‘We Are Very Well Aware of Situation’--Aziz

Here are excerpts from Iraqi Foreign Minister Tarik Aziz’s news conference after his meeting with Secretary of State James A. Baker III .

You were expecting me earlier, but Secretary Baker was a bit late in his press conference, and then I heard that President Bush intends to have a press conference. I prefer to listen to him. Then I was told that the press conference of the President--President Bush--has been postponed for a while, so I wanted to use the time to talk to you.

When I arrived last night in Geneva, I said that I have come with open-mindedness, and that was my intention, and I also came in good faith. The most important fact about these talks I would like to draw your attention to is that they are taking place after five months of the occurrence of the latest events in the gulf. And I drew the attention of Secretary Baker to that important fact. Also that this meeting took place after the last resolution that was taken under American pressure by the Security Council, which gives--which makes limits to diplomacy.

If we had an earlier opportunity several months ago, I told the secretary that we might have been able to remove a lot of misunderstandings between us, if there was a chance or there is a chance for that, because he spoke at length about his government’s assumptions of miscalculations by Iraq. And when I came to that point, I made it clear to him that we have never--we have not made miscalculations. We are very well aware of the situation. We have been very well aware of the situation from the very beginning.

And I told him that we have heard a lot of talk on his side and on the side of President Bush that the Iraqis have not got the message, they don’t know what’s going on around them, et cetera. You know what they have been saying in this regard. I told him if we had met several months ago, I would have told you that we do know everything.

We know what the deployment of your forces in the region means, we know what the resolutions you imposed on the Security Council mean and we know all the facts about the situation--the political facts, the military facts and the other facts.

So talking about miscalculation is incorrect. We have to convey to each other our view about the situation, and that removes the misunderstandings on either side. I heard Secretary Baker describing our meeting . . . And I say also that, from the professional point of view, it was a serious meeting. We both listened to each other very carefully. We both gave each other enough time to explain the views we wanted to explain, to convey the information we wanted to convey.

From this aspect, about this aspect in the talks, I am satisfied. But we had grave or big differences about the issues we addressed. Mr. Baker reiterated the very well known American position.

He is interested in one question only, that’s the situation in the gulf and Security Council resolutions about that situation.

I told him very clearly, and I repeated my idea and explained it at length, that what is at stake in our region is peace, security and stability. What’s at stake is the fate of the whole region, that region which has been suffering from wars, instabilities, hardships for several decades. If you are ready to bring about peace to the region--comprehensive, lasting, just peace to the whole region of the Middle East--we are ready to cooperate.

I told him I have no problem with the international legality. I have no problem with the principles of justice and fairness. On the contrary, those principles are in the best interests of the people of Iraq, and they are in the best interests of the Arab nations. We have been seeking for decades to have those principles respected and implemented in our region. But they have not been respected and implemented by the Israelis, and in that they have got a continuous strong American support. If the American Administration changes

its position and it works with us and with the other parties concerned in the region to bring about peace--comprehensive, lasting, just peace--we will be very glad and very enthusiastic to participate in that effort. . . .

He said that he does not believe that what happened on the 2nd of August and later was for the cause of the Palestinian question or to help the Palestinians. I explained to him the history of Iraq’s interest in the Palestinian question. I explained to him that the Palestinian question is a matter of national security to Iraq. If the Palestinian question is not resolved, we do not feel secure in our country, because there have been wars in the past. Iraq participated in those wars. Israel attacked Iraq in 1981 and we were expecting Israeli attack on Iraq this year--last year. In March and April last year we were expecting such an attack. And that was the main theme in the Arab summit that was held in Baghdad in late May. Therefore, it is a matter of Iraqi security as well as Arab security to see that the Palestinian question is solved in a just manner, according to international legality, according to the principles of justice and fairness. He said he does not believe that. I told him, “OK, test us. You can test us and see whether we are sincere in that or not.” I spoke at length about the linkage between the issues in the region. And I told him that when we speak about the linkage we are serious and sincere, because what was happening before the 2nd of August has a strong relationship with what happened later. . . .

If the matter is the implementation or the respect of the international organization, the respect of Security Council resolutions, we have a number of resolutions about the Palestinian question. They have been neglected for decades. The last two important resolutions, 242 and 338, the first was adopted in 1967, the other in 1973, and they are not yet implemented. And the United States and members of the coalition, as Mr. Baker calls it, have not sent troops to impose the implementation of those resolutions. They have not taken measures against Israel because Israel was intransigent. On the contrary, the United States government has covered the Israeli position, protected it politically at the Security Council, and that’s very well known to everybody. And the United States government still supplies Israel with the military and financial means to stick to its intransigence. So, if the matter is respect of international law, Security Council resolutions, we would like you to show the same attention to all Security Council resolutions. And if you do that, a lot of differences between us will be removed.

Concerning the threats or no threats which the secretary referred to in his address to you, the tone of his language was diplomatic and polite. I reciprocated. But the substance was full of threats and I told him, also in substance, that we will not yield to threats. We would like to have genuine, constructive dialogue between us, between our two nations, in order to make peace in the region and between our two nations. . . .

And we are fed up with this policy of double standards. We shall not accept to be treated as a nation as underdogs. We are a proud nation, we have our history, we have our contribution to human civilization, and we would like to be treated in a dignified and just manner.

You hear that I declined to receive the letter from President Bush to my president. At the beginning of the meeting, Secretary Baker told me that he carries a letter from his President to my president, and he handed over a copy to me. I told him I want to read this letter first, and I read it--as he said, carefully and slowly--and I knew what it was about. I told him I am sorry, I cannot receive this letter. And the reason is that the language in this letter is not compatible with the language that should be used in correspondence between heads of state.

I have no objection that Mr. Bush would state his position very clearly. A serious exchange of letters between leaders and politicians can, or should, contain the position of each party. But when a head of state writes to another head of state a letter, and if he really intends to make peace with that head of state or reach genuine understanding, he should use a polite language. And politeness does not contradict with substance.

Question: Can you give us an example of the language--

Answer: Well, I read it only once, and I have not rehearsed that letter but the contents of that letter was paraphrased in a way or another in the different statements the secretary made.

Q: Mr. Minister, would Iraq leave--would Iraq agree to leave Kuwait if promised an international conference on the question of Palestine?

A: I did not put it that way. I heard such a question during Mr. Baker’s meeting with you. I told the secretary that if you are ready to respect and implement international legality, the principles of justice and fairness as far as all the issues in the region are concerned, you will find us very cooperative. Yes?

Q: After your meeting with Secretary Baker, did you have a conversation with your president about the results of the meeting?

A: No. No, I think officials in this hotel know that I haven’t made any overseas phone calls.

Q: Do you want to answer the second part of the question? Do you believe that war with the United States is inevitable?

A: Well, that’s up to the American Administration to decide. I told Mr. Baker that we are prepared for all expectations. We have been prepared from the very beginning. If they decide to attack Iraq, we will not be surprised. We have our experience in war. And I told him that if the American Administration decides to attack Iraq militarily, Iraq will defend itself in a very bold manner.

Q: Do you deny that Iraq has stripped Kuwait of all its possessions, its wealth, its people, its humanity?

A: Well, you can put your question the way you like, but I’m not going to respond to allegations. The Iraqi people and the Iraqi government have their own historical rights, and when they deal with those rights they have their own view about it and they have their own standards about it.

You might have a different view, that’s up to you.

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, if the war starts in the Middle East, in the gulf, will you attack Israel?

A: Yes. Absolutely yes.

Q: Mr. Minister, are there circumstances under which Iraq would withdraw from Kuwait? And if so, can you tell us what they would be?

A: I am not going to answer hypothetical questions. I have a line which I made very clear in my talks with the secretary. If the United States is ready to address all the issues in the region on the same principles, on the same criterion, Iraq will do its contribution to that effort in a serious and sincere manner.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you rule out any attack any Israel before a U.S. attack on Iraq, No. 1? Two, could you give any more detail--

A: Iraq is not going to--

Q: Excuse me, sir, I’ll just finish--can you give us any more details? You said that you had information that Israel was going to attack Iraq last March or April. I was wondering if you could elaborate on that. And finally why not have face-to-face talks with Israel--yourself or your head of state--either in Jerusalem or Baghdad? You’ve talked about peace in the Middle East for decades. Why hasn’t that happened? And why aren’t you for it?

A: About the first half of the question, Iraq is not going to attack anybody, any party, before it is attacked. So, our action in this regard would be in retaliation to attacks and a defensive action.

As far as the talks you mentioned are concerned, there is no bilateral dispute between Iraq and the Israelis. There is the Palestinian question; the Israeli occupation of the Palestinian lands, the Israeli subjugation of the Palestinian people. . . .

Q: Mr. Foreign Minister, you stressed twice now during this press conference that you were satisfied with the “professional style,” as you put it, and the tone and the language of today’s talks with Secretary Baker. But then you explained to us that you rejected the letter because of the language President Bush used, supposedly, in this letter. Are you implying that Secretary Baker and President Bush used different language on the same issue?

A: The tone of our talks was different from the language that was used in the letter, although the substance doesn’t change very much. I am not, as I said, against the substance. Every head of state can convey to his counterpart whatever he wants to convey. But the question of--is a question of language, of politeness and resort to diplomatic means of correspondence.

I came to see Mr. Baker. He wanted to see me, and I wanted to see him, and we wanted to talk about all the questions of common interest or of the interest of this side and of the other. And we had a long discussion, as I said, from the professional point of view. They were good discussions.

Q: Mr. Minister, before leaving Baghdad, you said you would have new proposals and ideas. What you’ve just said this evening you’ve said many, many times before. Why did you have no new proposals or ideas?

A: I raised a lot of ideas with Mr. Baker. I told him: “Why don’t you work with us together and with the other parties to bring about peaceful, comprehensive, peaceful settlement to the whole region.” This is a very constructive idea. I raised with the secretary the question of the Arab solution. I told him “Why are you against the Arab solution?” And he said that the majority of the Arab countries are against the so-called Arab solution. I told him, “Wait a minute. I will count one country after the other who has shown interest in an Arab solution.” And when I counted the states, which showed interest in an Arab solution, the number was 11. And this shows that there is a majority among the Arab world to try an Arab solution. But he strongly refused that path, and he even denied that there is an Arab solution, the idea of an Arab solution.