Communists + Pluralism: Bulgaria’s Political Miracle : Democracy: Bulgaria was the first country of the Warsaw Pact to adopt a new constitution. Now it has held two free national elections.

Unlike in June, 1990, when crowds gathered to celebrate an expected opposition victory, the scene outside the Bulgarian Palace of Culture here was calm on election night. Perhaps Bulgarians feared being disappointed anew: After all, before last week’s elections, many experts predicted the former Communist Party--now renamed the Bulgarian Socialist Party (BSP)--would again obtain the largest number of seats in the National Assembly and control a majority of the municipalities.

Voters, however, confounded the experts. The Union of Democratic Forces (UDF), controlled by a group of opposition activists, won a narrow plurality over the BSP. Meanwhile, the Movement for Rights and Freedom, supported largely by ethnic Turks, won enough seats to hold the balance of power in the new legislature. Most surprisingly, no other parties, including the coalition identified with President Zhelu Zhelev, reached the 4% threshold required for representation.

These elections marked the latest step in Bulgaria’s extraordinary transition to pluralism, which, compared to its Eastern European neighbors, has been the most intriguing.

Unlike Poland, Czechoslovakia and Hungary, no well-developed, alternative political society existed in Bulgaria. There was no group ready to assume the mantle of power relinquished by the communist regime. Nor was the situation like Romania--where the lack of an alternative contributed to the hijacking of the revolution by former leaders of the old regime. It has taken almost two years for a pluralist society to emerge in Bulgaria--notwithstanding the survival of a reformed Communist Party, with its continuing political influence.

With the 1990 elections, Bulgaria became the only country in the region where a self-identified, reformed Communist Party won. This pattern has since been repeated in Serbia and, more recently, in Albania. Observers attributed the BSP’s 1990 success to residual fears that existed among large sectors of the rural population and the limited time that the opposition had to organize.

That BSP victory proved Pyrrhic, however. Street demonstrations forced the president to resign. In his place, the leader of the opposition, Zhelev, was elected.

Despite its majority in the National Assembly, the BSP found it could not govern alone. The opposition, however, first refused to join a coalition government, fearing cooptation and blame for Bulgaria’s severe economic crisis. Finally, in December, 1990, after a long period of political stagnation, a new government, composed of representatives of three leading parties and political independents, was formed.

With the country facing an extreme economic crisis last winter, many Bulgarians, particularly the young and educated, could not accept that a reformed Communist Party had won a relatively fair election. There seemed a general distrust of institutions and great anxiety about the future.

The schizophrenic nature of the transition was best exemplified by the decision of some UDF legislators to leave the National Assembly in May. They argued that political forces in the Assembly, with a “communist” majority, did not reflect the current public mood and that adoption of a new constitution under such circumstances would perpetuate the privileges and influence of the former Communist Party elite. Thus, they sought immediate dissolution of the Assembly.

Other UDF members, supported by President Zhelev, responded that dissolution would be economically disastrous. Legislation was needed to stimulate needed foreign investment and acquire economic assistance from multilateral agencies. In the end, the Assembly overwhelmingly adopted a new constitution, making Bulgaria the first of the Warsaw Pact countries to accomplish this feat.

Dissident UDF legislators sought to dramatize their displeasure with the constitution by orchestrating a hunger strike outside Parliament, but the gesture failed to win popular support and was soon abandoned. They focused instead on the scheduled elections. This time, the dissident legislators held the upper hand, having assumed control of the UDF’s organizational structure.

UDF legislators who had signed the constitution soon found themselves unwanted by their former allies. Zhelev, as the titular head of the opposition and the most popular figure in Bulgaria, sought to reunite the coalition or to form a more grand super-coalition, but his efforts failed.

Ultimately, four UDF factions submitted candidate slates. In a controversial decision, the Central Election Commission gave an advantage to those who controlled the UDF’s organizational structure by awarding them the blue-colored ballot used by the united UDF in 1990.

The muted response to the results of last week’s elections reflects, in part, the difficulty many Bulgarians have in accepting that, unlike other former Warsaw Pact countries, a reformed Communist Party is still supported by one-third of the population. However, for the most part, the BSP projects an image of moderation and stability appealing to many Bulgarians, particularly in rural areas.

The failure of the more moderate parties to gain representation in the legislature also worries some. The UDF legislators elected are the same legislators who refused to sign the new constitution when it was adopted in July. Will they now take an oath promising to uphold the constitution? Will they be able to balance their strident rhetoric with the reality of governing a country facing enormous economic challenges?

Finally, there is the question of whether Bulgarian society will accept that a Turkish-dominated party holds the balance of power. Before the elections, there were both legislative and judicial attempts to prevent the MRF from participating in the elections on the ground that it is an ethnic party--and so proscribed by the constitution. But such a decision would have been disastrous for Bulgaria’s image in the West, already hesitant in recognizing the full extent of Bulgaria’s democratic transition.

Bulgaria stands at a precipice. Despite the breakthroughs of the past two years, psychological hurdles retard further development. Frustrations, economic hardships and emigration are growing. While a forceful leader might move aggressively to counter the stagnation, one lingering consequence of more than 40 years of totalitarian rule is that former dissidents, such as Zhelev or Vaclav Havel in Czechoslovakia, hesitate to exercise authority unless certain a genuine consensus supports their position.

The challenges sometimes appear overwhelming. Yet, to judge by their transition process, the Bulgarians seem certain to resolve their problems. The approach may not follow the neat prescriptions Westerners prefer, but events in Bulgaria and elsewhere highlight the need to avoid underestimating the talents of political novices. After all, they, not the Western experts, managed the seemingly impossible task of transforming totalitarian regimes into pluralist societies.