Perspective on Israel : Bush’s Adamancy Did the Trick : Shamir misjudged America’s commitment to the peace process. Will the Democrats make the same mistake?

The election in Israel is a victory not only for the Labor Party and Yitzhak Rabin, but also for the Bush Administration’s policy on Middle East peace.

President Bush has taken a lot of flack from Israel’s hard-core constituency in this country, notably AIPAC (the American Israel Public Affairs Committee) and certain members of Congress, but the truth is, the President’s policy has achieved something historic: It forced a needed debate in Israel on the issues of building Israeli settlements in the Occupied Territories and trading land to Palestinian and Arab neighbors in return for a final peace settlement.

The Likud government, under the leadership of Yitzhak Shamir, had repeatedly made it clear that it had no interest in the “land for peace” formula outlined in U.N. resolutions and supported almost unanimously by the international community. Shamir assumed that the United States would be supportive, or at least would not interfere with his expansive and provocative settlement policy. He at first dismissed and later actively resisted efforts by the Bush Administration to convene peace talks and establish an atmosphere of good will.

The real test came on the issue of U.S. guarantees for Israel’s housing construction loans. Shamir calculated that if he could win Congress’ approval of the guarantees without having to compromise anything on the ground, he would solidify his political support and insure his dream of a “Greater Israel.” Indeed, one Administration official said that Shamir wanted to appear at the opening Madrid peace talks last fall with the Arabs around the table, the loan guarantees in his hand and the sanction of Congress to continue his expansionist policies. Shamir was confident that his friends in Washington would be able to put enough political pressure on the Administration to secure the loan guarantees without conditions.

The Likud government and its supporters sought to cast the issue as humanitarian--the need to house Soviet immigrants--but the President understood that settling Soviet Jews on Arab land would seriously endanger the peace process. (Ironically, exit polls on Tuesday showed only 18% of the Soviet immigrant vote going to Likud.)

Bush, who had just fought a war against one of Israel’s most bellicose neighbors, put his foot down. He shocked the pro-Israel community here by rejecting its intense lobbying effort and refusing to endorse unconditional loan guarantees. Bush rightly believed that more than politics was at stake: The peace process and the principles upon which peace must be built were also hanging in the balance.

He worked hard to create a climate of trust and opportunity in which both Arabs and Israelis would benefit from a real peace. He held out the promise of resolving tough regional issues like arms controls and water rights, all in an effort to induce both sides to sit down and negotiate a settlement based on the principles of “land for peace.”

The Administration’s tough but creative diplomacy--unprecedented in the history of this country’s relations with Israel--forced the American pro-Israel community and the Israeli electorate to deal with a question they had been reluctant to face since 1967: territorial expansion or regional peace?

It is in this context that Rabin, who is no dove, committed himself in his campaign to a one-year freeze on settlements and interim Palestinian autonomy within six months.

One of the sad ironies is that the Democratic Party in this country, taking its cues from AIPAC, is missing an opportunity to prove that it can put special-interest politics aside and do the right thing for peace in the Middle East.

While a conservative, Republican President seeks compromise and peace talks, liberal Democrats and, of late, prospective presidential nominee Bill Clinton, have all but embraced the policies of the right wing in Israel. This could be dangerous for the peace talks because, regardless of the election results, hard-liners here and in Israel will take heart from the Democratic pandering and continue to push for unconditional loan guarantees and accelerated settlement activity in the territories.

Now, more than ever, President Bush must remain firm. He must hold Rabin to the promises he made; if loan guarantees are to be approved, they must be conditioned on a settlement freeze and an interim Palestinian autonomy. This can set the stage for final status talks that can lead to a comprehensive peace providing security for Israel and eventual self-determination for Palestinians.

The elections in Israel could be the opening for peace in the Middle East or they could become yet another squandered opportunity to end the Arab-Israeli conflict. Bush, and the Democrats, should heed an Israeli electorate that appears more ready than many of Israel’s advocates here to make the sacrifices necessary for peace and prosperity.