Letting Germany and Japan Into the Club : The U.N. would greatly benefit; but can it be done?

Germany and Japan are letting it be known that they want permanent seats on the U.N. Security Council. Japanese officials speak of 1995, the United Nations’ 50th anniversary, as an appropriate date for achieving that goal. Both countries, given their regional importance and industrial strength (they are, respectively, the world’s second- and third-biggest economies), are clearly entitled to the international standing that permanent membership on the council implies. But what makes sense isn’t always what happens. Both countries must contend with significant political obstacles.

FADING POWERS: Of the Security Council’s 15 members, five--the United States, Russia, China, Britain and France, the major Allied powers of World War II--hold permanent seats and have veto power over council decisions. But the world of the 1990s is patently no longer the same world that emerged from history’s greatest war. Countries like Britain and France, whose vast colonial holdings once unquestionably made them major international powers, would be hard pressed today to claim that status.

The U.N. Charter specifically names the permanent council members, and if the council’s composition were to be changed--either by expansion or by replacing permanent members--the Charter would first have to be amended. That can be done by a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly “including all the permanent members of the Security Council.” That requirement gives an implicit veto over Charter changes to any of the permanent members. Thus, if China wants to remain the only permanent Asian council member, it could keep Japan out. Or if Britain and France don’t want to dilute their power as Europeans, they can reject a seat for Germany. In short, the members of this exclusive club appear to have the power to keep it as select as it always has been.

LINGERING ANIMOSITIES: If that’s their inclination they could find some quiet support among the broader U.N. membership. As Tokyo knows, Asian countries that suffered under Japanese militarism before and during World War II still harbor suspicions toward their powerful neighbor. They may not be ready to see Japan formally achieve the powerful status that a permanent place on the council confers. Some of Germany’s European neighbors could feel the same way.

There is a further consideration. The council is often called on to approve the dispatch of U.N. peacekeeping forces or even to sanction collective military action in response to aggression anywhere in the world. But the laws of Japan and Germany forbid using their military forces for such operations. If these countries are unable or unwilling to participate in international military operations, how can they call on other member states to do so? And if they change their laws to permit such operations, how would neighboring states that once were victimized by their aggression react?

The fact remains that both Japan and Germany have a strong case for greater political recognition at the United Nations than they have been accorded. But whatever the merits of their claims--and we think they are overwhelming--both clearly have a hard political sell ahead of them. The problems are by no means insurmountable, but expectations that change will come by 1995 may prove unrealistic.