Enough Fiddling: Get Hussein : Iraq: The goal should be to end the dictator’s regime and assist in the creation of a new government. Delay will only make matters more costly.

The confrontation between the United Nations and Saddam Hussein over the rights of U.N. inspectors to carry out Security Council resolutions should bring to an end the international debate over what is to be done about Iraq. World leaders must make the difficult decision to eliminate Hussein’s regime.

Regardless of President George Bush’s motives, his decision not to finish off the Iraqi dictator during the Persian Gulf War has enabled Hussein to consolidate his grip on his country, ruthlessly suppress domestic dissent, intimidate his neighbors and continue, almost without pause, efforts to build and field weapons of mass destruction.

Deterrence does not work with Hussein. Quite the contrary. His well-documented record of violent aggression, of support for international terrorism and of political miscalculation should remind world leaders that Hussein’s occasional rational behavior and tactical retreats are only means to buy time to restore Iraq’s military capabilities. In the past, for example, Hussein used the rubric of international law to argue that agreements entered into by Iraq under duress are meaningless, such as the 1975 Algiers Accord with Iran. Hussein justified his 1979 invasion of Iran on that basis.

Hussein did not assemble the means for creating a “super gun,” or for developing nuclear, chemical or biological weapons to demonstrate how such devices would operate peacefully. Rather, he relentlessly pursues his campaign to acquire these weapons for one unambiguous reason: Hussein has the will to use them to achieve his political objectives. That is why, despite the severe potential costs, he has detained U.N. inspectors who have uncovered convincing proof of Iraq’s nuclear-weapons capabilities.

Remember Iraq’s “human shields.” Terrorist behavior dies hard in Baghdad. Even Hussein’s most deluded Western supporters will be unable to defend Iraq when the evidence of its nuclear-weapons program is made public.

Since Hussein’s regime has neither self-destructed nor been brought down by the indigenous forces the Gulf coalition hoped would rise up against him, the fundamental question for world leaders is how to prevent Hussein from realizing his long-term goals: elimination of Western influence in the region, achievement of a leading position in the Arab World, hegemony throughout the Persian Gulf and arbiter of oil supply and price.

The international response to Hussein’s bloody, lawless behavior in Kuwait laid the groundwork for a post-Cold War order firmly rooted in the rule of law backed by appropriate measures of collective action under the auspices of an invigorated U.N. But it was clearly not enough to eliminate the threats posed by the Iraqi dictator.

The U.N. can--and should--play a central role in the demilitarization and reform of Iraq. But it is a creature of its members. Accordingly, the United States, in consultation with its coalition partners, must resume the role it so adroitly played during Desert Shield and Desert Storm.

This time, however, U.S. and coalition policy toward Iraq should be straightforward and unequivocal. The fundamental policy goal should be to end the regime of Hussein and to assist in the creation of a new government in Iraq. The switch to a democratic form of government can be accomplished only by first liberating Iraq from Hussein’s hold, followed by the gradual implementation, under U.N. administration, of a set of political and economic initiatives.

These steps should be set in motion immediately:

--Hussein and his Baathist clique must step down or be forcibly removed from power and brought to justice for war crimes and criminal behavior, which continues.

--Iraq must be demilitarized, including demobilizing the Iraqi army.

--The territorial integrity of Iraq should be guaranteed by the Security Council and the country occupied by coalition forces under the U.N. flag.

--The Security Council should create the post of a high commissioner for Iraq, whose mission would be to administer the occupation and manage political reform. One result could be a loose confederation of autonomous mini-states--Kurd, Shiite, and Sunni--akin to what is happening in the former Soviet Union.

--Economic sanctions should be ended and the World Bank assigned responsibility for the reconstruction of the infrastructure of Iraq.

It is clear that limited political, economic, military or covert actions will not suffice to implement this policy. Hussein’s grip is too tight. Nor can the Saudis, Syrians, Iranians or any other regional power promote a coup that will overthrow him. Just as there can be no delusions about Hussein, there can be no delusions about the will or capabilities or our regional allies.

As with the liberation of Kuwait, the liberation of Iraq must involve the massive and rapid application of force against the instruments of coercion that keep Hussein’s regime in power. As in Desert Storm, the military coalition should be given clear objectives, and the world’s political leaders should eschew the incongruous notion that the application of military power is somehow unrelated to politics. The goal of this policy is clear and within reach if the U.N and coalition leaders can match Hussein’s powerful will to act decisively.

Some will argue that such a policy smacks of neocolonialism or America’s failed policies in Vietnam. There will be knee-jerk protests that it is inherently wrong for the United States and its coalition partners to “impose” Western-style democracy in the Arab world, as if self-originating, self-perpetuating, repressive and brutal dictatorships are politically legitimate.

The future of Iraq, they will protest, should be left to the Iraqi “people,” as though the Iraqi people possess the political freedom to choose, or even influence, their leaders. Some will even argue that U.S. and coalition interests in the Gulf, let alone the implications for world order, do not merit the continuing commitment of political and military resources that such a policy would demand.

Regrettably, should world leaders fail to act decisively now, Hussein will be the one to strike the next blow. Whatever means he chooses, if the world waits for him to make the first move, it will inevitably be much more difficult and costly to bring stability, democracy and the rule of law to the Persian Gulf.