PERSPECTIVE ON THE SOVIET UNION : A Once-Great Power Is on Its Knees : ‘Partnership’ with the West has an exorbitant price: capitulation in foreign policy, security, even national identity.

The Bush-Gorbachev summit is the focus of world attention, and justifiably so. It is the first realistic possibility for curbing the nuclear genie that escaped from captivity on Aug. 6, 1945, and terrorized us for nearly half a century.

Great hopes are pinned to the treaty emerging from the summit. But the atmosphere of euphoria leads me to ponder certain elements of Soviet foreign policy.

The current summit, unlike previous summits, takes place at a time when the Soviet Union is in the grip of an abysmal political and economic crisis. This enables the United States to defend its vital interests more efficiently (including at the expense of the interests of the Soviet Union). One can hardly assert these days that relations between the Soviet Union and the United States are equal. The Soviet role on the world scene is steadily declining. Discussions are already under way on the possible consequences of the elimination of the Soviet Union as a nation as the result of disintegrative processes that are gaining momentum inside the country.

A Soviet diplomat who works at the United Nations told me a sad joke that is making the rounds there. One diplomat asks another: “What is the ‘new world order?’ ” The answer: “It is the old world order with the Soviet Union on its knees.”

Indeed, our country, which was listed as a superpower only a short while ago and made its voice heard on the world scene, is on its knees. Over the past six years the series of blunders and miscalculations by the architects of perestroika has led to a situation in which our country resembles a disaster area hit by a destructive tornado.

In 1985 the need for perestroika was explained by, among other things, the fact that our economy was stagnating and industrial output was growing at a rate of 1% to 2% a year. Six years later, industrial production is declining and the cabinet of ministers takes credit for keeping the decline at a level of 6% in May and June. Addressing the Supreme Soviet, KGB Chairman Vladimir Kryuchkov reminded members that our industrial production dropped just 8% during World War II, with half of the European part of the Soviet Union in ruins from the Nazi invasion.

In foreign relations, we have lost all of our former allies. Today the position of these countries concerning their former “big brother” is very tough. The system of military-political security that took decades to create has been destroyed. The main achievement of Soviet foreign policy is seen as the removal of confrontational elements from Soviet-American relations and the launching of a stage of “partnership.” Broad announcements have been made about the termination of the Cold War, new political thinking and the removal of ideological frictions from international relations, which should supposedly be dominated by universal human values. One even hears talk of a common European home, a lunatic asylum-cum-brothel with a comfortable berth for the Soviet Union.

But isn’t it too early to speak of a conflict-free relationship between us and the world, between us and our neighbors and opponents? There have always been differences between the United States and the Soviet Union, just as there have always been differences between the United States and Japan, between the Federal Republic of Germany and Great Britain; and they are bound to remain in place in the future. Isn’t it too early for us to give up on our own foreign policy?

The character of Soviet relations with the United States and other Western nations has undoubtedly changed. So far, this has led only to a regrouping of political forces in the world and has by no means removed the sting from north-south confrontations. No realist would act on the basis of vague promises of U.S. and West European leaders not to regard the Soviet Union as an enemy. Instead, the practical steps they have taken toward the Soviet Union in political, economic and military fields should be analyzed. There is no escaping the actual price paid for the positive changes in Soviet-U.S. relations, an exorbitant price for what has been acquired. It is no less than political capitulation, retreat in all directions, the impermissible concessions to the United States and the West that are causing irreparable damage to the national interest of the Soviet Union and transforming it into a second-rate country that is fully dependent on its so-called patrons.

What we witness these days is the collapse of perestroika’s last myth--the myth of the brilliant foreign policy of our country. There can be no success in foreign policy at a time when the country is in a mess. We deceive ourselves when we think that the world has become safer. The developments in Yugoslavia are a striking example.

In view of its domestic political instability, the Soviet Union of today poses an even greater threat to the West than in the years of Stalin and Khrushchev, simply because its behavior is unpredictable. When conflicts occur and blood flows in Yugoslavia, it’s one thing, for Yugoslavia is not in the league of militarily powerful states. If the Yugoslavian scenario is acted out in a nuclear superpower that has thousands of warheads, it’s an entirely different matter. The West’s more far-sighted politicians are well aware of that.

Therefore, while I welcome the conclusion of a treaty that reduces strategic offensive arms, I’m looking into the future with utmost concern: What’s there, at the end of the tunnel?