THE PULSE OF EUROPE : On Democracy : Mistrust Imperils Newfound Freedom : * In Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union, citizens are alienated from the emerging democratic institutions.

“Trust in social institutions is lacking,” complained a lawyer and member of Parliament of this nation that was once ancient Thrace--”(trust) in legislative, executive and legal powers. And this is a common problem for the whole of Eastern Europe.”

“A new ‘social contract’ is needed that will make people believe in state institutions,” he added almost despairingly. “All the rest is in second place. Without trust in the state institutions, it is hard to hope that we will develop democracy.”

The Bulgarian lawyer’s fear reflected a key finding of the Times Mirror Poll: Democracy, the political hope for all of the former Communist lands of Europe, may now be half a continent wide; but it’s barely a foot deep. It is young and fragile and threatened. And all the newly democratized nations of Eastern Europe are anxiously aware that authoritarianism, which ruled the region for a millennium, still lurks dangerously, just below the surface.

“Will Polish democratic institutions be able to safeguard democracy against the rising tide of demands, the tide of disappointment with market economy, disappointment with democratic institutions?” asked a young political activist in Bialystok.

Democracy is credited with having carried the day against the August coup attempt in the Soviet Union, and in fact, more than 60% of Russians support multi-party pluralism rather than a strong leader. But the Times Mirror Poll also found extraordinary public mistrust of governing bodies throughout the former Communist world--and increasing political alienation among these peoples who still do not feel their new votes count for much.

In a different form, the poll also revealed significant levels of alienation in Western Europe where individuals say they are increasingly fed up with their politicans and have turned their backs on politics.

Certainly in Russia and the Ukraine, the pillars of a civil, democratic society--such as functioning political parties that form a loyal opposition, the legitimacy of interest groups like trade unions and the rule of law as overseen by courts and police--do not yet exist. To a disturbing degree, these peoples do not yet know how to relate to such institutions.

“I have not had much trust in the words perestroika and glasnost from the very beginning,” admitted a businesswoman in Volgograd, deep in the Russian heartland, “because our country is notorious for living with certain slogans and mottoes that are meaningless.

“They are stretchable concepts, including democratization,” she added, “because we have no structures or institutions that could function without fail” to provide the vital checks and balances and ensure the rule of law.

“My wife and I think the situation today can end two ways,” a 30-year-old Moscow engineer said with resignation. “In a normal and civilized way, or in what Pushkin called ‘the Russian riot, senseless and bloody.’ ”

“Someone said that ours is a country with an unpredictable past,” sighed a young philologist in Moscow, referring to the repeated rewritings of history during Communist days. “I’d say our future is unpredictable, too. Anything is possible here. All variations.”

In East Europe, in the thin sliver of mostly Slavic states from the Baltic to the Black seas, as well as in Russia and the Ukraine, overwhelming majorities approve of the change to multi-party pluralism, believing that democracy is their best chance in the new world.

In addition to facilitating free-market economies, democracies promise peace. When “governments are under the control of legal public institutions,” said Russian Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev, “this practically rules out pursuance of an aggressive foreign policy.” Democracies could thus at least mitigate the dangers posed by resurfacing ethnic hatred and by the barely hidden desire to recover former lands.

For ordinary citizens, the new opportunities to take part in politics sometimes have an exhilarating effect. But, reflecting their recent history, some seem embarrassed by their enthusiasm.

“There is a greater opportunity to be committed, how shall I say, to public service, in a political--that’s a nasty word--way,” said a middle-aged shopkeeper in Prague with a shy smile.

“I liked very much the (1990) elections when we prepared the necessary things like ballots, and plenty of people took part spontaneously, willing to help, without getting anything in reward, or expecting it, except democracy being established here,” she added.

But most East Europeans are critical of the newly emerging political institutions, particularly the parliaments, and of their political leaders, the Times Mirror Poll found.

Parliaments fared worst among all social institutions in the region, with disapproval running as high as 5 to 1 in Slovakia. Hungary was only slightly less critical of its legislature.

“They have bandages over their eyes, solving problems in the dark, without a program, a definite goal,” a university librarian in the Hungarian town of Debrecen complained. “It’s like a circus.”

“There are so many changes that one has no confidence in the new system either,” said a Budapest university student. “I hear speeches in Parliament, prices are going up, but the state is incapable of presenting a comprehensive program.”

Public criticism sometimes focuses on marginal diversions, such as the time spent on peripheral issues like national symbols. Should the Polish eagle again wear a crown? Should the Hungarian emblem be again topped by the Holy Crown of St. Stephen? (The Parliament members voted yes, in both cases.)

But the most substantive criticism dealt with delays in passing laws to privatize the state-owned economy. Among almost every national group, there were complaints that the economy is being reformed too slowly. Hungarians are most impatient, with those saying that reforms are lagging in the majority by a 5-to-1 margin. Only the Slovaks, who feel especially hurt by the changes, believe reform is moving too fast.

The conclusion is that impatience with economic changes is causing disenchantment with the fragile democratic processes in the region, with potentially ominous consequences.

Placing the blame on the parliaments for economic foot-dragging is not wholly fair, however. Delays in enacting privatization laws also reflect the ambiguity within these former East Bloc peoples the concept of private property, the survey found.

Mentally, they do not appear prepared for the leap. Interviews associated with the survey found many people who expressed fears of the risks associated with free enterprise. They also fear the “politics of envy”--neighbors who would smear them if they became successful. And finally, they were concerned that their concept of egalitarianism would be trampled by allowing anyone to become very rich.

“Is our society ready for economic independence, for the inequality that goes with private property in which some get very rich?” asked a 30-year-old Kiev lawyer. “The psychology of equality is so strong in our society that I’m not sure we are ready for private property.”

“I’m for private property, and privatization is necessary and inevitable, and the sooner the better,” commented a 27-year computer programmer. “But I’m afraid to be a pioneer on this wagon. Something tells me to wait. While we have a dictatorship of jealousy, it’s hard to have private property.”

In the end, the survey found seeming contradictions. All peoples in all countries approved overwhelmingly of the change to a multi-party system. Most of them similarly approved overwhelmingly of the change to free market economies, with Russia and the Ukraine least enthusiastic (with 52% and 53% majorities, respectively.)

But when asked about the combined political and economic changes of the past two years, the responses were much more hedged. Most East European nations approved wholeheartedly, but the jury is still out in Hungary and Slovakia, where the changes get only marginal approval. And in Russia and the Ukraine, the combined transformations are overwhelmingly disapproved by almost two to one.

Beyond the performance of parliaments and the psychological disorientation of the peoples in the region, East European publics are deeply suspicious of most of their leaders and of their motives. (Czechoslovak President Vaclav Havel is the outstanding exception.)

They do not believe, despite all the Communist propaganda of the past four decades, that the state is run for the benefit of the people. And they are highly dubious that their votes count; majorities or huge minorities in most of the former Soviet Bloc peoples (Czechs and Bulgarians excepted) do not agree that voting gives them some say about how the government runs things.

Americans are also skeptical that their elected officials care about them, but 73% do think that voting empowers them. In Western Europe, the French and Spaniards feel about the same as East Europeans, with Italians the most alienated; only 49% believe their votes count.

“I see myself absolutely impotent, powerless,” declared Giorgio Alpeggiani, a corporation lawyer in Milan. “I am so angry with the government, I don’t know what to do. My stomach is like this,” he fumed, churning his hands.

But this frustration is due in large part to Italy’s remarkable stability amid seeming political turmoil. The country has had 50 changes of government since World War II--more than one per year--but most of them have been little more than reshuffles of the same political faces. So while Italians may feel impotent and distrustful of others in society, Italy has also enjoyed increasing economic prosperity.

Promising signs for democratic development were found throughout the former Communist region. Large majorities support politicians who are willing to compromise, for example. Although highly critical of the press, all oppose greater constraints such as censorship on the media.

But disturbing signals also were seen. Unlike Western Europe, huge majorities in all former Communist states would deny freedom of speech to fascists. All would also ban books with ideas “dangerous to society”; some Western publics also feel this way, but by much smaller margins.

Some sympathy for authoritarianism appeared in the willingness of majorities in almost every East European country to circumscribe their freedoms for material guarantees. All except Czechs would prefer the state to play an active role to guarantee that no one is in need, rather than allow everyone to freely pursue his or her life’s goal without state interference.

Eastern Germans showed significantly different attitudes compared to their Western cousins on this issue: Far more favored state intervention (68%) over freedom, compared to the West (41%). Similarly, the easterners were less critical of state-run enterprises: only 24% agreed that such firms are usually inefficient and wasteful, while nearly half (45%) of West Germans did.

Large minorities in Russia and the Ukraine favor a strong leader rather than democracy (39% and 30%, respectively), a view that was echoed throughout the region in group interviews.

“I do not favor a good czar, but I do want a wise ruler,” said a city official in Lugansk, in the eastern Ukraine.

“I see Bulgaria as a monarchy,” said a drama critic in Sofia. “The coming chaos will bring us to a situation where we will need the czar to guarantee our boundaries.”

“Liberty for us has always been the forbidden fruit,” added a Polish priest in Krakow. “The paradox of freedom is that once it is achieved, it’s a great burden, which everybody would like to shed. One of the forms of escape from liberty is to long for what we had before, authoritarianism.”

And a Polish historian said “There exists in our country a clientele for totalitarianism.” Even President Lech Walesa shows a capacity for becoming an authoritarian figure, he said.

As for Moscow, Russian Federation President Boris N. Yeltsin’s immediate post-coup actions, including banning Communist publications and the party by decree, hinted at an authoritarian inclination.

A related question is what these peoples are to eat while their parliaments debate.

“People are disappointed in politics because it can’t bring immediate material changes in their lives, which is clearly impossible,” said a university official in Debrecen, Hungary. “There is a real danger they will become more and more apolitical or even turn to extremist groups.”

“Yes, political freedom is interesting,” echoed a Leningrad teacher, “but for only a small part of the population. Economic freedom is necessary for everyone.”

The emphasis on improving the standard of living throughout the region led repeatedly to admiring remarks for autocratic governments abroad that have thriving market economies, including South Korea and Taiwan, as well as Spain under Francisco Franco and Chile under Augusto Pinochet. Many people in the former Soviet Bloc would trade democracy for short-term authoritarian rule in order to achieve prosperity.

But left unanswered was the chicken-and-egg dilemma: Which should take priority, economic or political reform?

“A political democracy cannot exist without a free-market economy,” the Polish history professor argued.

“If the bomb (social revolution) explodes,” said a Hungarian history teacher, “it will be because of chaotic economic problems. It was political pressure before; now it’s going to explode because of economic pressure.”

But a Prague woman insisted that political change must come first. “The economy won’t be reformed by old politicians, only by new ones,” she said.

And in Bulgaria, a lawyer insisted that “political stability is a necessary condition for economic reform.” Without democracy’s independent courts and the law to enforce contracts and protect private property, free-market economies cannot exist, he said.

LINKING UPHEAVAL AND MORALITY How have political changes affected public changes affected public morality in their countries? A dim view from Eastern Europe

Country Good influence Bad influence Czechoslovakia 12% 80% Germany (total) 24% 49% Poland 29% 39% Germany (East) 17% 73% Hungary 11% 79% Russia 7% 76% Bulgaria 11% 73% Germany (West) 27% 42% Lithuania 49% 37% Ukraine 8% 77%