A Big and Wise Diplomatic Move

It’s possible that victory in the Persian Gulf brought at least a rhetorical end to the much-discussed Vietnam syndrome. But the Administration’s new diplomatic initiative may do more than that: For if in fact Washington achieves the aim of establishing a normalization of relations between Washington and Hanoi in two years, the deeply seated demons of the Vietnam War may finally be exorcised from the American psyche. Then the war truly will be over.

The diplomatic initiative presented Tuesday by U.S. Assistant Secretary of State Richard H. Solomon to Trinh Xuan Lang, Vietnam’s ambassador to the United Nations, is aimed at expediting a U.N. peace settlement in Cambodia. The strategy is to offer Vietnam a series of economic and trade benefits in exchange for Hanoi’s cooperation in devising a new government structure for Cambodia. Without Vietnam’s cooperation, such government-building cannot succeed.

The initiative will be a road map that could lead to normalizing relations with Vietnam, including lifting of the U.S. trade embargo. Hanoi, starved of Soviet aid, has been eager to trade with this country, and American businesses have long been pressing for an end to the embargo.

State Department officials said acting U.S. Ambassador to Laos Charles B. Salmon Jr. presented a similar list of U.S. conditions for normalizing relations with Cambodia to a Cambodian government official. The Administration’s goal is to jump-start Cambodian peace talks stalled since last fall.

The U.N. peace plan, approved last summer by the U.N. Security Council, calls for the four warring Cambodian factions--the Hanoi-backed government of Premier Hun Sen, the murderous Khmer Rouge and the two non-Communist factions--to share power under the umbrella of a Supreme National Council. The U.N. would oversee the government, arrange a cease-fire and conduct free elections.

Hanoi’s initial cooperation helped bring Hun Sen to the bargaining table and that induced the four factions to accept the U.N. plan. But Hanoi and Phnom Penh reneged on giving up real power to the Supreme National Council for fear of losing too much influence. The Administration’s incentives are designed to show Hanoi and Phnom Penh how they would benefit by cooperating.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III said last summer that talks with Hanoi would be limited to Cambodia. So the Administration’s offer to broaden the Hanoi dialogue is a welcome step toward resolving an animosity that has gone on too long for anyone’s good.