PERSPECTIVE ON ISRAEL : Security and Justice for All : Keep the West Bank as a military buffer zone while ceding it as a political entity to the Palestinians.

At every stop along Secretary of State James A. Baker’s Middle East tour, local tutors of all persuasions have sought to instruct him in “the lessons of the Gulf War.” Many of these new lessons actually are old litanies repackaged. Here, among Israelis, “the lesson” is said to be that our freshly demonstrated vulnerability proves that we must hold on to all of the West Bank forever.

In actuality, the war only dramatized what the military has known for years: As long as Israel remains threatened, we must retain full military control over all of the West Bank. This is as true today as it was last July.

But a crucial corollary also remains valid, one long accepted by a large majority of Israel’s defense experts and supported by Israeli public opinion: Effective military control of the West Bank, as a defensive buffer zone, does not require Israeli political rule over 1.8 million Palestinian Arabs.

To be sure, the war accentuated some immediate dangers, such as Jordan’s instability, while it diminished others, such as Iraq’s offensive capability. But Israeli defense planners dare not focus on transient events. They must look far ahead and prepare for worst-case contingencies. From this perspective, Israel’s peril remains fundamentally unchanged:

--Heavily-armed, dictatorial Arab states pose a serious threat to Israel’s very existence. Imagine Israel’s military position had we faced an Iraqi-led Arab coalition alone. In a sea of instability, even relatively docile states like Jordan can turn suddenly virulent.

--Signing a peace treaty will not in itself obviate the threat to Israel. This will persist until a comprehensive peace agreement resolves all bilateral issues and the Arab-Muslim societies undergo a revolutionary social and cultural transition to democracy and stability.

--Deep Palestinian hostility to Israel continues. If they thought it possible, most Palestinians would advocate replacing Israel with a Palestinian state stretching from the Mediterranean to the Jordan River.

--The festering Israeli-Palestinian conflict enables local tyrants like Saddam Hussein to easily incite Arab masses throughout the region.

As long as these threats remain, Israel must retain the West Bank as a military buffer zone. But the essential benefits of strategic depth--such as early warning, surveillance, control of airspace, and strict demilitarization--do not require Israeli political rule over the inhabitants and the territory.

Twenty-three years ago, former Prime Minister Levi Eshkol recommended “a clear differentiation between Israel’s security borders and her political borders.” Israel’s political borders delineate the land over which we exercise full political sovereignty--the boundaries of the state. Our security border marks a far larger area over which we must effectively maintain full military control.

Former Prime Minister Menachem Begin implemented Eshkol’s formula when he signed the peace treaty with Egypt. Israel withdrew to the 1948 border, but left in place elaborate de facto security arrangements, starting at the Suez Canal. Begin thus achieved the best of both worlds: He neutralized Israel’s most dangerous enemy, yet kept all the military advantages of the Sinai buffer zone.

The details of security arrangements in the West Bank must go far beyond those in Sinai. The topography, demography and distances are radically different. As long as a threat from the East persists, Israel will justifiably demand extensive security measures, including warning stations, air defense systems, overflight, surveillance and strict border controls, as well as a limited Israeli military presence at certain vital strategic points in the West Bank.

Yet perpetuation of Israeli political sovereignty over 1.8 million restive Palestinians gains us nothing but grief. It exacts a growing cost to Israel’s economy, unity, morale and international standing. It may undermine our ability to successfully absorb the largest wave of immigration in the history of the Jewish state.

The sooner a political settlement is reached, the better Israel’s chances for the future. It does not take a prophet to see that in the age of missile and unconventional warfare, military developments in the region will grow increasingly deadly.

No political resolution can be achieved without taking into account the concerns and positions of both sides. It follows that no solution is possible that does not entail Israeli withdrawal from most of the territory of the West Bank and Gaza, and the establishment therein of an independent Palestinian entity. Refusal to recognize this central point will result in the same deadlock that has paralyzed the peace process since Camp David.

For its part, the Arab side must recognize Israel’s legitimate concerns regarding its vulnerability and agree to extensive security arrangements that satisfy Israel’s optimal--not its minimal--defense requirements. Recognition of Israel’s security needs, not positions taken during the Gulf crisis, must be the key criterion for determining acceptable negotiating partners among Arab states and the Palestinians.

Fortunately, Israel’s security needs require neither sovereignty nor perpetuation of Israeli rule over Palestinian Arabs against their will. Israel can and must forgo claims to sovereignty over the territories. The Palestinians and Arab states can and must accept Israel’s security requirements. The Gulf War only makes this task more urgent.