BUDGET : Gulf War Seen Aiding Military Arms Spending : Success of disputed plane, tank cited. Pentagon backers expect to have easier time defending other exotic weapons.

Rep. Beverly B. Byron (D-Md.), a longtime proponent of the A-10 anti-tank plane, was overjoyed when she learned her favorite weapon had performed successfully in the Persian Gulf--so happy, in fact, that she telephoned its one-time opponent, former Rep. Jim Lloyd (D-Los Angeles).

“Remember me?” Byron said, speaking into Lloyd’s answering machine. “It works!”

To Byron and others, the weapon’s performance has more importance than giving them a chance to gloat. They see the Gulf War as strengthening their hand in defending such weapons systems in the bruising Pentagon budget battles that lie ahead.

The Pentagon, for all its triumphs in the Gulf, will not escape the general clampdown on federal spending in coming years. And proponents of the kinds of advanced weapons that proved effective against Iraq will argue that they have been vindicated for resisting the so-called “military reformers,” who spent the last two decades fighting the Pentagon’s move toward high-tech weaponry.

“The military reformers look so bad right now; they’ve been so wrong,” said Sen. Warren B. Rudman (R-N.H.), a member of the Senate defense appropriations subcommittee.

Over the last two decades, several major weapons systems were nearly killed--by Congress or the Pentagon--as a result of political controversies over cost overruns, poor performance ratings or disagreements over their mission.

Rudman said he was particularly proud of his role in saving the Abrams tank, which was a mainstay of the U.S. ground assault against Iraqi forces.

For their part, the reformers counter that the war with Iraq was not a true test of these weapons, which were designed to compete with a sophisticated Soviet war machine. Furthermore, they argue, without prodding from them over the last two decades, the Pentagon would never have fixed the flaws in the weapons.

“If people hadn’t asked questions,” said former Sen. Thomas F. Eagleton (D-Mo.), a longtime Pentagon critic and an early opponent of the Abrams tank, “I’m not so sure that we would have had as good systems as we had in the Gulf.”

Rep. Barbara Boxer (D-Greenbrae), who in 1988 pointed up defects in the Bradley Fighting Vehicle, boasts that, as a result of her efforts, the U.S. military was forced to correct defects in the vehicle that might have cost American lives in the Gulf War.

As for the A-10, former Rep. Lloyd noted that the plane met with little or no resistance in the Gulf and added that he still thinks it is a lousy system. “As long as there is no opposition,” he said sarcastically, “it’s a whale of a piece of equipment.”

On April 18, the House Armed Services will hold a hearing that Chairman Les Aspin (D-Wis.) said will consider: “Who was right?”--the reformers or the pro-Pentagon lawmakers.

Regardless of the answer, there is little question that some things will be different now. As Rudman puts it, “People may be more inclined to give the Pentagon the benefit of the doubt--they’ve earned that.”

Rep. Norm Dicks (D-Wash.), a member of the defense appropriations subcommittee, said the U.S. demonstrated in the Persian Gulf that flawed systems can be fixed.

“It proves that we haven’t been asking the right questions,” Dicks said. “Instead of saying, ‘Let’s kill it and start over again,’ we should be asking, ‘Can we make it work?’ ”

Moreover, Armed Services Committee analyst Warren L. Nelson cautioned, “You have to be careful what kinds of lessons you draw . . . . Every weapons system has its limitations. This is a game of percentages. You don’t demand that every batter for the Yankees bats 1.000.”

WEAPONS THAT ALMOST NEVER WENT TO WAR

* ABRAMS TANK: In 1971, Congress killed the MBT-70, an early predecessor, because it was called “gold-plated.” Despite considerable debate over design flaws in the later version, known as M-1, there was never support to kill it.

* BRADLEY FIGHTING VEHICLE: In December, 1977, GAO reported that it was too slow, too big, too complicated and too expensive. President Carter killed it. Congress revived it the following summer. A decade later, reformers once again were complaining about design flaws. In 1988, after proposals to kill the Bradley were defeated, Congress enacted legislation requring the Army to fix several problems.

* A-10 ANTI-TANK PLANE: Although the Air Force never genuinely wanted this plane or the job of providing close air support to ground troops, the Pentagon repeatedly was forced to defend it against critics who claimed it would be vulnerable to ground fire. In 1980, the House defeated an amendment designed to kill the A-10.

* AH-64A APACHE ATTACK HELICOPTER: Apache’s predecessor, Cheyenne, was canceled in 1969. Despite warnings that the new helicopter had design problems, the Apache entered production in 1982. By 1985, the Defense Department had found several serious flaws. Last year, the GAO concluded that Apache was never properly tested.

* PATRIOT MISSILE: In 1973, pro-Pentagon members of the Senate Armed Services Committee voted by a narrow margin to keep the program alive, and the Senate voted 56-34 against an amendment to kill the missile, then known as SAM-D. Critics said it was too complex and too expensive. But after improvements were made, the missile was deployed in Europe in 1985.