PERSPECTIVE ON KOREA : Playing Ball on the Peninsula : Let’s respond to the North’s half-hearted overtures on nuclear weapons, even if it means losing some face.

South Korean President Roh Tae Woo and George Bush have much to ponder in their summit meeting that starts today. Neither has illusions that, under the current system, the North will abandon its efforts to undercut the legitimacy of the government in the South and to separate it from its American ally.

Moreover, although Washington and Seoul have successfully deterred a North Korean attack since 1953, acute security concerns have re-emerged as mounting evidence points toward a nuclear-weapons program in the North. Despite its 1985 signature on the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, North Korea has resisted treaty-required inspections of its nuclear facilities by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Pyongyang argues that the United States must first eliminate its “nuclear threat” to the North.

Washington, in turn, insists that North Korea not be rewarded for fulfilling its treaty obligations. Not only does it reject negotiating a reciprocal withdrawal of any American nuclear weapons deployed in South Korea, it has long insisted that it will not raise the level of the two-year-old limited dialogue between the U.S. and North Korean embassies in Beijing until Pyongyang accepts safeguards.

Now, in the face of economic pressures and with its principal allies in Moscow and Beijing ardently pursuing Seoul, North Korea shows signs of a remarkable turnaround on some key issues. Although still dedicated in its domestic policies to its “unique” and highly authoritarian policy of juche (self-reliance), the North appears to be altering major aspects of its foreign policy.

Not only is Pyongyang seeking foreign investment, engaging in high-level talks with the South and striving to normalize relations with Japan, it has recently made an about-face on its United Nations stance. Confronted with almost certain embarrassment this fall when the Soviet Union and China are expected to permit South Korea to join the world body, the North announced that it, too, would apply for separate membership, abandoning its insistance on a single “Korean” seat.

Movement on the nuclear issue is less certain but potentially more significant in the short term. What one discerns from a series of contradictory statements by North Korean officials is that Pyongyang will sign a safeguards agreement with the IAEA, dropping its preconditions regarding elimination of alleged U.S. nuclear deployments in South Korea and adoption of a binding U.S. commitment. However, it appears Pyongyang will delay implementation until there is some movement on its concerns by Washington.

If North Korea does sign an agreement with IAEA, Bush and Roh should consider a bolder and more imaginative approach, not as a deal, and not to reward the North, but to encourage it along the path of accommodation.

After discussion with Roh, Bush should announce that, if North Korea signs an IAEA accord, he will agree to upgrade the U.S.-North Korea dialogue and move it to New York. This would facilitate meaningful exchanges on a number of issues from recovering remains of Korean War MIAs to preventing proliferation of ballistic missiles, combatting international terrorism and promoting a North-South dialogue.

Further, Bush and Roh should announce that they would be responsive if Pyongyang allows full inspections of all nuclear facilities. North Korea denies it is building a nuclear reprocessing plant: Except for producing weapons-grade material, it has no reason to build one. Confirmation of this claim should be part of the process. But assuming these conditions are met, Washington and Seoul should let Pyongyang know that they will take steps to permit an announcement that no nuclear weapons are deployed or stored in South Korea.

Some will object that this is a reward to Pyongyang for fulfilling existing treaty obligations. But it is it is not in the interest of long-term U.S.-South Korean relations nor is it necessary for the maintenance of nuclear deterrence that nuclear weapons be present on Korean soil. If there are any there, they should go.

Insisting that Pyongyang move first will inevitably lead to characterization of any later U.S.-South Korea move as at least an indirect quid pro quo . One must either accept that or move urgently to facilitate an announcement soon that there are no nuclear weapons in the South.

Pyongyang insists on a legally binding, cross-your-heart-and-hope-to-die commitment that the United States will never use nuclear weapons against the North. It insists that the general “negative security assurances” issued by the Carter Administration in 1978, and reiterated by other administrations since, are not sufficient.

A more forthcoming American disclaimer in this regard should be crafted. But it should still be conditioned on the North’s adherence to its own nonaggression and non-nuclear pledges; Pyongyang will have to live with the fact that a residual nuclear umbrella over South Korea remains a political necessity in a situation of continuing mistrust.

Despite North Korea’s persistent attempts to stir up South Korean politics, the salient fact is not only that Seoul is capable of dealing with that threat, but that Pyongyang’s overwhelming priority is now to preserve its own system. While this may prove impossible over the long run, even policy-makers in Seoul agree that sudden, near-term collapse of the North is undesirable; it would be both costly and potentially dangerous. One way to avoid that outcome would be to reduce Pyongyang’s isolation. Responding to North Korean initiatives, however belligerently couched and incomplete, would help.

Washington and Seoul should keep their eye on the ball--the need to stop a North Korean nuclear weapons program and to reduce tensions between North and South Korea. Even if Pyongyang has not quite managed to hit that ball into their court, the United States and South Korea should encroach on the net and hit it back.