Japan’s Energy Future Linked to Risky Cargo

In the words of one American official, the need to maintain secrecy is “like preparing for Desert Storm.”

Sometime this autumn, the Japanese ship Shikishima, armed with 35-millimeter cannon and rapid-fire guns, will set out from the French port of Cherbourg on a seven-week journey so potentially dangerous that several nervous governments will monitor its every nautical mile.

The Shikishima will serve as escort for a convoy transporting to Japan roughly a ton of radioactive plutonium--an amount large enough to make about 125 crude nuclear bombs. “It will be the largest shipment of plutonium in the history of the world,” one U.S. official acknowledged.

The cargo is expected to be the first in a series of shipments over the next 20 years. Japanese officials say they need to start importing plutonium from Europe for a new generation of “fast-breeder” nuclear reactors that will use technology the United States and virtually all other nations have discarded as too risky and expensive.

This spring, Japan must clear its plutonium transport arrangements with the United States. As the Bush Administration nears a decision, the planned shipments have sparked a new debate in Washington about the purpose, the necessity and the safety of Japan’s unprecedented program to import plutonium.

The dispute touches on some of the most sensitive long-range issues affecting relations between the United States and Japan.

Japan views the plutonium imports as the key to ending its reliance on foreign supplies of energy, such as oil from the Persian Gulf and uranium from the United States. That, in turn, would reduce its dependence on American raw materials and military protection.

“It’s the heart of our energy policy,” said Yukihide Hayashi, science counselor at the Japanese Embassy in Washington. “We don’t have any resources. We don’t have any natural uranium. So it’s very important to us to use plutonium.”

Some Americans argue that Japan’s program is inherently risky. They say it could open the way for international trafficking in plutonium that will lead, eventually, to the spread of nuclear arms, perhaps by countries such as North Korea or even by Japan itself.

“The two Koreas cannot reasonably be expected to abstain from plutonium indefinitely in the face of Japan’s insatiable appetite for it,” Paul Leventhal, president of the Nuclear Control Institute, told a congressional hearing last month. The private institute opposes the shipments.

Plutonium can be used directly for making a nuclear bomb. By contrast, uranium, the primary fuel used in ordinary nuclear power plants, must be enriched through a series of complicated, expensive processes before it can be turned into weapons-grade material.

Critics, including former CIA Director Stansfield Turner, charge that Japan’s plutonium shipments could be subject to attack by terrorists or by renegade nations seeking nuclear weapons.

“Seized by terrorists, plutonium would be a valuable commodity for sale to states seeking entry into the nuclear club, and it would be a powerful instrument for political blackmail,” Turner and Thomas Davies, a former official of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, wrote two years ago.

Japanese and U.S. officials counter that the security problems raised by the shipments are manageable. “If there’s a threat, they can delay the shipment or reroute it. They’re not going to set sail in the face of, say, Saddam Hussein having just seized the Black Sea Fleet,” one State Department official noted.

Lurking behind these other issues is the touchiest question of all: Is it possible that Japan, the nation that survived the nuclear attacks on Hiroshima and Nagasaki, might be interested in stockpiling plutonium to put itself in a position where it could develop a future nuclear weapons program?

With the help of the shipments from Europe, Japan would have accumulated within 20 years a supply of plutonium nearly as large as that contained in the arsenal of the United States or the former Soviet Union.

“They’re acquiring the option, and they’ve taken steps, arguably the hardest of which is the acquiring of plutonium, that will make this possible in the future,” said Frank Gaffney of the Center for Security Policy.

“I think it is a predictable event that Japan will, at some time in the future, want nuclear weapons, notwithstanding their disclaimers, notwithstanding Hiroshima and Nagasaki,” said Gaffney, who was an aide to former Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger. “Now, whether it is going to be a year from now, 10 years from now, 50 years from now, I don’t know.”

To many U.S. officials, such suggestions seem preposterous. “We don’t try to govern the world,” one State Department official said. “Japan’s non-proliferation credentials are quite good. It’s a stable political system. And it has a perspective on nuclear weapons that is different from other countries’.

“Furthermore, if Japan ever had a nuclear weapons program, we would learn about it long before Japan was at the point where it had nuclear weapons,” the official said. “Japan is not like Iraq, where everyone’s afraid to speak out. Regardless of how secretively Japan was carrying out a nuclear weapons program, things would leak out.”

However, a diplomat for one nation allied with the United States said that two or three years ago, his government was startled to find that in addition to the plutonium, Japan was acquiring other items “that didn’t make much sense for purely civilian use.” He would not identify these items, saying the information is highly classified.

The diplomat, speaking on condition that neither he nor his country be identified, noted that he does not believe that Japan has a nuclear weapons program or has plans to develop one.

Even so, he said he believes that Japan’s planned imports of plutonium and acquisition of other items serve as “insurance” for the future--in case neighboring countries, such as North Korea or a reunified Korea, develop nuclear weapons at a time when Japan’s ties to the United States are less strong than they are today.

“It (Japan) could, if the situation was evolving in a certain way, proceed (toward nuclear weapons) on a much larger scale than, say, North Korea or Iraq,” this diplomat said.

Japanese officials reject out of hand the idea that they might someday use the plutonium for nuclear weapons. “If you visited Hiroshima, you would understand that is beyond our imagination,” asserted Takao Kuramochi of the Japanese Embassy in Washington.

Japan’s constitution stipulates that the country will never develop nuclear weapons. Japan has signed the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, and all its nuclear facilities are subject to inspection by the International Atomic Energy Agency.

Moreover, Hayashi pointed out that Japan already has a small amount of plutonium from its own existing nuclear reactors. As a result, he argues, if Japan really wanted plutonium for a nuclear weapons program instead of for fast-breeder nuclear reactors, it would not need to import it.

“We would already have this capability, even if we didn’t transport plutonium from France to Japan,” he said.

Japan has 39 commercial nuclear power plants that produce more than a quarter of its electricity. Another 11 plants are under construction. For the past two decades, Japan has been shipping the nuclear wastes from these plants to France and Britain, which have facilities capable of reprocessing spent uranium fuel into plutonium.

The two reprocessing plants are located at Cap de la Hague in France and Sellafield in Britain. Japan is now building its own reprocessing plant at Rokkasho, but it will not be ready until the end of the decade.

The return shipments of plutonium from Europe to Japan that will begin this fall represent a new phase in Japan’s energy program--and a crucial step toward fulfillment of the dream of energy independence that Japan has been pursuing for decades.

“We are now in a transition phase from a uranium economy to a plutonium economy,” Kuramochi observed.

Conventional nuclear power plants require a continuous supply of fresh uranium fuel and produce a stream of nuclear wastes. The fast-breeder reactors that Japan is now developing would require an initial supply of plutonium, which would then turn out new supplies of plutonium at the same time it powers electrical generators. This plutonium would be reused in a renewable energy cycle.

Two decades ago, the United States and many other nations had programs to build breeder reactors. But virtually all of them have discarded these plans.

One reason for doing so was the fear that the widespread use of plutonium in breeder reactors could lead to the development and spread of nuclear weapons.

A State Department official recently acknowledged that “the U.S. government policy today is to discourage breeder reactors in most of the world.” But he said the United States does not oppose the Japanese program because of Japan’s unusual political stability and strong record in opposing nuclear proliferation.

Another factor causing other countries to drop their plans for breeder reactors was a sharp decline in the price of uranium, which made it far more costly to operate a nuclear plant with plutonium than with uranium.

“Plutonium is so expensive to fabricate and ship around,” explained Leonard S. Spector, a nuclear expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. “It’s a big deal to switch over from conventional reactors to plutonium fuel.”

Japanese officials acknowledge that because of the high costs, breeder reactors probably will not be commercially viable until about the year 2030. But the Japanese government, particularly its Atomic Energy Commission, has pushed forward with development of the new reactors.

“Japan’s program is an historical anomaly,” Spector said. “It’s a holdover from an earlier era, clung to tenaciously by a nuclear bureaucracy immune to the trends that have affected every other country’s breeder program. . . . If the Japanese were hard-nosed about this, they’d see this is not economically viable, and they’d stockpile uranium.”

Japanese officials counter that their need for energy independence makes the costs worthwhile. “Japan would be in a very vulnerable position if it only used uranium,” Hayashi said.

Many experts believe that with supplies from Europe, along with the plutonium it will eventually obtain through domestic reprocessing, Japan will accumulate far more plutonium over the next two decades than its breeder reactors and other nuclear plants can use.

A study last fall by Tatsujiro Suzuki, a Japanese nuclear engineer at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology’s Center for Energy Policy, estimates that by the year 2010, Japan will possess 30 tons of plutonium imported from Europe and 50 to 60 tons from its own reprocessing plants.

Yet Suzuki said that Japan’s breeder and other reactors will need only about 40 tons of plutonium. “The country could accumulate a plutonium surplus,” he concluded. “Such a surplus would inevitably raise concerns about the increased risks of proliferation.”

While President Jimmy Carter tried unsuccessfully to persuade Japan to abandon its pursuit of a breeder reactor, the Ronald Reagan Administration relaxed the American opposition.

Eight years ago, the Reagan Administration gave the green light for a one-time shipment of 250 kilograms of reprocessed plutonium from France to Japan. On that occasion, the only such shipment that has ever occurred, the United States and France provided naval escort vessels.

Until 1988, the United States, which has provided the technology and much of the uranium used in Japan’s conventional nuclear plants, had to give its consent for each individual shipment of reprocessed plutonium to Japan.

Four years ago, however, Congress went along with a Reagan Administration request to change the law and grant general approval for Japan to transport plutonium for a period of 30 years--but only if the shipments went by ship instead of airplane, and with an armed escort provided by Japan instead of the United States.

The 1988 law also requires that Japan clear the detailed arrangements of its transport plan with the United States.

That is what Japan is doing now. “We have begun discussions with the Japanese on their plan,” a State Department official said, adding that the Administration hopes to complete a review of Japan’s plutonium shipments and inform congressional committees of the government’s decision sometime this spring.

The plans for next fall’s shipment are being kept as secret as a military operation.

Neither U.S. nor Japanese officials will identify the route the plutonium convoy will take from France to Japan. “No one is trying to ship this material in Libyan waters,” a Japanese diplomat said.

Some anti-nuclear activists have suggested that the convoy may go through the Panama Canal. But in an interview with a Times reporter, a State Department official seemed to cast doubt on this possibility, asking: “Do you think it would be wise to do that?” He declined, however, to divulge any details of the route the 6,500-ton escort ship Shikishima and its convoy will take.

The plutonium cargo reportedly will be watched by satellites to guard against a surprise attack or other trouble. The container holding the plutonium will be equipped with electronic seals. And Japanese and U.S. officials say they believe that the Shikishima will be adequately armed to fend off terrorist attacks.

The Shikishima is a vessel not of Japan’s Maritime Self-Defense Force, or navy, but of its Maritime Safety Agency, or coast guard--a step taken to ward off concerns about an expansion in the range of the Japanese navy. The Shikishima will carry two helicopters.

“The safety and security of this exercise is the most important thing from our government’s point of view,” Kuramochi said. “If somebody attacked this ship, that would hurt our program a lot, maybe even more than Chernobyl.”

Still, Japan’s assurances do not satisfy American critics, who question not only whether the plutonium shipments are safe, but whether they are necessary.

“None of their arguments stand up to scrutiny,” said Gary Milhollan of the Wisconsin Project on Nuclear Arms Control. “Energy independence? They can buy enough uranium from the United States to stockpile it forever. Cost? Conventional nuclear plants are much cheaper. You have to ask what the real purpose of this is.”

Radioactive Cargo: The Key Issues

The main issues in Japan’s proposed plutonium shipments, as stated by both critics and defenders of the program:

Safety: Fear of Terrorist Attack

Critics: The shipments from Europe to Japan could be attacked by terrorists or by renegade nations seeking to acquire nuclear weapons. If the ships are damaged or sunk, they would pose an environmental hazard.

Defenders: The plutonium cargo will be well sealed and guarded by an armed Japanese escort ship.

Energy: A Dangerous Technology?

Critics: The fast-breeder nuclear reactors that Japan is developing use plutonium technology that the United States and most other nations have decided to forsake because of the high costs and the danger of nuclear proliferation. Japan could stockpile uranium and use conventional nuclear reactors at lower cost and risk.

Defenders: Japan needs fast-breeder reactors because of the importance of eliminating its dependence on foreign supplies of oil and uranium.

Arms: A Tempting Weapon

Critics: Plutonium is the crucial ingredient for making nuclear bombs. Japan’s import of large amounts of plutonium could someday tempt its neighbors, or Japan itself, to develop nuclear weapons.

Defenders: Japan has pledged never to develop nuclear weapons. The legacy of the attacks at Hiroshima and Nagasaki is so strong that the Japanese public would never support a nuclear weapons program. Japan’s record on non-proliferation issues is good, and the country enjoys unusual political stability.

Source: Times Staff Reports