Moscow, Bidding for a Voice in Mideast, Offers Proposals for Regional Security : Diplomacy: Soviets call for ‘addressing without delay . . . the Arab-Israeli conflict.’ But they come up with few specifics.

The Soviet Union, bidding for a role in the diplomatic reshaping of the Middle East, outlined a far-reaching, six-point plan Saturday for regional security, including steps toward settlement of the Arab-Israeli conflict.

Seeking to build on the same international resolve that defeated Iraq and restored Kuwaiti independence, the Soviet plan calls for “addressing without delay the problem of seeking a settlement to the Arab-Israeli conflict.”

But the plan, unlike past Soviet proposals, carefully avoids going further, either in setting specific goals such as forming a Palestinian state or in proposing ways such as an international conference to achieve them, in the hope of avoiding immediate rejection by Israel.

“In the Middle East, for the Arab-Israeli conflict, we favor a flexible, multi-option approach,” Vitaly I. Churkin, chief spokesman of the Soviet Foreign Ministry, replied when pressed by Arab journalists on what they called a “retreat” from the previous Soviet position.

“We do not think that without an international conference there can be no progress. There can be, definitely. There is a role for bilateral contacts, for the United Nations Security Council, for smaller regional forums. An international conference is still seen as playing an important role in the future sometime.”

Presented by President Mikhail S. Gorbachev on Friday to Secretary of State James A. Baker III, the proposals will be the main thrust in a major Soviet diplomatic offensive as Moscow tries to ensure itself a continued role in a region that it has long seen as vital to its geostrategic interests.

“We acknowledge that setting up a regionwide security system would not be a onetime action but rather a process that would take some time to unfold,” the Soviet position paper presented by Churkin said. “It appears all the more necessary, therefore, to take at least the first steps as soon as possible in those areas where progress can be realistically achieved.

“In formulating these ideas, we do not claim to possess the final truth. Shaping a fundamentally new type of interstate relations in the region will require vigorous political and diplomatic efforts involving the broadest range of countries concerned.”

Among the key elements in the Soviet plan, which will be put by special envoys to leaders in the Middle East, Europe and the Third World:

* Reductions in arms shipments to the region, including limits on sales of offensive weapons and new barriers to prevent the proliferation of nuclear, chemical and biological weapons. The goal would be “maintaining a balance of forces at progressively lower levels of armament with a view to finally reaching the level of defensive sufficiency.”

* Establishment of demilitarized zones, limits on troop concentrations, advance notice of military maneuvers and other “confidence-building measures” similar to those in Europe.

* Withdrawal of foreign troops from the region with the possible exception of a U.N. peacekeeping or observer force, preferably formed from Arab or Muslim countries.

* “Gradually evening out and harmonizing the rates of economic development” among Persian Gulf nations. Aimed at preventing small, rich countries from becoming prey for larger, poor ones, the proposal implies that the countries in the region might agree on a plan to share oil revenues.

* A greater role for the United Nations. Building on the success of the U.N. Security Council in responding to the Gulf crisis, Moscow proposes that the United Nations act as the guarantor of new agreements on regional security. It also urges a role for the U.N. Military Staff Committee in future crises. Established by the U.N. Charter to manage international forces but never functional, the committee should be prepared to implement future Security Council orders, Churkin suggested.

The Gulf states themselves, the Soviet plan asserts, should take the lead in formulating the postwar security arrangements for the region, and outside powers should play a supporting role.

“They should be the ones to find the type of balance for their rights and interests that would allow for broad political and other cooperation,” the position paper said. “Yet, it should not be a question of forming isolated blocs closed to other countries and thus creating new antagonisms while fueling old ones.”

Baker’s response was “positive and interested,” Churkin said, but the Soviet proposal is intended primarily as “a contribution to a diplomatic dialogue that is now under way.”

“We were not attempting to see where our ideas coincided--although they did in many places--or where they may have diverged,” he added. “It is really too early to talk about convergences and differences in the Soviet and American approaches.”