convinced that every alternative to war has been pursued.

Less certain is our skill in achieving a negotiated solution on the seemingly intractable issues that will come under discussion. As past dealings with Iran show, the U.S. track record is uneven in its use of intermediaries and in tolerating apparently ambiguous outcomes. The delivery of a Bible and a cake to Tehran by Robert C. McFarlane and his associates in May, 1986, provides only a bizarre example of our shortcomings in understanding Middle Eastern traditions of honor, face-saving and negotiation.

From an Arab point of view, Bush’s offer to talk constitutes more than a face-saving gesture. It concedes nothing but publicly acknowledges Hussein as a worthy adversary, one who can be persuaded instead of humiliated and despised. In Middle Eastern terms, Hussein’s reputation remains intact so long as he can claim to work for a worthy collective cause. He may privately be considered dishonorable, but it is public claims that count, and his reputation as a dangerous person effectively silences the contrary opinions of those within his reach. We must separate the causes that Hussein represents, often opportunistically, from the person and not deny the justice of his avowed causes because we dislike the messenger.

Sudden reversal of tactics does nothing to lessen Hussein’s prestige, so a peaceful solution with no loss of face among his Arab public, the only public that counts for him, is still possible. His prior reversals, the most recent of which is his unconditional offer of peace with Iran and the relinquishment of his meager gains from a debilitating war, need not be explained in personality terms alone. Such a turnabout may seem surprising to Westerners because of our obsession with undying friendship, unconditional surrender and lasting peace. For Hussein’s Arab audience, the essence of human affairs is provisionality. In changed circumstances, only a fanatic would stick to the same course.

Without fanfare, several Arabian peninsula countries, for example, have recently agreed to demarcate their frontiers after decades of bitter disagreement. In the case of Saudi Arabia and Oman, Saudi Arabia’s reason for agreeing to a settlement was the unification of the two Yemens, a threat that may come to the fore once the crisis on its northern frontier abates. Settlements in the Middle East range between truces to agreements for “all time,” in the Western sense. They are the best that mortals can achieve. Both sides anticipate betrayal and the reversal of loyalties but do their best to make the price of reversals higher than the cost of continued compliance.

Consider Hussein’s labeling of Western and Japanese hostages as “guests,” an Orwellian term even to Iraqis. In the world of the Iraqi leader’s youth and in some parts of the Arab world today, the taking of hostages from adversary groups is a means of preventing violence until intermediaries can negotiate a settlement.

Western governments rightly deny being influenced by hostages, but it is not unreasonable to assume that their presence forestalled preemptive Western air strikes against strategic Iraqi installations. Hussein’s release of the hostages suggests that he now trusts the United States sufficiently to believe that negotiations can replace armed conflict. And even if the hostages have been replaced by an alternative deterrent--such as Iraq’s ability to inflict damage on Kuwaiti and Saudi oil fields--the public reading is that the time has come to negotiate.

All parties to the current crisis can still extricate themselves with honor. Repelling the aggression against Kuwait and achieving an Iraqi withdrawal was beyond the means of any neighboring Arab state, so an outside power was called in, allowing Iraq to label Kuwait and Saudi Arabia as traitors to the Arab cause. Nonetheless, the solidarity of world opinion against Hussein, backed by an international force that includes Arabs and other Muslims, has reconstituted the honor of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. These two countries have shown their strength through their allies and are now free to seek a settlement.

In Arab eyes, the United States shows honor by not yet using its overwhelming force against Iraq and in making every effort to allow Hussein an exit. Under Middle Eastern “rules,” the stronger party does not bully the weaker one into submission without offering alternatives to physical force, as the United States and its allies skillfully continue to do. The weaker party is then seen to be intransigent and resistant to reason, especially if bona fide intermediaries, such as the Algerians, are also invoked to serve as guarantors. In the Middle East, intermediaries must be involved to secure an effective settlement.

If war can be forestalled, the likely alternative is protracted negotiations, both open and covert, in which an Iraqi withdrawal from Kuwait will be only one element. Resolving the Arab-Israeli conflict and the massive inequalities of wealth between rich and poor states in the Arab world are real issues in the eyes of most Arabs, Israelis and Europeans.

Other “linkages” would require even more farsightedness by U.S. policy-makers, because they involve the participation of all states in the Middle East. A protracted U.S. presence in the gulf--now almost inevitable--will create expectations of U.S.-style democracy and popular participation on the autocratic Arabian peninsula. Kuwait’s government-in-exile is rising to this challenge; so must our other regional allies. Our long-term interests in the region lie with transformed polities in which an increasingly wide body of educated and informed citizens participate in major decisions, not with a narrow circle of rulers and their advisers who are often resistant to significant change.

If Hussein survives--and some argue that his total defeat would bring about greater instability than his continued existence--Egypt, Saudi Arabia, Israel, Syria and even Iran will have a common interest in containing him and weakening his power. It is not out of the question to envision an alliance or even a settlement of longstanding antagonisms between present-day adversaries as a result. Friends in the Middle East are often former enemies, for neither party harbors illusions about the other. Such a settlement would not wipe away the real and imagined injustices of the past but would pave the way to a less debilitating future. In Middle Eastern terms, that is a cause for hope.

Iraq can still consider a bold reversal of its course. Anwar Sadat claimed a “victory” over Israel in 1973--for so it is seen in many Arab eyes. It gave him the stature needed to fly to Jerusalem in 1977. Unfortunately, no current Middle Eastern leader is likely to win a Nobel Prize for imaginative political solutions. But if Hussein aspires to leadership, he can claim “victory” in Iraq’s total withdrawal from Kuwait. Paradoxically, the retreat could enhance his standing in the eyes of Iraqis and other Arabs.