Any Other Nuclear Nightmares Out There? : As Iraq revelations show, there’s almost no way of knowing

Confident assurances last January by President Bush and American commanders that allied bombing had all but eliminated Iraq’s nuclear weapons projects are now seen to have been based on an alarming ignorance of the true extent of Baghdad’s nuclear program.

On-the-ground evidence gathered by international inspectors working under the aegis of the United Nations makes it chillingly clear that Saddam Hussein’s efforts to build nuclear weapons were both larger and further along than prewar intelligence estimates supposed. Work was even progressing on fabricating lithium-6--the fuel used in hydrogen bombs. Iraq may indeed have been within 12 to 18 months of acquiring a nuclear device, a development of nightmarish human and political implications for the whole of the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

In a report to the U.N. Security Council the inspection team describes an installation about 40 miles south of Baghdad that seems to have been at the center of the program “to design and produce a nuclear device.” The installation, called Al Atheer, was known to U.S. intelligence agencies, but its importance apparently had been underestimated. The U.N. team says that only about 15% of Al Atheer’s buildings were hit by allied bombing. Other sites believed to be involved with nuclear weapons development were attacked more heavily and damaged more extensively.

Al Atheer’s significance was revealed by a partial examination of the approximately 25,000 documents that the inspectors removed from Iraq last month under the authority of Security Council resolutions. Iraq did its best to thwart the loss of this highly sensitive material, even detaining the inspectors in a Baghdad parking lot for four days to try to make them yield seized photographs and papers describing Iraq’s nuclear program.

These seized documents, and the on-site work carried out by the U.N. team, are crucial to understanding the scope of Iraq’s efforts. Earlier intelligence monitoring showed that Iraq was pursuing a nuclear weapons program but did not disclose the program’s full range. Information on the reach of the operation probably came from defectors, at least one of whom contacted allied troops in northern Iraq earlier this year. It was clearly on the basis of inside information that the U.N. inspectors knew precisely what buildings, what rooms, what filing cabinets to go to as they carried out their searches in Iraq.

The forces opposing nuclear proliferation were lucky to get that information. Such luck can’t be counted on in other cases. North Korea, Libya and Iran are among the countries that are hostile to the West and are believed to be pursuing covert nuclear weapons programs. As with Iraq, technical reconnaissance of their efforts may well be disturbingly insufficient. Closer, more focused surveillance is urgently required.

Iraq used hundreds of foreign suppliers for its nuclear weapons projects, often disguising the destination and the end use of the supplies it bought. Intelligence agencies around the world know what equipment and products go into making nuclear weapons and the systems for delivering them. The sources of these products also are known. What’s needed is a more extensive and cooperative international effort to monitor the movement of these products to countries on the non-proliferation watch list. What also may be needed are much tougher national laws and penalties to curb the willingness of some suppliers to sell dangerous nuclear-related materials and equipment to anyone willing to pay the price.

Nuclear weapons in the hands of a Saddam Hussein are a horror almost too ghastly to contemplate. The world came perilously close to having to confront that horror. One prospective nuclear surprise is enough. It’s time to become more serious--and if need be more intrusive--about halting the spread of nuclear weapons.