Diplomacy as Theater: The Kabuki Dance of Soviet-Cuban Relations : Cuba: Despite Washington’s greeting of a ‘new’ agenda, Gorbachev’s announcement about Havana said nothing we haven’t heard before.

Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s highly touted “announcement” concerning Moscow’s ties with Cuba was not so much an announcement as well-staged theater. There was almost nothing new in what he said. For well over a year now, the Soviets have been moving to place their economic ties with Cuba on a commercial basis. Gorbachev’s Sept. 10 statement simply reaffirmed that economic relations will continue to move in that direction--with bilateral trade definitely continuing.

Both Gorbachev and Boris N. Yeltsin had already said a gradual troop withdrawal was in the works. Gorbachev’s statement signaled the first concrete step in that process. Moscow, he said, will soon discuss with Havana the withdrawal of one unit, the Soviet brigade of 1978 fame. The intention clearly is to withdraw all troops, but there is no timetable; it may take many months, even years.

The Cubans were unhappy that Gorbachev did not get a greater quid for his quo--specifically, a U.S. commitment to withdraw from the Guatanamo Naval Base--and that he informed the rest of the world before telling them discussions would soon begin. But as one Cuban diplomat in Washington noted: “Otherwise, there was nothing we did not already know about.”

If there was nothing new in the statement, why was it given headline treatment by the U.S. media? Because the Bush Administration greeted it as a dramatic new departure. Secretary of State James A. Baker III said it was an important step; his aides rushed to assure the accompanying press corps that this was a breakthrough. Spin doctors back in Washington expressed pleased surprise over this “unexpected gesture.”

Why give it such an interpretation? Because the Administration had created a problem for itself. Even before last year’s Soviet shift toward trade on a commercial basis, the Central Intelligence Agency’s estimates of Soviet aid--like most CIA estimates--were not worth the paper they were printed on. The agency’s figure of $5 billion to $8 billion was reached largely by grossly overvaluing the ruble and thus calculating that the Soviets were paying huge subsidies for Cuban goods--when they were often paying under the world market price.

Whatever the balance on paper, both countries benefitted from the trade. The Soviets needed the sugar, nickel and citrus products; the Cubans needed the petroleum, wheat and other commodities they received. Nonetheless, late last year, the Soviets moved to place trade more fully on a commercial basis, with accounts kept in dollars rather than rubles. At that point, “aid”--to the extent that there was any--became trade.

All that withstanding, the Bush Administration, like a broken record, continued to complain about billions of dollars in Soviet subsidies. As it should have foreseen, that backfired. Suddenly, just as the Administration was deciding it served U.S. interests to provide assistance to the Soviet Union, Congress, taking its cue from the Administration’s own posturing, resolved there wouldn’t be any aid to Moscow until the latter halted its “massive subsidies” to Havana. How to get out of the corner? A bit of theater was needed, and the Administration provided it, greeting Gorbachev’s restatements of policy as dramatic new concessions.

Fine. Let’s hope it works. Establishing a new relationship with the Soviets is of fundamental importance to the United States, and economic assistance is likely to be a key element in that effort. Cuba, on the other hand, no longer represents a problem. Its troops are out of Africa. The guerrilla wars in Latin America are over or winding down. Concerns over a Soviet threat mounted from Cuba had dissipated even before the troop withdrawal. Indeed, even if Soviet aid to Cuba were continuing, it would make little sense to demand its termination as a precondition to an expanded relationship with Moscow. The latter is critical, the former a matter of no significance.

While the Gorbachev statement leaves Fidel Castro’s situation unchanged, that does not mean it is an enviable one. On the contrary, disruptions in his ties with Moscow in the past two years have left Castro’s economy in the doldrums. Collapse is not imminent. But if Castro is not to face economic disaster and perhaps a bloody upheaval, he must make sweeping changes--moving to a mixed economy and a more open political system.

Despite Castro’s public vows of “socialism or death,” changes are afoot in Cuba, such as the energetic expansion of the tourist industry and biotech exports. More important, Castro has invited foreign private capital to participate in joint ventures with Cuban enterprises--not just in tourism, but in every area of the economy. Foreign capitalists, moreover, can not only repatriate profits but also send in their own management teams.

This foreign capital could change the face of the Cuban economy. But it is up to the Cubans: If they want to attract more private capital, they must move more rapidly toward privatization.

But U.S. pressure is also an inhibiting factor. Because joint ventures are a long step toward a mixed economy, the Bush Administration should applaud them. Instead, it is threatening reprisals against companies--be they Brazilian, Spanish or Mexican--that invest in Cuba. As one Cuban diplomat noted, “You say you want us to move toward a market economy, but when we take a step in that direction, you oppose it.”

Earlier on, important political changes had also been discussed--innovations such as direct elections to the National Assembly, perhaps permitting the formation of other parties (though not their participation in elections), and removing all discriminatory lines against religious believers. Some measures may still be adopted at the Fourth Party Congress, scheduled for mid-October, but Castro seems to be shifting toward caution--announcing a few cosmetic changes to keep the lid on but not enough to launch a true reform program. In part, this results from his determination, stimulated by recent events in the Soviet Union, not to permit any unraveling to begin. Again, however, it also has to do with unrelenting U.S. pressure. As Cubans loyal to Castro increasingly conclude that nothing short of his head on a platter will end U.S. hostility, they are preparing not so much for reforms as to fight to the end.

Washington should be working for peaceful change in Cuba, relaxing tensions and indicating that steps toward a more open political and economic system will meet with a positive response. Instead, it is increasing efforts to isolate Havana and vowing not to engage until Cuba holds democratic elections and adopts a market economy. Couching ultimate objectives as preconditions is obtuse diplomacy. In this case, it may provoke a bloody denouement.

In taking such a rigid position, moreover, the Administration displays a flagrant double standard. President George Bush defends an extensive relationship with China on the ground that no purpose is served by trying to isolate the other country; rather, constructive engagement is the ticket. But if that is the U.S. approach to China, Kuwait, Syria and Saudi Arabia--all with worse human-rights records than Cuba’s and none having held democratic elections--why is it not the case with Cuba? This is a question the Administration has never been able to answer.