History Again Casts French in Key Unity Role

For nearly four decades since the end of World War II, France has dreamed of being the pivotal country in a united Europe, with Paris as its cultural heart and intellectual center.

Each in his fashion, French leaders as different as the towering nationalist Charles de Gaulle, the worldly aristocrat Valery Giscard d’Estaing and today’s Socialist President Francois Mitterrand all actively joined in a march toward a federal European state to rival the United States and Japan on the world stage.

Never shy in the spotlight, French leaders over the years came to see themselves as the principal shapers--”architects,” in their words--of a new Europe without borders. When Mitterrand was reelected to a second seven-year term in 1988, he quickly identified European “construction” as the central theme of his new mandate. No one, it seemed until recently, was more pro-European than the French.

With today’s vote on the Maastricht Treaty for European union, however, the French find themselves cast in the uncomfortable role of possible spoiler.

The eyes of Europe are anxiously upon citizens of the French republic stretching from the once-disputed territory of Alsace-Lorraine to the French Pacific islands as they go to the polls in a referendum many feel can break--or at least greatly retard--the 40-year drive toward a politically and economically linked Europe.

“If France says no, she will be viewed as the problem child who has gone off in the corner to sulk,” said former Prime Minister Jacques Chirac, whose Gaullist political party is badly split over the referendum. “She will be weakened. And the souffle that has been the construction of Europe runs the risk of falling flat.”

The French will be voting to ratify or reject a dry, legalistic, 900-page document known as the Maastricht Treaty, which takes its name from the small Dutch city where it was initialed by the 12 European Community leaders last December.

The treaty is really nothing more than a contract--with various opt-out clauses for reticent members Britain and Denmark--outlining the structure of a federal European state in which members gradually give away some of their sovereignty to a European government headquartered in Brussels and to a European Parliament based in Strasbourg, France.

The treaty’s most important and controversial feature is the establishment of a single European currency by the year 1999. Moving beyond the EC’s traditional economic sphere, the document would also create new mechanisms for setting joint foreign and even defense policies--although one nation’s veto could still thwart the will of the other 11.

Symbolically, the Maastricht Treaty has taken on even greater meaning as a measure of just how much the 12 EC nations are willing to sacrifice to build the dream of European federalism.

A narrow rejection by Danish voters in June has put great pressure on the French to demonstrate their faith in Europe. If the referendum succeeds, one of the first objectives of European leaders will be to devise a way to get the Danes to reconsider.

If the referendum fails, the treaty, already wounded by the Danes, will be dead. British Prime Minister John Major has already said he would withdraw it from consideration by his Parliament.

But the shock of rejection might be greatest in neighboring Germany, France’s so-called “twin pillar” in the European movement.

“I hope the French know what they are doing when they vote,” a German diplomat said recently in Paris. “If they vote against Maastricht they will destroy years of effort and hurt a lot of feelings in Germany. It could be very difficult after that to persuade the Germans to trust the French.”

In a recent interview with the British newspaper The Independent, Mitterrand brooded about the consequences of a negative vote.

“It would be a serious reversal for France and for Europe, without doubt, with dozens of years lost before a similar chance would recur,” he said.

On other occasions Mitterrand has been even gloomier about the idea of Europe without the Maastricht accord. “It would break Europe,” he said in a July 14 television appearance, “because there would be no more impetus, no one would believe in it anymore.”

He said voter rejection would erase “45 years of French foreign policy.”

Mitterrand is not alone. Practically all of France’s main political leaders, with the exception of Communist Party chief Georges Marchais and extreme right National Front party head Jean-Marie Le Pen, vigorously support the treaty. Nearly every newspaper and important political columnist supports it.

But the most recent public opinion polls showed supporters of the Maastricht Treaty holding only a slight edge, with more than enough undecided voters to throw the outcome either way.

Support for the treaty dropped from a high of more than 60% of those who said they had made up their minds in June to as low as 47% in some polls at the beginning of September. A final poll after Mitterrand went on television in a three-hour defense of the treaty earlier this month showed the vote deadlocked, 50-50. London oddsmakers have made the “yes” vote a slight favorite.

The rapid deterioration of what once looked like a sure bet has caused rounds of anxious hand-wringing and head-shaking in the French capital about what some see as the nation’s penchant for self-destruction.

A rejection of Maastricht would not mark the first time that France stood in the way of an important step in the development of a modern pan-European state. The French Parliament killed the 1954 European Defense Community Treaty, authored by a French diplomat, that had already been approved by the other members of the nascent European Community. One of the young members of Parliament who voted “no” on that occasion was Mitterrand.

Le Monde newspaper publisher Jacques Lesourne compared the French character to that of lemmings. “From time to time,” he said recently, “without any apparent reason, whole droves of these rodents commit collective suicide by throwing themselves into the sea. It is an attitude that makes you think of France in these days of September.”

Supporters of the Maastricht Treaty did not foresee that the referendum would cause a grass-roots movement of citizens, never before consulted directly on the European development question, who were concerned about the treaty’s implications for their national rights and cultural traditions.

“There’s a revolt by the people,” said Stanley Crossick, chairman of the Belmont European Policy Center in Brussels. “They sense there’s something about European unity that they don’t understand, and they’re attacking Maastricht because that’s all there is to attack.”

Crossick expects a happy ending. The divisive debate over Maastricht, he said, will be the equivalent of “an invigorating cold shower” for Europe’s leaders if it brings the people into the discussion on what Europe should be.

One aspect of the treaty that was exploited successfully by Le Pen and his National Front is a provision granting the right to vote to all European citizens in any of the EC member countries where they reside. Thus a German living in Marseille could vote in local and national elections.

Opponents also have won points with the electorate by raising the specter of France’s relinquishing its sovereignty to technocratic bureaucrats based in Brussels.

For many French, the treaty has come to represent a challenge to their treasured way of life, although the issues that concern them often have nothing to do with the text of the treaty itself.

Farmers see the document as a threat to their heavy agricultural subsidies and a concession to American pressure for more open trade in grains and produce. Industrial workers fear Maastricht as a lever by big business to cut into generous French social benefits.

Clouding the climate of the vote are the insecurities created by the present European monetary crisis and accompanying fears about the nature of relations between France and Germany.

Supporters of the Maastricht Treaty see the European union as a way of tying Germany to a common cause. Opponents fear that Germany, with its powerful economy and Western Europe’s largest population, will use the EC to dominate Europe. The demonstration of economic power displayed last week by the German Bundesbank in the monetary crisis fueled arguments in both camps.

Another development that could affect the vote is the revelation last week that Mitterrand, 75, suffers from prostate cancer. Although his doctors report that the cancer is relatively common in men of his age, Mitterrand’s hospitalization in the week before the vote is likely to win him some sympathy votes when he needs them most.

By insisting that he will remain in office in the event of a “no” vote and remaining vague about his plans if there is a resounding “yes,” Mitterrand has managed to remove himself as a central issue in the debate. “My personal fate counts for little in this instance and is not at issue in this affair,” Mitterrand said in an interview July 14.

However, historian Jean Lacouture estimated during an interview that the unpopular Mitterrand, whose most recent rating in the polls was 26%, could still cost the treaty between 6% and 8% of the vote.

What most rankles EC bureaucrats in Brussels--the “technocrats” attacked by treaty foes in the debate--is that the French president called for the referendum in the first place. Mitterrand had the option of seeking ratification through Parliament, where support seemed assured.

A French Cliffhanger

1. Belgium: Approval expected in October.

2. Greece: Treaty ratified Aug. 1.

3. Ireland: First nation to ratify the accord on June 18.

4. Luxembourg: Treaty ratified July 2.

5. Denmark: Rejected the accord June 2.

6. Britain: If France votes “no,” it will withdraw the bill from Parliament.

7. France: Referendum on Sunday.

8. Germany: Debate opens in October.

9. Italy: Ratification expected soon.

10. Netherlands: Treaty submitted to Parliament June 3.

11. Portugal: Ratification expected in October.

12. Spain: Debate to begin in October. Ratification expected.

French voters will: Either reject or approve the treaty, which proposes closer political and economic union for the European Community’s 12 member nations. Approval would be a first step to issuing a common currency.

Yes: Analysts believe a resounding French “yes” could put European integration back on track. It would likely mean quick ratification by the parliaments of the seven European Community nations that have not yet completed action.

No: Rejection of the treaty by powerful France would kill the accord in its current form. It could trigger a new outbreak of chaos in Europe’s currency markets, with a strong possibility that the system of fixed exchange rates between 11 of the EC countries will collapse.

Source: Associated Press