The President’s Aims Come Clear : How the war plays out will determine whether Bush’s ‘new world order’ survives--or improves on the old one.

By having “let slip the dogs of war,” President Bush has set in train a sequence of events that will surely end in U.S. military success, but that will also create new political challenges, both in the region and in his hope for a “new world order.”

After the most exhaustive before-the-fact debate about war in U.S. history, the nation has embarked on the only major conflict in this century that was not a direct and rapid response to military provocation against U.S. interests. Many Americans remain skeptical about the course chosen, and many believe that sanctions against Iraq should have been given longer to work. Indeed, had the U.S. Senate voted by secret ballot last week, the President would not have received a domestic mandate for war.

But with a military struggle now joined, the debate must shift from the wisdom of that course to the manner of the war’s conduct, the requirements for its termination and the burden of its aftermath.

The initial shock of battle and the success of the first attacks have already reduced some of the inherent political risks. In what must be a stunning paradox of television, almost total public discussion of military alternatives did not prepare Iraq to counter what was coming. Remarkably, U.S. forces achieved tactical surprise, and that fact may provide benefits lasting throughout the conflict and beyond.

An early success at arms shores up support at home and abroad, even if it is later eroded by more difficult battles. Especially valuable, politically, were two aspects of the initial attack.

By highlighting the role played by aircraft from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the Administration has built a case at home that the key beneficiaries of U.S. engagement in the gulf are helping themselves, and it has tried to build a backfire in the Arab world against charges that this is just a Western war against an Arab state. And by choosing a form of attack for its tactical advantages--engaging U.S. air power before a ground attack--the United States has also put off a test whether other key Arab states, Egypt and Syria, will fight.

When he spoke to the nation, President Bush presented, for the first time, a succinct list of U.S. war aims, beyond liberating Kuwait and restoring its legitimate government. Only now, in fact, does such a statement of aims have validity. Bush cited eliminating Iraq’s chemical weapons facilities, its nuclear weapons program and key parts of its conventional military arsenal, especially artillery and tanks.

Significantly, the United States promptly fulfilled the first two of these war aims, by striking chemical and nuclear targets that could have no relevance to the current battle, at the expense of targets that had more immediate tactical importance. Haste was necessary to avoid any risk that Saddam Hussein would rapidly sue for peace before this most important and useful business could be completed.

Cutting Iraq’s conventional forces down to size is a more daunting task, however, and by citing this as a war aim, the President raised questions about what the United States will seek in addition to Iraq’s expulsion from Kuwait--and what the costs could be.

Even though the conflict has just begun, it is important to begin considering the peace beyond. There are still risks ahead, beyond the potential for significant casualties. The war’s long-term impact on U.S. standing in the Arab and Islamic worlds is far from clear. And there is no certainty that the coalition can achieve the President’s goal of breaking Iraq militarily while preserving its integrity as a country.

Even with rapid military success, most prewar tasks must still be pursued after the war. These include helping to develop viable security arrangements among regional countries, trying to draw Iran into a positive role and prosecuting Arab-Israeli peace--a task that remains critical, although the intrusion of war has broken any direct linkage with the Persian Gulf crisis.

Two problems should be easier to resolve because of the conflict--preventing the regional spread of weapons of mass destruction and limiting the growth of military arsenals--but they cannot be ignored.

Most important for the future, the course of the conflict can have a critical impact on Bush’s central argument for war: that it was necessary to lay the foundation for a “new world order.”

A short and decisive battle can leave the concept intact, though still imprecise; a long war that spreads turmoil throughout the region can kill it before it is developed.

The fate of the “new world order,” not victory, will be the President’s legacy; and the world is watching not only to see the effectiveness of U.S. military power but the wisdom of our postwar diplomacy.