America, Be Choosy in Ascribing Democratic Virtue : Foreign Affairs: In dealing with the Commonwealth of Independent States, U.S. risks trouble by letting hopes for democracy be its guide.

Secretary of State James A. Baker III has put forward four criteria for the admission of the new republics of the former Soviet Union into the community of democratic nations: democratic values and practices, protection of human rights and minorities, respect for borders and peaceful change and fulfillment of international obligations.

These goals, however commendable, may not be reached for many years, if ever. If America holds its policy hostage to their fulfillment, it faces two risks. It may ascribe democratic virtue to leaders whose democratic rhetoric is only lip service to achieve a different political agenda. Or, finding its hopes unrealized, the U.S. policy of “constructive engagement” could turn into a vehicle for disengagement.

The Commonwealth of Independent States reflects a melange of motives. Most Russian leaders see it as a way to keep alive what can be salvaged of the traditional union and perhaps of Russia’s historic domination. The larger republics--Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan--consider the commonwealth as a regrettable halfway house on the road to full independence. The smaller republics, especially in Asia, view it as a modest improvement over the old Union.

The ambiguity of the commonwealth’s founding document reflects these cross currents. Consider:

-- Neither the competencies nor the composition of the commonwealth ministerial committees, which are supposed to “coordinate” the republics, has been spelled out.

-- The parties declare an interest in creating an “economic space” and forswear economic coercion against each other, yet they have not defined what they mean nor practice what it implies.

-- The agreement does not explain how borders are to be demarcated or who is responsible for their security.

-- There is no agreement on what commonwealth citizenship means.

In the face of such looming controversies, what should the U.S. attitude be? Baker’s principles do not address America’s interest in the overall structure emerging in the former Soviet Union. Yet a confederation strong enough to assure the security of its peoples but not cohesive enough to initiate aggression would fill the bill.

If that should become the shape of the new commonwealth, world politics would change. For the first time in two centuries, Eastern Europe, the Baltics and the Balkans would be insulated from Russian military pressure. In turn, the Russian Republic would have a security belt against invasions from Europe. In a loose confederation, the huge resources previously sacrificed to foreign adventures could be channeled to the people.

Still, statements by Russian leaders suggest that the Russian proclivity for domination, demonstrated over 300 years, has not been wholly eradicated. Seceding republics are warned that they cannot take their Russian populations with them. In economic policy, there is an ominous unilateralism about Russia using its control over resources--oil--to force the other republics to fall in line.

Although I have the highest regard for Boris N. Yeltsin’s courage in opposing the communist Establishment and for his energy and skill in shaping the commonwealth, the fact remains that Russia’s prickly nationalism has been a perennial force. Nor can Russia’s long-term behavior be deduced from its pliability during a period of extreme dependence on the outside world. It is likely to re-emerge as the dismantling of the Gorbachev era is completed and nationalism may be seen as a tempting unifying force during the stretch of austerity that lies ahead.

The United States faces two challenges. On the international scene, the United States should work closely with the Russian Republic, because a non-expansionist Russia would not clash with U.S. interests. Such a Russia should receive U.S. encouragement and support to help it surmount its communist past.

But close international cooperation should not lure us into inadvertently encouraging Russian domination of the other peoples of the former Soviet Union. A lasting structure of peace requires close cooperation between Washington and Moscow, the capital of a nuclear power stretching across 11 time zones. But this will work only if it is compatible with the existence of independent countries on the territory of the former Soviet Union. For attempts to recentralize that vast territory would require methods, policies and justifications bound to rekindle tensions reminiscent of the Cold War.

U.S. officials could contribute to this dangerous recentralization if they fail to understand that their invocation of America’s sacramental language may incur quite another meaning in the context of Soviet and Russian history. When they bestow the appellation “democratic” on particular leaders, they often confer a courtesy title that reflects a hope rather than a record. Almost without exception, the leaders of the new republics achieved high office as cadre of the Communist Party. Their adaptability to nationalist slogans and democratic rhetoric is a tribute to their survival skills; it would be a mistake to treat anti-Stalinism as a fundamental conversion to democracy. Recent events in several of the republics leave little doubt that the lesson of democracy in a country with few democratic traditions remains incomplete.

All factions in the former Soviet Union are fighting their battles in the name of democracy. But do we really know enough about the players to take stands in the political contests developing in faraway republics? How many of the civil conflicts are exacerbated from the outside?

Similarly, anyone brought up in the American tradition will support the principle of protection for minorities. But in the Soviet context, the issue of minorities merges with territorial claims: to the territory east of the Dnieper and the Crimea in Ukraine, to the eastern part of Belarus, to important regions of Latvia and Estonia. We must take care that an American constitutional principle not legitimize the forcible takeover of disputed territories.

The window of opportunity for supporting pluralism in the former Soviet Union may prove to be very fleeting. In addition to fostering relations with the Russian Republic, we should therefore accelerate diplomatic, economic and cultural contact with at least the larger new republics.

Too often the United States displays the same grudging attitude toward the new republics that it once did toward Yeltsin in his relationship with Mikhail S. Gorbachev. Washington has been far more voluble in putting forward conditions for recognition of the new republics--other than the Russian Republic--than in defining opportunities for cooperation. Some U.S. statements seem determined to enthrone the Russian Republic as heir of czarist and communist centralizers. This is neither in its interest, nor in ours. It risks sacrificing vast opportunities for a genuinely new world order to unforeseeable civil conflicts and a possible civil war.

The United States should deal with the republics of the new commonwealth as it has dealt with the nations of Europe; it should treat commonwealth institutions as it has those of the European Community. The United States has been meticulous about avoiding the principle of a dominant European country. The Russian Republic will always have a major international role, an important place in U.S. foreign policy and a leadership position in the commonwealth. But it should be encouraged to do so from within its boundaries and consistent with the spirit of the institutions it has helped to create.

The great historic opportunity for peace resides in pluralism among the republics of the former Soviet Union side by side with a close and confident U.S. relationship with a Russian republic that is non-expansionist for the first time in its history. Such an architecture would open up unprecedented prospects for all the peoples of the world and especially for the long-suffering populations of the former Soviet Union.