COLUMN RIGHT / RICHARD BURT / ROSE GOTTEMOELLER : Start Sooner on U.S.-Soviet Nuclear Safety : Arms treaty is on hold, but verification steps could begin now, easing U.S. concerns.

President Bush has outlined a long-range vision for the role of nuclear weapons in America’s national security policy. But we are faced with a more immediate concern, which is how instability in the Soviet Union could affect global security. With the recently completed strategic arms accord on hold, the United States and the Soviet Union should move now to implement part of that agreement in order to relieve worldwide concern over the status and fate of Moscow’s huge nuclear arms stockpile.

The arms reduction treaty, START, which was signed by Presidents Bush and Gorbachev in July, contains a set of revolutionary procedures for monitoring and verifying numbers and locations of U.S. and Soviet nuclear missiles and bombers. However, with future Soviet political developments in doubt, START is unlikely to be ratified by either the Senate or the reborn Supreme Soviet before next spring, if then. As a result, we are likely to miss the treaty’s important contribution to nuclear stability at the very moment in Soviet history when we need it the most.

The growing need to shore up Soviet nuclear security was vividly underscored during the tumultuous days of the August coup, when President Mikhail Gorbachev’s “football”--his command and control link to Soviet nuclear forces--was seized by hard-line conspirators for 48 hours or so. But perhaps a more alarming development was the apparently unilateral decision by the commander-in-chief of the Soviet rocket forces, in the midst of the crisis, to call SS-25 mobile missiles back into their garrisons from their hiding places in the field. As it turned out, this move was probably meant to signal that Moscow’s arsenal was in responsible hands. But it could have been otherwise.

Now a new problem has emerged, in the form of the possible proliferation of Soviet nuclear weapons within an increasingly decentralized and fragmented Soviet Union. For instance, Nursultan Nazarbayev, the forceful leader of Kazakhstan, earlier said he wanted Soviet nuclear weapons off his territory; now, apparently fearing Russian nuclear hegemony, not only is he implying that he wants the weapons to stay but he also is demanding a role in Soviet nuclear decision-making.

While there is no simple, complete solution to the Soviet nuclear control problem, the verification and confidence-building elements of START would go a long way to alleviate concerns over the changing status of Moscow’s nuclear arsenal. Thus, rather than waiting months for ratification, Washington and Moscow should move quickly now to implement three groups of measures in the accord.

-- Data exchange: Under the treaty, the two sides have agreed to provide one another information on numbers, locations and characteristics of weapons. Military experts have already exchanged one batch of information, but the treaty calls for periodic updates that would be especially useful if, as seems probable, the situation concerning Soviet nuclear arms in non-Russian republics remains ambiguous.

-- Notifications: In addition to exchanging information, the two sides have also agreed to a regime that requires them to provide one another hundreds of formal nuclear notifications each year. These notifications cover the movement of missiles from storage areas to launcher sites; the beginning and end of missile training exercises, and large-scale bomber flights.

-- On-site inspection: As helpful as nuclear data exchanges and notifications would be, there is no substitute for having American inspectors on the ground, able to see for themselves that the Soviet nuclear arsenal is secure.

While the idea of implementing part of the arms treaty now may sound unusual, the two sides have done something similar in the past. In 1989, President Bush proposed a series of “verification and stability” measures in Geneva. These proposals called for the two sides to work out the details of the procedures and try them out prior to treaty ratification. The Soviets agreed, and the trial inspections that followed contributed to the treaty’s far-reaching verification system.

In the long run, of course, it will be important to ratify and implement all of START, particularly the provisions substantially reducing Soviet missile power. And it will also be important for the two to have a comprehensive discussion on nuclear command and control. For now, however, we already have the key pieces of a unique nuclear management regime in hand. It should be put to work right away.