How Could the Kurds Have Misunderstood? : The unintended consequences of demonization of Saddam

President Bush says he is surprised at the criticism his Administration is getting for not rushing to the rescue of Iraq’s Kurds, whose rebellion against Saddam Hussein is being crushed so brutally. So, apparently, is Secretary of State James A. Baker III, who Monday got a first-hand look at the human tragedy unfolding in Kurdish refugee camps as a result of the latest outrage perpetrated by the Iraqi regime.

Bush and Baker shouldn’t be--and neither should the many other Administration officials who, in the weeks and months leading up to the Persian Gulf War, went to such great lengths to demonize Hussein in countless official statements and anonymously sourced news stories. The most vivid--but by no means only--examples were Bush’s constant comparison of Hussein to Adolf Hitler.

No doubt Bush and his aides still believe they had legitimate reasons for using such powerful language in denouncing Iraq’s dictator. They were trying to prepare American opinion for a war they had concluded was inevitable but which they feared could be bloody. But sometimes when things are said for the benefit of American public opinion, others are also listening outside the country, and react according to their own perceptions and hopes. That’s what happened with the Kurds.

Though a substantial minority in Iraq as well as in neighboring Turkey and Iran, the Kurds have longstanding aspirations for nationhood. They also have some very specific grievances--to put it mildly--against the regime in Baghdad. Kurds were among the first to learn how brutally efficient Hussein’s military could be in suppressing his opponents. Many died when the Iraqi army gassed Kurdish villages in the early 1980s, long before many Americans even knew who Saddam Hussein was.

So when Bush, Baker and countless other U.S. foreign policy spokesmen began denouncing the Iraqi leader publicly and repeatedly, what kind of a message did they expect the Kurds (and other anti-Hussein groups, like the Shiite Muslims of southern Iraq) to get? Did they really expect them to understand the nuance of diplomatic double talk? Did they really think they would not take such strong language as a sign that the United States would approve of an uprising against Baghdad?

Administration officials are correct when they point out that the record clearly shows that no U.S. spokesman ever promised this country would help overthrow Hussein. But let’s be realistic: When you compare a man to Hitler and leak news stories that state flatly how glad we’d be if he were ousted from power, that’s little more than the proverbial wink-and-nod. It was a signal that somebody should take this ruler out, with the arguable underlying implication that we’d be there to help if push came to shove.

Push came to shove in Kuwait, and we won more quickly and easily than almost anyone could have hoped. But if the history of this war-torn century teaches anything, it is that all wars--even when they are as relatively brief and successful as the liberation of Kuwait--have unintended consequences. That’s the painful lesson Bush, Baker and company are now learning. Americans can only be sadly thankful we are not suffering as painfully as the Kurds.