NOW THE HARD PART: Winning the Peace : Victory Does Not Mean Influence

The ending of the Gulf War should force us to recognize that the region is a dark and ill-kept storehouse of flammable materials capable of bursting into new conflagrations. A disastrous firestorm might be triggered at any time by an accumulation of corrosive discontents: intense and ancient passions, religious rivalries and a wave of fierce fundamentalism--all given special impetus by an accident of geology that has produced bitter income disparities among Arab nations. These materials are tailor-made for exploitation by megalomaniac dictators, and the next conflagration might prove uncontainable.

Since Arabs have a strong sense of history, they draw little comfort from President Bush’s repeated promise to create a “new world order.” They remember earlier statesmen who made such declarations at the close of historical epochs--and how few useful results followed from such bold promises.

If such disappointments are not to be repeated, we must seriously ask ourselves how America can contribute to building a durable new world order that will preserve peace. At the same time, Washington should recognize that there are few parts of the world less well adapted to a rational world system based on traditional techniques and principles. Because the nation-states of the Middle East are too fragile and unstable to make a balance-of-power system workable, we must necessarily turn to some organized system of collective security--the United Nations.

Of course, at this moment of victory, most Americans would like to put aside the problems of the Middle East and get back to normal business. But we have tried that before--and later regretted it.

At the same time, we should approach Middle East problems with a realistic sense of our limited ability to shape the politics of the region. Along with being impressed by the U.S. military achievement, many Arabs were deeply troubled by the spectacle of the world’s most powerful country directing the full might of its advanced technology at the destruction of an Arab nation. The fact that its leader is a singularly brutal and repulsive personality made little difference to many Arab people--Saddam Hussein was still an Arab standing up to the United States, Israel and the combined forces of the West. For many poor and bitter Arabs, a Baghdad in ruins has begun to acquire the romantic legend of Guernica.

If we are not to be too disabled by our nation’s special disqualifications in the Middle East, we must, as first priority, try to mitigate the violent Arab resentments of Israel and the United States--which the Arabs regard as Israel’s big brother.

The United States faces a strict list of priorities. If we are to play any role in building a new order we must now, as an indispensable first task, use all our diplomatic leverage to achieve for the Palestinians the same right to self-determination accorded to other nations. At a time when domestic politics dominate over foreign policy, this will require an exercise of political will few American politicians possess, and the Administration may face more formidable negotiations with the Congress than with Arab governments.

We may fail in this task but, if we do, we shall lose every one of our Middle Eastern friends.

The situation the Palestinians have been subjected to is intolerable. For 24 years, the Palestinian inhabitants of the West Bank and Gaza have been treated with a harsh discrimination that resembles apartheid. Palestinian schools are closed for many months at a time; curfews make it difficult to maintain jobs in Israel. Meanwhile, the Israeli government authorizes a settlements policy that has deprived West Bank residents of more than half their arable land and 95% of their water supply.

In one sense, the Gulf War has made the Palestinian problem more difficult, because the Israeli government has asserted it will not talk with a Palestinian people who vocally hailed Hussein as their potential liberator. Though the Palestinians’ decision was manifestly stupid--and one cannot condone it--we should at least try to understand the situation that produced it. With no state apparently willing to champion their cause, the Palestinians have grown increasingly desperate. Thus, no matter how venal Hussein was, the fact that he stood up against the United States and Israel seemed to offer a desperate--though unrealistic--chance of rescue to a people otherwise bereft of hope.

In addition to the problem of ridding itself of the stigma of identification with Israeli colonial practices, there are other problems the United States should give urgent attention to.

An immediate issue is what army will occupy and defend Kuwait while longer-range affairs are sorted out, and who will take the responsibility for feeding the Iraqis and rehabilitating the country. Both these questions are primarily for the United Nations, because any continued stationing of U.S. forces in the region would only increase friction with the Arab nations. The United Nations has had long experience in the creation of peacekeeping forces, and it possesses agencies equipped to feed the Iraqis and--with the help of oil-rich Arab nations--provide resources to rehabilitate the country.

The United States should, under no condition, try to do the job itself--it is enough that we have made a heroic military effort. We should not delay withdrawal any longer than essential. The rich Arab oil states should now pick up most of the bill.

Let there be no illusions on another point. The United States cannot go about reshuffling the political furniture of the area. We are a stranger in the Middle Eastern house--an invited guest--and we can undertake only what our hosts permit.

Our most useful function will be to initiate an effort to reduce the level of lethal arms now flooding into the region. The warring Middle East nations possess more armaments than those assigned to the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and the process of arms escalation is leaping forward at a shocking pace. With the fading of the Cold War and reduction of Soviet competition, the United States and the other permanent Security Council members--the Middle East’s major arms suppliers--should have no difficulty agreeing on a sharp reduction and on appropriate quotas as situations develop. We should also seek:

--The creation of machinery for monitoring the dismemberment of facilities for producing nuclear, chemical and biological weapons, together with existing weapons, leading to the creation of a nuclear-free zone. Such a zone has often been proposed both by Egypt and Israel, and its principle should be extended to biological and chemical weapons;

--Measures to protect Israel’s security, such as adequate guarantees. These should assure the territorial integrity of the states bordering Israel as well as Israel’s own borders. Those assurances should be underwritten by the Security Council or at least its five permanent members, including the United States;

--The withdrawal of Syrian forces from Lebanon together with the dispersal of Israel’s surrogate force there, and the recognition by all states in the region of Lebanon’s sovereignty;

--An expanded agenda of problems involving the land, water and global environment, including a collective effort to restore the ecology of the Gulf;

--The creation of a Middle East development bank, funded primarily by the oil-producing nations, to finance the costs of these necessary measures.

At least momentarily, the United States has political influence in the area and we should do everything possible to encourage the creation of a democratic system in Iraq--a task that would be greatly facilitated by the disappearance of Hussein’s regime.

But we should leave Hussein’s disposition largely to the Iraqi people; in the same manner, the initiation of any war-crimes trials should be left to his Arab neighbors. In addition, we should take steps to assure that any government where he might seek refuge, such as Algeria, does not permit him to use that sanctuary as base for agitation. Again, this is a matter primarily for the Iraqi people, but we should work carefully to encourage it through the Security Council and other instrumentalities of the United Nations.