COLUMN ONE : The Varied Politics of Islam : Some Western leaders worry about the growth of Muslim fundamentalism. But many in the movement are pragmatic, and their strength may not be destabilizing.

As the chattering friends sat down to a meal of delicately roasted pigeon and glazed vegetables a few days after the Gulf War, the host raised a glass of French wine. “A toast: to the Americans and the defeat of Iraq.” All the guests but one raised their glasses. He got up and walked out of the room.

Breaking the embarrassed silence, a woman dismissively waved her bejeweled arm and remarked to an American guest: “Oh, don’t pay any attention to him. He belongs to the Muslim Brotherhood.”

With his London-styled suit, faultless English and neatly trimmed beard, the American-educated doctor hardly met the Western stereotype of a Muslim fanatic. Yet as a member of the Muslim Brotherhood, he is an Islamic fundamentalist and, to many minds, a threat to Western values and traditions and the American way.

In a conversation a day later, the disgruntled guest, who asked not to be identified, explained why he left. “It didn’t have anything to do with you,” he said to the American. “But what went on there was exactly what is wrong now here in Egypt and in the Middle East.

“Not only did Abdel (the host) make the toast with wine (which is prohibited by Islamic law), he honored foreigners and dishonored an Arab in the presence of a Westerner. I opposed the invasion of Kuwait, but we don’t want or need Americans here.”

Who or what, then, should be here? he was asked. “An Arab nation made up of Islamic republics” was the quick, straightforward response.

His is an attitude that is spreading throughout the Arab and Islamic world. It represents to many Western political leaders and analysts what they fear most from the aftermath of the otherwise successful Gulf War: a collection of Middle East regimes following the anti-Western, theologically driven policies of the only existing radical Islamic nation--Iran.

Throughout the region, fundamentalism is growing. More and more women are wearing veils; sales of the Koran and other religious literature are rising, and the sale and public consumption of liquor are under increasing attack.

“People are more observant,” Saad Eddin Ibrahim, a sociologist at the American University of Cairo and one of the most influential students of Islam in the Middle East, said in an interview. “It is a trend that started after 1967 (the year Israel demolished several Arab armies in the Six-Day War) as a reaction to defeat, and it has gained momentum because of the Gulf crisis.”

Pointing to impressive electoral gains by fundamentalists in elections in Algeria and Jordan, the increased power of extremist Muslim forces among Palestinians and the growing influence of Islamic movements even in such supposedly moderate and largely secular states as Turkey and Egypt, Margaret Thatcher, then the British prime minister, warned the West last year: “There is no guarantee that threats to our security will stop at some imaginary line across the mid-Atlantic. With the spread of sophisticated weapons and military technology to areas like the Middle East, potential threats (to the West) may originate from outside Europe.”

The Gulf War that shortly followed, and the storm of anti-Western sentiment it generated in large parts of the Muslim world, seemed to give substance to Thatcher’s alarm.

Still, there is something in the attitude of the fundamentalist Muslim dinner guest that personally--and as a symbol of his movement--points up the complicated nature of the issue. It also defies the alarmist assumptions and horrific fears of those who share Thatcher’s views.

Besides his Western-style suits and ties and his American education, the respected doctor believes in a market economy and political democracy, opposes Iraqi President Saddam Hussein and generally leads a life that would be familiar to most middle-class Americans.

In fact, his mix of modernism and religious fundamentalism underlines what many scholars of Islam and the Arab world argue: Islam is a wide and varied religion; Muslim fundamentalism is no single set of beliefs and actions, and the Arab world, as shown by the divisions over the Gulf War, is really only a collection of states with a common language and a shared religion but often opposing political systems.

“The growth of fundamentalism is not necessarily a threat to the West or inherently destabilizing in the region,” said Earl Sullivan, a political scientist at the American University of Cairo. “Not all fundamentalists are extremists. Many are pragmatic and realistic.”

Sullivan, a Middle East resident since 1973 and an expert on the political implications of Islam, argued that even Iran, a country viewed in the West as on the lunatic fringe of religious extremism, has shown it can accommodate its strict dogma to the necessities of global politics.

“Look at Iran’s role in the Gulf War,” he said. “They stayed neutral but also worked with the (U.S.-led) coalition against Iraq. (Iranian President Hashemi) Rafsanjani sees a need for better relations with the West.”

The varied nature of Islam is rooted in the religion’s beginnings, when it quickly divided into competing groups--the Shiite and Sunni sects. It is a split as deep and wide as that separating Roman Catholicism and Protestantism, and no more violent. The division, which dates to the 7th Century, is rooted as much in internal politics as doctrine, with the dominant Sunnis representing, at least in Western eyes, a more moderate, open approach against the perceived extremist and violent reactionary religious orthodoxy of the Shiite movement.

In modern times, this is played out in Iran, an overwhelmingly Shiite nation and vanguard of strict religious observance, hatred of foreign influence and the use of violence to defend its faith. Included on the other side are Turkey and Egypt, both predominantly Sunni but politically secular and largely pro-Western in foreign policy.

Iran Moderates Policy

But it may be too simple to cast Iran’s politics--as well as the often violent actions of Shiites in Iraq, Syria and Lebanon--only, or even mostly, in terms of religious fanaticism.

“Iran is one of the more democratic states in the region and has a high degree of legitimacy,” Sullivan said, citing its elected Parliament and president. “It is now, with the acceptance of the people, moderating its policy, even in internal matters with strong religious content.” His example was a recent call by Rafsanjani, a Muslim cleric, for liberalizing the restraints on women.

And as Abbas Kelidar, a professor of Oriental studies at London University, has argued, much of the motivation for fundamentalism among Shiites results from a frustration arising from the political repression imposed by others, including Sunni Muslims.

Without a legitimate outlet through normal political functions, Kelidar maintains, the mosque becomes the only institution for public expression of views.

So, for example, the opposition to the governments of Iraq and Syria--where Sunni minorities rule, often by repressive force over Shiite majorities--is most often cast in religious terms.

And, if there is anything that shows that radical Islam can adapt to Western thought, it is the use of elections, that most democratic of devices, which, ironically, is opening Islamic fundamentalism to even greater influence.

As more and more once-autocratic Middle East governments give way to demands for democratic reforms, it is Muslim fundamentalists who often win elections on platforms demanding the ousting of foreign presence and influence and a return to strict Islamic law. In Jordan, for example, fundamentalists won 36 of 80 seats in the country’s limited parliamentary elections last year, and members of the Islamic Salvation Front took majorities in 32 of 48 regional and local elections in Algeria.

Meantime, in Egypt, Syria, Morocco, Tunisia and elsewhere, the strength of fundamentalism is shown both by the accommodations the governments are making to the movement and by the measures taken to repress such groups as the Muslim Brotherhood.

Egypt best exemplifies both trends, mixing tolerance and repression, sometimes in the same case. For instance, while the Muslim Brotherhood is officially outlawed, its members are free to affiliate openly with other political organizations, which has given the group a base to challenge the government of President Hosni Mubarak.

And although Mubarak uses a heavy hand against organized fundamentalism, as did nearly all his predecessors since the Muslim Brotherhood was founded in 1928, his government has given in to demands to move the country toward more religious orthodoxy.

For instance, state-owned EgyptAir now bans alcohol on all flights, and local governors in 11 of the country’s 26 provinces, all Mubarak followers, have closed all liquor stores “to preserve Islamic identity and prevent indecencies.” A similar rationale was used a year ago when the Ministry of Supply set up women-only bakeries so that women wouldn’t have to stand in line with men to buy bread.

Does all this--the electoral success, increasing influence and popular attraction of fundamentalism--mean that American and Western interests and influence are seriously threatened in the Middle East?

If the fundamentalists were to win widespread control, one European diplomat said, “It shouldn’t be assumed that it would be an external threat to the West. If we don’t pursue policies that threaten their interests or appear to intervene in their internal affairs, there is no reason to fear them.”

In Egypt, said Sullivan of the American University, “even if the Muslim Brotherhood were to gain power, there would be no abrogation of the peace treaty with Israel,” a stated goal of many extremist groups. (The Muslim Brotherhood disavowed violence as a tactic 20 years ago.)

Even in Jordan, where King Hussein has bowed to fundamentalist pressure--to the point where he grew a beard and backed Saddam Hussein--there has been no change in a relatively moderate position concerning Israel.

Another question about the cohesiveness of fundamental Islam and its long-range threat to the West arises from the failures of the governments under pressure from the fundamentalists.

Breakdown in Rule

The fundamentalists, for example, have been successful in Algeria and in Iran under the shah, not because of those nations’ foreign policies or even their less-than-observant religious approaches. Rather, according to Sullivan and others, that success was the product of a breakdown in government caused by disastrous economic policies and unresponsive, over-centralized bureaucracies.

“People may be turning to fundamentalism in such cases,” said Ibrahim, the American University sociologist, “because it represents the only viable alternative politically, not because the people have fully accepted its doctrine.”

And since there are no signs that a fundamentalist regime would do any better--as seen by Iran’s failure to cure its economic ills--there is no reason to think that Islamic extremism will eliminate popular dissatisfaction or guarantee longstanding political acceptance.

In fact, Sullivan said, Iran’s relaxation of its extremism may be a response to popular unrest over the government’s inability to create jobs or to bring prosperity, in spite of its oil wealth.

An analysis of the electoral success last year of the Islamic Salvation Front in Algeria and the Muslim coalition in Jordan also indicates, through the large number of people who did not vote, that the fundamentalists don’t necessarily have a majority of the population.

“The truth is,” Sullivan said, “that in a full, honest election in which most of the people think voting would make any difference, and therefore participate, the fundamentalists could easily lose.”

Or as Ibrahim put it: “If there is no improvement in economic and social conditions, state and secular forces will combine within five years to challenge the fundamentalists.” In Kuwait, in fact, the pressure is for secular government and away from religious politics.

Even in internal matters, there are no easy assumptions regarding the imposition of strict Islamic law and social policy. Even as Iranian President Rafsanjani has proposed liberalizing rules governing women, including the dress code, Sheik Abassi Madani, leader of the Islamic Salvation Front, said such things as segregated swimming beaches and veils for females “will come through education and not otherwise.”

“A good example of this attitude,” Sullivan said, “is what one of them (an Egyptian fundamentalist) told me about Stella,” the state-owned brewery. “They would sell it, not close it.”

Charles P. Wallace, The Times’ Bangkok bureau chief, who was on assignment in Bahrain, contributed to this story.

BACKGROUND

Islam is one of the world’s major religions, with an estimated 925 million adherents, nearly 18% of the world’s population. About 85% are Sunni Muslims, the remainder Shiites. The split occurred not long after Islam’s founding in AD 622 by the Prophet Mohammed in Medina when a dispute arose over his successor, or caliph. Shiites, representing a Persian variation of the religion, have come to reject many of the oral traditions of Islam, and also differ from Sunnis in matters of law and ceremony. Shiite practice tends toward the ecstatic, and the zeal of some Shiites, often intensified by nationalism, has given rise to fanatic sects. Sunnis tend to be more staid. Shiite belief affirms man’s free will; Sunnis are more deterministic.