PERSPECTIVE ON THE BALKANS : U.S. Would Have to Go It Alone : Collectively, the Europeans have no military-political backbone; individually, they’re not up for war.

If President Bush believes he will get any moral, let alone material, assistance from the European Community for a forceful intervention in the Bosnian crisis, he is gravely mistaken. The community as a whole and its separate governments are incapable of any kind of military or foreign-policy leadership. They are not even dependable followers--not, at any rate, for the hesitant kind of leadership that Bush is likely to provide.

It may seem extraordinary that the community system, which has proved so successful in binding the states of Europe together economically, should have failed so signally to give them collective military-political backbone, but so it is. In the international field, the EC is less than the sum of its parts, and the point has been proved again and again--over the disintegration of the Soviet system, over Iraq, and now over the Balkans.

It is not just that individual members disagree, though they do. Germany’s instinct is to back Catholic Slovenia and Croatia, as it did in both World Wars I and II. The British Foreign Office and the French Quai d’Orsay initially supported the integrity of their old creation, Yugoslavia--in effect their former ally, Serbia. When Yugoslavia disintegrated beyond repair and backing bloodstained Serbia was no longer acceptable to public opinion, they were left without any policy at all beyond hand-flapping, at which they have plenty of experience.

The disagreements are underlined by more material reasons for doing nothing. Germany is full of old soldiers who vividly recall fighting Yugoslav guerrillas in impossible terrain between 1941 and 1945. At one time the Germans had 750,000 men there, and it brought them nothing but blood, sweat, tears and eventual defeat, a Teutonic Vietnam. In any case, Germany has strong legal and psychological inhibitions against sending its troops abroad, and these are now reinforced by financial stringency. Integrating East Germany is proving much more expensive than anyone in government foresaw, the economy is in recession, and there is no cash or credit to finance foreign adventures. Germany is in fact taking a lead in disarming; it is destroying stocks of trucks, armored troop-carriers and tanks with all deliberate speed. Its mood is the reverse of warlike.

France is perhaps the country most inclined--or least disinclined--to commit ground troops to Balkan peace-keeping. But that is because President Francois Mitterrand would welcome a spectacular display of humanitarianism with military trimmings to bolster his own and his Socialist Party’s sagging political fortunes. He has a referendum to win in September. But for these very reasons, while France might follow a strong American lead into Bosnia, it could not be relied on to stay there, especially if things got tough. France is not a country to go guerrilla-shooting with.

For the rest, Spain is just about up to running the Olympic Games--which, to its credit, it has done splendidly--but has neither will nor puff for geopolitics. Italy is in general disarray: huge public debts, which make even America’s seem under control by comparison, a wave of popular revulsion against the entire political system and especially the politicians who manipulate it and a feeling of dread that the Mafia is taking over the country. The Balkan mess is just across the Adriatic and Italy has already had to battle a flood of Albanian refugees. Any Italian action would be reluctant and of a token nature.

That leaves Britain. The record shows that the United Kingdom can generally be counted on to assist American peacekeeping efforts, not just in the letter but in the spirit. Indeed, the one geopolitical force that still functions smoothly and effectively in the world today is the old “special relationship” between Washington and London. It worked particularly well during the 1990 Kuwait crisis, and the buildup of forces in the Persian Gulf during the months before the action against Iraq was an impressive display of Anglo-American diplomatic and military cooperation.

However, things have changed since then. For one thing, Margaret Thatcher is now out of the geopolitical game, except as a critic on the sidelines, and her ability to make big decisions and back them with terrific willpower--so crucial during the weeks immediately after the invasion of Kuwait--is no longer, alas, available.

Prime Minister John Major is rightly trusted in Washington but he is not a leader and risk-taker in the Thatcher class. Moreover, he has economic and political problems of growing magnitude, which makes him reluctant to take on more commitments. Britain’s recession is already the longest and most severe since the 1930s and shows no sign of ending.

The budget surplus of the Thatcher age has been transformed into an alarming, and constantly growing, deficit. Major is obsessed with a trio of problems: getting the economy moving again, controlling public spending, and pushing the Maastricht Treaty through Parliament. He is dead against any land commitments in Bosnia, and for once Britain would not report for duty to any Washington summons to arms.

For all these reasons, Europe cannot be expected to mount a rescue mission in the Balkans or to participate, except nominally, in one mounted by the United States. The feeling here is that the most likely next move is to supply Bosnians and Croats with the heavy weapons they need to contain Serbian aggression, and leave them to get on with it. The danger is that the Serbs will then put pressure on Russia, the one major Slav power, to raise the military ante. Keeping Russia out of any Balkan imbroglio is probably the most useful contribution Europe can make to damping down a crisis that rouses strong humanitarian feelings but baffles diplomatic intellects.