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‘Unequivocal’ Pledge by Hussein Is Needed : Diplomacy: A joint U.S.-Soviet statement appears to soften earlier American stance, which insisted on an actual ‘massive withdrawal’ from Kuwait.

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The allied assault on Iraq could end now if Iraqi President Saddam Hussein makes an “unequivocal commitment” to withdraw from Kuwait, the United States and Soviet Union declared Tuesday in a joint statement that appeared to soften past U.S. insistence that only an actual “massive withdrawal” by Iraq would stop the war.

The statement also pledged joint U.S.-Soviet efforts “to promote Arab-Israeli peace” once the war is over, the farthest the Bush Administration has gone toward linking the war with the Palestinian issue or toward involving the Soviet Union in Middle Eastern peacemaking efforts. American policy-makers in the past often tried to exclude the Soviets from that field.

At the same time, the White House announced that Moscow had given Bush assurances that at least some Soviet troops would be withdrawn from the Baltics. The statement appeared to be the first concrete pledge by the Soviets to remove troops from the Baltics, although Administration officials said that neither the number of troops nor the speed of the withdrawal was specified.

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The announcements came at the close of a four-day visit to Washington by Alexander A. Bessmertnykh, the new Soviet foreign minister. During his meetings with Bush and Secretary of State James A. Baker III, Bessmertnykh delivered a letter from Soviet President Mikhail S. Gorbachev outlining in detail a new set of Soviet peace proposals for the gulf, a Soviet spokesman announced in Moscow.

According to the spokesman, Gorbachev press secretary Vitaly N. Ignatenko, the Soviets are seeking comments from other countries before formally presenting their proposal in the United Nations or some other international forum.

“We stand on the threshold of very serious decisions,” Ignatenko told journalists at a briefing in Moscow. “From the side of the Soviet Union, there are several suggestions, initiatives. . . . The message to President Bush contains specific proposals to reduce tensions in the Persian Gulf.”

The offer of a “cessation of hostilities” based on an “unequivocal commitment” by Iraq to withdraw from Kuwait could be part of that Soviet plan. It is language that Administration officials have been careful to avoid in recent days.

But the statement left considerable room for further interpretation, since it does not define “unequivocal commitment” and notes that “such a commitment must be backed by immediate, concrete steps leading to full compliance” with U.N. resolutions calling for an end to Iraq’s six-month occupation of its neighbor.

Although phrased in diplomatically evasive language, the joint statement makes clear that major differences continue to exist between the United States and the Soviets over gulf policy. Soviet officials in recent days repeatedly have voiced concerns that the United States may be widening the aims of the Gulf War, seeking to destroy Iraq’s military capability, rather than merely trying to expel the Iraqis from Kuwait.

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Baker, according to the joint statement, “emphasized that the United States and its coalition partners are seeking the liberation of Kuwait, not the destruction of Iraq,” and reiterated that the Administration “is not interested in expanding the conflict.”

Bessmertnykh, for his part, “took note of the American position,” a phrase that is generally used in diplomatic statements to indicate lack of agreement.

“Both sides,” the statement continued, “believe that everything possible should be done to avoid further escalation of the war and expansion of its scale.”

The carefully phrased statement appears to provide advantages for both sides, said Peter W. Rodman, a former National Security Council official now with Johns Hopkins University’s Foreign Policy Institute in Washington.

The Soviets “can present themselves to the Arabs as the champions of the Arabs, having gotten something out of the Americans--these assurances about war aims,” Rodman said. “What we get is that the Soviets are now obligated not to make mischief. They have given away a card they were threatening to play, which was to cause trouble for us on these particular points.”

At the same time, the pledge of future joint cooperation to deal with “the causes of instability and the sources of conflict, including the Arab-Israeli conflict,” could mark the closest U.S.-Soviet cooperation in Middle East peace efforts since the mid-1970s.

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The statement, however, carefully avoided any reference to a Middle East “peace conference,” a forum to which Israel has strongly objected. Although the Administration has supported a peace conference in some form in the past, it has resisted any call for one at this point, saying that a conference now would be counterproductive.

If the Soviets follow through on their “representations” that they will pull troops out of the restive Baltic republics of Latvia and Lithuania and reopen a dialogue with elected nationalist leaders there, that could also be a major plus for the White House.

Bush has staked much on the ability of Gorbachev to continue his reform policies, and the apparent sharp turn to the right within the Soviet Union in recent weeks has deeply worried Administration officials.

Bessmertnykh delivered the Soviet assurance to Bush in their Oval Office meeting Monday, Administration officials said.

Soviet paratroopers sent by Moscow this month have killed 21 demonstrators in Latvia and Lithuania, where the democratically elected local governments have been demanding full independence from Moscow.

President Bush referred to the pledge in his State of the Union address Tuesday evening, saying: “In our recent discussions with Soviet leaders, we have been given representations, which, if fulfilled, would result in the withdrawal of some Soviet forces, a reopening of dialogue with the republics and a move away from violence.”

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A senior Administration official said the Soviet assurances were significant, but added that they were “quite general.”

Noting that the assurances, in his opinion, were similar to Gorbachev’s public pronouncements about his hope of restoring peace to the Baltic republics, the official said he was “not trying to say that there is something mystical or new about this.”

Another official referred to the Soviet statements as “favorable-sounding noises.”

But if the Soviet withdrawal includes the roughly 1,000-man paratroop regiment sent to the Lithuanian capital of Vilnius, it would be a highly symbolic act--for that was the unit that attacked Lithuania’s television broadcasting center on Jan. 13, killing 13 civilians and one Soviet officer.

The Moscow government has already said that it intends to withdraw or disband the special police commandos, known as “Black Berets,” whose actions have drawn wide protests in the Latvian capital of Riga.

The weight of the assurances appeared to lie primarily in the fact that they were made directly and formally by Gorbachev, through his new foreign minister, to Bush--a form of promise that the Soviets had not previously made on the Baltic issue.

Asked whether Gorbachev had promised to reduce troops below the level already present in Latvia and Lithuania before this month’s confrontation with Moscow, the official shook his head negatively.

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The senior official said the Administration believes the Baltic republics have no choice but to negotiate with Moscow.

“They can only gain independence by the sufferance of the Soviet Union and therefore we’re encouraging a dialogue,” he said.

Tensions in the Baltics were one of the main reasons for Monday’s decision to postpone the U.S.-Soviet summit that had been planned for mid-February.

In Moscow, however, Ignatenko said Gorbachev did not feel that the delay in the summit reflected a deterioration in relations between the two countries. The primary reason for the delay, he said was Bush’s inability to leave the United States because of the Gulf War, an explanation also offered by U.S. officials.

Ignatenko also provided a general description of the peace plan that Gorbachev has proposed for the gulf, reiterating Soviet opposition to the extension of the war beyond the ouster of Iraqi forces from Kuwait and the restoration of Kuwait independence and sovereignty.

“The destruction of the country (Iraq) must be prevented,” Ignatenko said. “The multinational forces must not allow unjustified victims, especially victims among civilians,” he said, and “the military activity must not destroy the moral values in whose name the international community decided to use military force.

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“The fulfillment of the resolutions of the United Nations is only the start of a long period of stabilization, the establishment of a very complex system of security,” he added.

Ignatenko said consultations about the plan were under way at the United Nations among members of the Security Council and directly with a number of countries, including other European powers, notably France, and India as a leader of the Nonaligned Movement.

“Our proposal concerns a very broad spectrum of questions, but the main one is how to end the conflict and how we can avoid further bloodshed,” Ignatenko said.

Times staff writers Michael Parks in Moscow and John M. Broder in Washington contributed to this report.

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