Reading Between the Treaty Lines : Syria-Lebanon pact may not threaten Israel

The new “brotherhood, cooperation and coordination” pact between Lebanon and Syria is a classic example of an unequal treaty in which the stronger partner--Syria--inevitably comes to dominate the foreign and defense policies of the weaker.

With this agreement Syria has taken a giant step toward asserting a hegemony over Lebanon that it claims as a historic right. For 400 years under the Turkish Ottoman Empire the area now called Lebanon was part of a Greater Syria administrative unit. Under their League of Nations mandates France and Britain divided that unit, with France splitting off modern Lebanon in 1920. Syria has never accepted the legitimacy of that partition. At the signing ceremony in Damascus this week Syrian President Hafez Assad underscored the point. “We say we are one people in two separate states . . . (with) the same history, geography and blood.” How long the smaller of those states will remain sovereign is now in question.

Israel’s government is understandably disturbed by this change in the political status quo. Its concerns are strategic. Syria already has about 40,000 troops in Lebanon, sent there as a “peacekeeping” force. But what was originally supposed to be a temporary deployment is increasingly emerging as a permanent one. During the months when the United States and other Western countries were focused on Iraq’s occupation of Kuwait, Syria consolidated its own military position in Lebanon, crushing the Christian militia forces that most opposed it. Syria’s army now controls two-thirds of Lebanon. Israeli officials worry that the new treaty will give Syria a legal basis for bolstering that army and its firepower.

The perceived threat, in other words, is that Israel could find itself with a new military front to its north. Israelis particularly worry about a buildup in Syrian tanks and missiles. The Soviet Union has moved to shut down its weapons pipeline to Syria, but the Damascus regime, freshly refinanced by a Saudi Arabia grateful for its support against Iraq, is now turning to such countries as North Korea and China for ground-to-ground missiles. Israel sees these as a threat. If they were moved into Lebanon they might well trigger a sudden Israeli attack.

The situation, though, may not be as threatening as some think. Syria has always talked tough to Israel. But at the same time it has tended to behave with prudence. One day it may again plan to wage war on Israel. But in the absence of militarily powerful allies--and Syria has none now--such a course could be suicidal.

Syria’s interest in keeping the Lebanon-Israel border quiet for now may in fact be equal to Israel’s. To that end it’s more than possible that Syria next will move to restrain those forces in southern Lebanon--Palestinians and pro-Iranian Lebanese Shiites--whose militancy and cross-border attacks invite Israeli retaliation. The question is whether an Israel grown nervous over Syria’s continuing arms buildup will have the patience to wait and see what develops, rather than moving preemptively in response to its fears.