We Need to Reorganize Intelligence Agencies, Not Dismember Them : CIA: Two bills revamping the way the United States gathers data in the post-Cold War era would create chaos. What’s the big rush to reform?

During his confirmation hearings for director of Central Intelligence, Robert M. Gates acknowledged the need to make significant changes in the organization and operations of the intelligence community. Once on the job, he commissioned several task forces to provide the guidelines for the post-Cold War era.

But before they could issue their reports, the chairmen of the Senate and House intelligence committees jumped in and separately introduced legislation to accomplish the reorganization. Unfortunately, the virtually identical bills would create chaos by establishing competing intelligence fiefdoms. In addition, the bill by Sen. David Boren (D-Okla.) would unnecessarily reduce the CIA’s role to one of managing spies and conducting covert operations, while hampering the military’s human intelligence capabilities.

The creation of a new post--director of national intelligence--is the legislation’s most dramatic proposal. The director would control intelligence analysis through a deputy. The CIA’s intelligence directorate, along with analysts employed by other intelligence units, would be reassigned to the deputy.

The CIA would also lose elements of its directorate of science and technology. A new National Imagery Agency would be part of the Defense Department and handle all imagery collection operations--satellite and aircraft--now divided between the National Reconnaissance Office and the Strategic Air Command. The proposed agency would decide which satellites and aircraft to buy and which targets to photograph. As a result, the National Reconnaissance Office would be either abolished or sharply downgraded.

The reorganization plans offered by Boren and David McCurdy (D-Okla.), who chairs the House intelligence committee, are not wholly regrettable. Replacing the officially secret National Reconnaissance Office with an officially public National Imagery Agency is a good idea, since it would at least make it easier to use the technology for environmental and disaster relief purposes. Relying on one agency, with one chain of command, to collect satellite and aerial imagery would also facilitate dissemination of the images. As the Gulf War demonstrated, the inability to get images quickly into the right hands can undermine the most sophisticated of collection activities.

But the plans undercut their premise--greater central control of intelligence operations-- where it is most necessary: the collection of imagery and signals intelligence. On paper, the director of national intelligence would be responsible for approving the procurement and operation of overhead reconnaissance systems and for making sure that the necessary intelligence is collected. But the legislation establishes czars for imagery and signals intelligence within the Defense Department. They would also be responsible for imagery and signals intelligence gathering--from procurement to data processing. This is a recipe for chaos. How would the director of national intelligence control them?

Also, the bills’ assignment of responsibilities for procurement decisions to the directors of the National Imagery Agency and the National Security Agency is based on the assumption that directors are in the best position to know what they need. History isn’t so optimistic. Several revolutionary intelligence-collection systems were developed only because the CIA’s science and technology wing fought off attempts, by the Defense Department and the National Security Agency, to build or continue inferior systems.

The director of the slimmed-down CIA would do more than simply coordinate human intelligence collection: He would direct it. But that presents a problem. The only other agencies conducting human intelligence operations are military. As such, the intelligence is tailored to Defense Department needs. Assigning the CIA this responsibility risks compromising the military mission.

A smaller CIA presents other problems. There is no need, for example, to move the directorate of intelligence out of the CIA for it to serve as the focus of national intelligence analysis. The directorate and the CIA director’s National Intelligence Council are already the nucleus of intelligence analysis. If necessary, their roles could be strengthened within the current framework.

Moving the directorate of intelligence out of the CIA would eliminate or hamper attempts to increase understanding between spies and analysts. Former CIA director William H. Webster, followed up by Gates, established centers on counterintelligence, narcotics, proliferation and terrorism that brought together analysts and operators. Giving the CIA analysts a new boss would undermine those efforts.

The time for serious reform of the intelligence community has arrived. The Boren-McCurdy plan will generate discussion on future intelligence requirements and how to satisfy those requirements. But rushing head-long into extensive reform will do more harm than good.