Scholars Disdain the Polls, Point to Bush Trump Cards : Election: Researchers say other factors are more reliable forecasters than swift shifts of public opinion.

In the face of a ton of polling data that suggests Democratic standard-bearer Bill Clinton already has the White House within his grasp, another set of assessments points to a far different outcome to the 1992 campaign. The possibilities range from a dead heat to a landslide for President Bush.

These contrarian predictions are the work of academicians relying far more on the lessons of history and the potency of economic data than on the swiftly shifting tides of public opinion. They boast an impressive record of accuracy in the past.

Underlying the discrepancy between their forecasts and the polls--which have shown Clinton with nearly a 30-point lead--are some political fundamentals that the scholars factor into their model equations and that past experience suggests should work greatly to Bush’s advantage.

But the big question--whose answer will likely determine the election--is whether Bush can overcome his shortcomings to play out the trump cards that history has dealt him.

In the main, Bush’s potential assets are the power and prestige of his presidential office and the seemingly broader appeal of his Republican Party in presidential campaigns. Yet another factor in his favor is the evidence that the economy, however feeble, is still emitting signs of life.

“A Republican incumbent running for reelection with a low inflation rate and a growth rate that’s at least not negative ought to to win fairly well,” says Yale economics professor Ray Fair, who is forecasting a Bush victory with 54% to 55% of the popular vote based on a model that has a margin of error of only about 3 percentage points in elections going back to 1916.

Despite the models’ high level of reliability in the past, most model makers admit to qualms about the actual end result in 1992. Their concerns help to illuminate the factors, notable among them the deficiencies of the Bush presidency and the uneven pace of the economic recovery, which have combined to drive the 1992 election campaign down a singularly erratic course.

It is hard to quarrel with the criteria chosen by Fair and the other academic forecasters in creating their predictive models. But Bush’s own performance in office remains a critical variable.

The electorate’s tendency to vote Republican for President, which some models take into account, is evidenced not only by the GOP’s victories in seven of the 11 elections beginning in 1948 but also by the party’s 53% share of the two-party vote during that period, compared to 47% for the Democrats.

In the last three elections this popular vote lead has helped the Republicans carry 38 states with 408 electoral votes, 138 more than the majority required for election, an edge many analysts consider tantamount to the GOP having a lock on the Electoral College.

But in his role as as party leader Bush has fallen far short of his predecessor, Ronald Reagan, who was able to win the heart of Democrats and independents while retaining the loyalty of the conservatives who make up the GOP’s core.

As for the advantage of incumbency, which is a given in almost all election models, history suggests how powerful a factor it is, particularly when combined with Republicanism.

In the 11 postwar presidential elections only one Republican incumbent President has been defeated. That was Gerald R. Ford, who when he ran in 1976 had never been elected to national office, and who had to contend with the damage done to his party by the Watergate scandal. During that period, three GOP presidents, Dwight D. Eisenhower, Richard M. Nixon and Reagan, won reelection by landslide margins.

The power of incumbency has been demonstrated time and again in presidential campaigns. For example, as the 1972 campaign approached, Nixon jolted a faltering economy back to life with a “new economic policy” featuring a wage-price freeze. Then he stole the global spotlight with his precedent-shattering trip to mainland China.

By contrast, Bush has often seemed inattentive to the country’s needs at home. And even in playing his strong suit, foreign policy, since his triumph in the Gulf War Bush has been taken to task for lack of imagination and vigor.

“George Bush should have been able through a more aggressive domestic agenda to keep his popularity high,” says Professor Tom Rice of the University of Vermont, who predicts that Bush will get 58% of the electoral vote.

The model created by Rice and University of Iowa political scientist Michael Lewis-Beck, which takes into account the strength of the President’s party in the House of Representatives, his personal popularity and his support in primary contests, has had only a 5.6 percentage-point average margin of error in electoral vote forecasts since 1948.

The ups and downs of the economy, as demonstrated by last week’s report that the rate of economic growth had slowed markedly in the second quarter of the year, also make the forecaster’s job harder than ever this year.

“It would really take a collapse of the economy for Bush to lose,” says Richard Gleisner, an economics professor at Minnesota’s St. Cloud State University who foresees Bush getting 60% of the popular vote, which would amount to a landslide. Gleisner’s forecasting model, which has an average error of only about 2 points in elections back to 1908, is similar to Fair’s, except that Gleisner also factors in the rise or fall of the stock market.

Nevertheless, Gleisner says, “What makes me uneasy is that people do seem to be a lot more pessimistic than the economic numbers suggest.”

Even a partisan like Democratic pollster Mark Mellman concedes that although the economy “is bad, it’s not as bad as it might be.” Mellman has created his own model for analyzing the election, which takes into account voter attitudes toward the two parties on foreign policy as well as the rate of increase in per capita disposable income--on the basis of which he predicts an outcome ranging from a 50-50 split to a 52% to 48% Clinton victory.

The main reason for the electorate’s intensely grim view of the economy is “that this has been an especially prolonged and difficult recession, if not an especially deep recession,” says American University professor Allan Lichtman, co-author with Ken Decell of “The 13 Keys to the Presidency, Prediction Without Polls.”

Lichtman’s approach is more subjective than most. Instead of a mathematical formula, he relies on a set of guidelines or “keys” to evaluate significant factors in the campaign, including not only economic conditions but also the personal appeal of the rival candidates and the domestic and foreign policy performance of the incumbent Administration.

Lichtman won’t yet make a firm prediction about the election, although his formula makes him skeptical of the validity of Clinton’s high standing in the polls.

“You can’t call this against Bush now,” says Lichtman, who intends to wait until September to make his prediction.

Another factor contributing to the volatility is the growing public impatience with the gridlock in Washington caused by the conflict between the Democratic Congress and the Republican White House, an attitude manifested by the burst of public enthusiasm for the idea of Ross Perot’s challenge to the two parties.

“A third of Americans were going to vote for Perot without knowing a damn thing about him,” says Vermont’s Rice. “What united them is the feeling that government has just been totally ineffective so that people are saying, ‘I’m willing to see something done that I might not agree with just to get something done.’ ”

In this atmosphere, American University’s Lichtman is certain only that the uncertainty that has marked this campaign from its start will continue. “I can’t tell you what the next surprise is going to be,” he says, “but I don’t think we’ve seen the last surprise.”

But whatever their self-doubts, the scholars believe that their models are more reliable than polls in forecasting election outcomes. “The process leading up to the final voting decision is much different than a casual response to a pollster who calls while you are in the middle of dinner,” says Fair of Yale.

Fair’s election model combines the rate of economic growth and the inflation rate with the historical bias toward the GOP in presidential elections as well as the benefits of incumbency. He points out that four years ago, in July of 1988, when many polls showed Democrat Michael S. Dukakis well ahead of Bush, his model forecast a Bush victory with 52.2% of the vote--close to Bush’s actual tally of 53.8%

In the end, the model makers base their forecasts not on some magic ability to see into the future but on their understanding of the forces that have determined election outcomes in the past.

“What we’re saying is that given long-term trends and the relationship of these key factors to election outcomes, our best guess is that Bush is going to win this election,” says Vermont forecaster Rice.

Predicting Presidents

Among many models for predicting the outcome of presidential elections is this one devised by American University history professor Allan Lichtman and his associate, Ken Decell. Under their theory, when the answer to six or more of the following statements is false, the party in power loses. Here are their 13 keys, along with the answer they have provided at the present time.

KEY 1 (Party mandate): The incumbent party holds more U.S. House seats than after the midterm elections of the previous Administration. (FALSE)

KEY 2 (Contest): There is no serious contest (1/3 of delegate votes) for the incumbent party nomination. (TRUE)

KEY 3 (Incumbency): The incumbent party candidate is the sitting President. (TRUE)

KEY 4 (Third party): There is no significant third-party or independent campaign. (?)

KEY 5 (Short-term economy): The economy is not in recession during the election campaign. (?)

KEY 6 (Long-term economy): Real growth during the term at least equals mean growth during the previous two terms. (FALSE)

KEY 7 (Policy change): The incumbent Administration effects major changes in national policy. (FALSE)

KEY 8 (Social unrest): There is no sustained social unrest during the term (TRUE).

KEY 9 (Scandal): The incumbent Administration is untainted by major scandal (TRUE).

KEY 10 (Foreign/military failure): The incumbent Administration suffers no major failure in foreign or military affairs (TRUE).

KEY 11 (Foreign/military success): The incumbent Administration achieves a major success in foreign or military affairs. (TRUE)

KEY 12 (Incumbent charisma): The incumbent-party candidate is charismatic or a national hero. (FALSE)

KEY 13 (Challenger charisma): The challenging-party candidate is not charismatic or a national hero. (TRUE)