A Return to Pre-Jesse Jackson Days : Politics: Without a candidate of their own, blacks must figure how to get their concerns across to the Democrats.

With the absence of both the Rev. Jesse Jackson and Gov. L. Douglas Wilder from the presidential race, there is no black candidate running for President.

The Jackson campaigns of 1984 and 1988 were vehicles of political leverage for blacks and their white progressive allies. They had the convenience of the sort that made it possible to deposit their votes with Jackson’s Rainbow Coalition, support a liberal set of policy issues and participate--as a major organized force--in the major committees of the Democratic Party and in the convention.

Now most black voters and white progressives are back to the pre-1984 period in politics. This was essentially politics that sought indirect or “dependent-leverage,” through one of the existing candidates.

The objectives of black leaders utilizing the politics of dependent-leverage were defined by two distinct activities. First, some professional politicians committed themselves to one of the candidates early in the primary-election process, seeking personal access in the event that the candidate won the Democratic nomination and the general election. Second, black leaders sought to fashion an agenda of issues, usually through black conventions, and to determine which of the Democratic presidential candidates would support most of their concerns. A consensus then formed around that candidate.

Before the 1984 election, choosing a candidate in the primary was not as critical, because the field in the Democratic Party held roughly similar liberal views, and the attempt to influence the political agenda of the party was directed toward the platform and eventually the nominee’s priorities in the general-election campaign.

This year, however, the positions of the candidates are more diverse. This presents a unique dilemma for black political leaders and voters, both in the primaries and in the general election.

The dilemma is twofold: First, there is the strategic dilemma of whether to commit to one candidate or to withhold support in an attempt to influence the positions of the front-runner. For those willing to commit, there would still appear to be some choice between Bill Clinton and Tom Harkin, the liberal senator from Iowa, although Clinton has lost his front-runner status because of a series of damaging allegations about this personal life. When some prominent blacks commit to a candidate before his agenda has been fully tested in the public arena, more progressive blacks have always perceived it as weakening the community’s bargaining leverage on the candidates, which could lead to an exchange of black votes for commitment to the agenda of the black community.

Second, Virginia Gov. Douglas Wilder’s withdrawal from the race this year constitutes a “two-headed sword”: With him out, the Democratic Party leadership will have a greater opportunity to achieve the stated objective of its chairman, Ron Brown, of having a consensus candidate early in the race. On the other side of the coin is the prospect that black turnout in the primaries will not be as vigorous as in the past, when Jackson was running.

With no black running, a successful showing by Clinton in the Southern primaries might help him rebound from defeat in New Hampshire. In 1988, black turnout in the Northeast ran 30% to 40% in the primaries and roughly half that in the South. If it is still lower in 1992, a Clinton victory in the South might create the illusion that he is stronger there than he would actually be in a two-party contest in the general election, especially given his recent problems.

The Democratic Party, therefore, will need to find ways to invigorate the black vote in the primaries if the candidates are not able to do so.

In most elections, once the nominee has been chosen, the party and the nominee’s campaign played a role in developing outreach projects to attract blacks. Because of the possibility of a disastrous turnout this year, these measures will have to be employed early. The Jackson campaign not only sought to attract voters, but it registered a significant number of new voters, many of whom went on to vote in the general election.

With both Jackson and Wilder out of the race, many black voters may stay at home during the primaries, and this may threaten their turnout rate in the general election as well. Between 1984 and 1988, black turnout in the general election declined by more than 4%, from 55.8% to 51.5%. If this trend continues, it threatens to significantly decrease the Democratic vote (blacks are at least 25% of the party’s voting base), making it extremely difficult for the Democratic nominee to win. This fact should prompt concern--that is, if party leaders still want the black vote as a part of their electoral coalition.

The worst-case scenario for blacks and for the Democratic Party would be the temptation for party leaders to pursue a strategy dictated by the logic of convention wisdom: that blacks have become a liability, and the party leaders will lose no sleep over a low black turnout in the primaries if someone like Bill Clinton can win back a significant number of Southern white Democrats and keep them in the general election. The basis of this logic is that the absence of black votes in the general election could be tolerated as long as they are replaced by white ones.

It would appear that blacks are back to the pre-1984 position of having to consider what strategy is powerful enough to make the party or parties pay attention to their interests--without a black candidacy to organize those interests. In 1984, this concern led to the black presidential candidacy. What will it lead to in 1992?