Loan Guarantees for Israel

In “A Door Slams on Jerusalem” (Commentary, Feb. 26), Yossi Melman left out a few pertinent facts, which, if taken into account, shed a different light on the situation.

The linkage between the Likud’s settlements policy and the wave of new immigrants was first made by Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir when he stated in 1991: “A greater Aliyah (immigration) requires a Greater Israel.”

Every time Secretary of State James Baker came to Israel to personally negotiate the terms of the peace conference, he was welcomed by yet another new settlement, well aware that every settlement needed government approval and funding.

Shamir did not attend the peace conference in Madrid in order to safeguard the loan guarantees, but to fulfill Israel’s long-held desire for peace with its neighbors. By going there, Shamir did not succumb to U.S. pressure, but rather to Israeli public opinion, which overwhelmingly (over 90%) supported Israel’s participation in the peace talks.

In 1984, Labor and Likud formed a national unity government, which enforced a nearly complete settlements freeze. It is both sad and infuriating to note that in order to hold on to power, the Likud accepted Labor’s demand to freeze settlements, but would not do so to help settle the new immigrants.

Lastly, the dispute between the Israeli government and the U.S. Administration has really little to do with either the loan guarantees or even the settlements. This is just a smoke screen. The crux of the matter is the peace process, and Israel’s future--a Greater Israel without peace and security, or regional security arrangements leading to territorial concessions and peace.

URIEL MASAD, Regional Director

Americans for Peace Now

Los Angeles