In Alcohol-Free Gulf, GIs Stayed Out of Hot Water

An airman steals drugs from a flight surgeon. A Marine shoots himself in the leg to avoid duty. A sergeant falls asleep at his guard post.

In the seven months since half a million U.S. troops were dispatched to Saudi Arabia, more than 3,500 American service personnel have been punished for a wide range of offenses--from minor infractions, such as showing disrespect, to more serious crimes such as negligent homicide.

The numbers are preliminary and expected to grow. Even so, military officers contend that the caseload is remarkably low, given the size of the American force and the fact that past conflicts, such as Panama and Vietnam, were marred by serious abuses committed by servicemen.

Of 3,506 cases of wrongdoing during Operation Desert Storm and its predecessor, Desert Shield, only 191 resulted in courts-martial, and only 18 of those were in the most serious category of general courts-martial, according to figures provided by the U.S. Central Command.

“The phenomenal thing about this operation has been the exceptionally low level of acts of indiscipline,” said Col. Raymond C. Ruppert, the Central Command’s judge advocate general, who oversees matters of military crime and punishment.

“The number of offenses that have been committed are incredibly low,” Ruppert said. “If you went to the city of Richmond, Virginia, . . . the police would report that many violations of law in a considerably (shorter) period of time.”

In fiscal year 1989, a time of peace, 71 courts-martial per 10,000 troops were recorded, compared to 3 1/2 per 10,000 troops participating in the Persian Gulf War, according to the Central Command.

The factor keeping the men and women in line that is cited most frequently by most officers is the absence of alcohol in this Muslim country. All alcoholic beverages are strictly prohibited.

Some GIs have been known to brew their own from grape juice or have received bottles smuggled in through the mail, and bootleg liquor has figured in some of the infractions. But military officials say alcohol and other drugs have been largely unavailable.

“I tell you, no-drinking solved a whole lot of problems,” said Lt. Gen. Peter de la Billiere, commander of the British forces here, echoing sentiments expressed throughout the allied leadership.

Secondly, many units of the American forces spent most of their time in the isolation of the desolate Saudi desert, away from temptations and away from much of the civilian population.

Both the forced abstinence and the distance from local communities pose sharp contrast to the circumstances of the Vietnam War, where drug abuse was a serious problem and troops had frequent, sometimes hostile contact with Vietnamese in both Saigon and the countryside.

U.S. Central Command leaders also maintain that the army that fought the Gulf War is more mature, better trained and educated, and thus better disciplined than the soldiers who were sent to Vietnam.

Most violations of military law during the Gulf War and the months leading up to it were minor infractions that did not require a court-martial. In these cases, the GI accepted his or her punishment, which could range from a letter of reprimand to the docking of pay or stripping of a stripe. No judicial proceedings were involved.

The more serious crimes result in a court-martial under rules laid out by the Uniform Code of Military Justice. Punishment can be severe.

An army sergeant pleaded guilty to stealing a pistol. He was given a bad-conduct discharge and sent to Leavenworth for three years.

Two sailors aboard an aircraft carrier were found guilty of drug possession; one was sentenced to three years in jail, the other six.

Two soldiers stole mail and were sentenced to jail for 12 to 15 months.

An airman working at a base in Saudi Arabia was convicted of stealing drugs from a flight surgeon and ordered to serve 10 years in prison. He was also given a dishonorable discharge.

A Marine who shot himself in the leg to avoid duty was sentenced to eight years at hard labor.

A Marine from the 1st Marine Division, which participated in the march on Kuwait city, was convicted of negligent homicide, thrown out of the military and sentenced to 10 months at hard labor.

Further details of the case were not available, but Ruppert, the judge advocate general, said it and a handful of other pending negligent-homicide courts-martial probably involved traffic accidents or the improper firing of weapons.

“Given the fact that there have been Saudis that have been killed on our roads and there (has) been negligent discharging of weapons, there should be one or two more cases (of negligent homicide) out there,” Ruppert added.

Ruppert said he has not received any reports of abuse of an Iraqi prisoner of war by an American service member. Nor was he aware of any cases of the more serious crimes that haunted Vietnam and Panama, such as rape and murder.

After the invasion of Panama by 24,000 U.S. troops on Dec. 20, 1989, a sergeant from the 82nd Airborne Division was court-martialed on charges that he killed a wounded prisoner of war. He was acquitted in a trial last year that became the first combat-related court-martial since Vietnam.

Another Army private who participated in the occupation of Panama was convicted last year of the murder of a 50-year-old Panamanian woman killed by a stray bullet fired when the private and a fellow sergeant staged a fake gun battle to cover up the loss of a weapon at a brothel. The sergeant was acquitted of murder, but both men were convicted of disobeying orders not to have sexual contact with Panamanian women or to drink alcohol.

Vietnam produced one of the most heinous incidents to result in a court-martial: the 1968 My Lai massacre. Since My Lai, Army commanders have been under orders to vigorously pursue allegations that soldiers violated the rules of war.

Today, American and allied military commanders insist, things are different.

“The military (in the Gulf) would not have been able to do it (maintain strict discipline) if this had been the army of Vietnam,” said a Western diplomat in Riyadh, the Saudi capital.

As troops were being deployed to the conservative, insular kingdom of Saudi Arabia, commanders tried to prepare them for what they were getting into and find ways to avoid inevitable friction. Gen. H. Norman Schwarzkopf, the top allied commander, ordered that his men and women be given instruction on the culture of Islam.

“If you are a male, do not show any type of interest in an Arab woman or female member of an Arab family,” warned one of the brochures distributed to the Americans. “Do not photograph them, stare at them or try to speak to them. Dating, a Western practice, is not a practice in the Arab countries. Do not try to date Arab women.”

In addition to warnings on liquor, troops were ordered not to wear their uniforms in many sections of major cities, and some urban areas were completely off-limits to military personnel through most of the war.

In rural areas, such as the central Saudi town of Kharj, where the allies’ largest air base is located, female members of the Air Force were ordered to wear black abayas (cloaks) and veils--the typical dress of a Saudi woman--whenever they went off-base.

A special liaison was set up to mediate disputes between the Saudis and Americans in an effort to defuse incidents before they became major, embarrassing confrontations.

The most famous incidents involved women military personnel who drove in public and exposed their arms, two violations of law and custom in Saudi Arabia. The so-called religious police became outraged; an oft-repeated tale--no one knows for sure if it’s true--describes a female soldier turning around and belting a religious police vigilante who was haranguing her about not wearing an abaya .

The Saudi government eventually called off the religious fundamentalists, and exceptions were made for American servicewomen. They were allowed to drive military vehicles, for example, but not civilian cars.

The efforts at smoothing cultural differences, the absence of alcohol, the isolation of troops and the better training are all credited with keeping down acts of indiscipline. Also, the war was short enough to avoid the disintegration of morale and discipline that might occur during a longer deployment. Some American officials worry, however, that with the war over and soldiers increasingly eager to go home and with ever-more-idle time on their hands, new troubles could erupt.

MILITARY JUSTICE Military discipline cases in the Gulf since last August are remarkably low. Officials say the ban on alcohol in Saudi Arabia is a strong factor. The numbers: Reports of wrongdoing: 3,506

Courts-martial: 191

Most serious cases: 18

COMPARATIVE YEARS (Courts-martial per 10,000 troops) Fiscal Year 1989 (peace) 71

Gulf War 3 1/2

Source: U.S. Central Command Times staff writer David Freed contributed to this story.