China’s Contenders Prepare to Enter the Ring at Party Congress : Politics: Participants are expected to look at possible successors to Deng Xiaoping. The odds are on reformers.

Politburo member Qiao Shi, who heads China’s security apparatus, could have assumed the Communist Party’s top post immediately after the 1989 massacre of pro-democracy protesters in Beijing, according to a widely held belief here.

But Qiao was too smart, in this view, to take the No. 1 position when the party’s then-General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was ousted for allegedly sympathizing with the student demonstrators in Tian An Men Square. Had Qiao taken the top party spot then, his image would have been forever bloodied. Qiao also knew, of course, that the real boss in China is senior leader Deng Xiaoping--and that the record of success by heirs apparent in Chinese Communist history is a resounding zero.

A Communist Party congress, typically held once every five years, is now due to open Monday to grapple with succession issues left hanging by the upheavals of 1989. The final full-scale struggle to succeed Deng, 88, as China’s supreme leader begins only on the day he dies or is fully incapacitated. But this weeklong congress will largely determine who is in the race, who is favored and what strengths the contenders bring to battle.

Qiao, 68, is at least a potential kingmaker somewhere down the road, and he seems as credible a candidate as anyone to become paramount leader of the successor generation. Observers will be watching to see whether he now moves up in the party hierarchy. Other key questions are whether General Secretary Jiang Zemin, the man chosen in 1989 to ultimately replace Zhao, finds his power trimmed and whether any vice premiers get party promotions.

This will be the 14th congress since the Chinese Communist Party was founded in 1921. The last congress, held in 1987, installed Zhao as Deng’s anointed heir. The 1,991 delegates will elect a new Central Committee, which currently has 175 members. It, in turn, will choose a new ruling Politburo, likely to number about 20, and a Politburo Standing Committee of about seven leaders who institutionally hold the top reins of power. Higher still are Deng and a few other revolutionary elders who rule through the strength of their prestige, seniority and personal connections.

All the rumored lists of names for Politburo promotions imply a strengthening of the position of reformers who are basically in the Zhao mold. Zhao himself, once the leader of reformist forces in China, remains out of sight and presumably under some form of house arrest.

The party’s current Central Committee, in a pre-congress meeting that concluded Friday, announced the formal end of an “investigation” into Zhao’s actions during the student protests. It took no action other than to reconfirm a 1989 decision that Zhao had committed the “mistake” of “supporting the turmoil and splitting the party.”

Friday’s decision apparently sets the stage for the congress to ignore the issue of Zhao himself, focusing instead on pushing forward the policies he favored: bold economic reform and cautious political relaxation under Communist Party control.

“The gravity of political power at the top is definitely shifting to a moderate-to-radical reform group,” David Shambaugh, a specialist in Chinese politics at the University of London, said during a recent visit to Beijing. “It’s Zhao Ziyang-ism without Zhao Ziyang.”

In keeping with the principle of top-to-bottom rule, the decisions to be endorsed by the congress have already been made privately by the handful of top leaders who rule China, including current members of the Politburo and nominally retired elders like Deng. Delegates to the congress are chosen partly for their trustworthiness in such matters as following instructions on how to vote.

The congress is significant primarily as a public forum to announce top-level decisions and present a show of unity in support of them.

Also, by formally redistributing authority at the top, a congress lays the groundwork for personnel changes across the upper levels of the vast bureaucracy entrusted with day-to-day rule in China. Chinese media have already announced that the congress aims to push forward market-oriented economic reforms. The congress also is expected to approve a modest loosening of cultural and ideological controls, which would be accomplished in part through personnel changes at key propaganda organs.

Deng’s goal appears to be a gradual enforcement of more radical reform measures without a wholesale purge of those, such as Premier Li Peng, who have dragged their feet on reform.

“From all the readings we get, there seems no question the congress is intended to be a strong reaffirmation of the Deng Xiaoping line of reform and openness,” said a Western diplomat, who spoke on condition of anonymity. “What they want is a sense that everybody is getting on the reform bandwagon. They want to strengthen reform, but not as a rout of opponents.”

What the congress seems likely to do is endorse a collective leadership formally dedicated to the long-term continuation of Deng’s basic policies, without really trying to settle the succession issue.

When Jiang, the bland party boss of Shanghai, was elevated to general secretary in 1989, official media described him as the “core” of the successor generation of leadership.

He also serves as nominal commander of the People’s Liberation Army through his role as chairman of the Central Military Commission. Still, Jiang lacks any strong power base of his own. Most observers believe he can be pushed aside whenever stronger rivals find it convenient.

There is little expectation that Jiang will be ousted now, but the congress could take steps that would further weaken him.

Jiang’s shaky position is illustrated by a popular joke that swept Beijing in the summer and fall of 1989. In a country where it can be dangerous to criticize one’s rulers, the bitterly humorous story is significant for what it says about public attitudes toward three key leaders.

It seems, according to the joke, that a donkey appeared one day in Tian An Men Square and refused to leave. The ousted Zhao, Premier Li and newly installed General Secretary Jiang were all sent to deal with the problem.

Neither Zhao nor Li had been terribly successful that spring with their alternative methods of urging student protesters to leave the square. But confronted with the donkey, they persevered with the same old techniques, according to the joke.

Zhao, taking a conciliatory approach, promised the donkey some hay if it would leave the square. It didn’t move.

Li, front man for the military crackdown on the student demonstrators, then tried.

“If you don’t leave the square, we’ll shoot you,” he threatened. The beast still wouldn’t budge.

Then Jiang stepped up and whispered something in the donkey’s ear. Its eyes bulged with terror, and it bolted away.

“What did you say?” asked an astonished Li.

“I told him that if he didn’t leave the square, I’d make him the next general secretary,” Jiang replied.

To fully understand this little tale, it helps to remember that Jiang’s two immediate predecessors--Hu Yaobang and Zhao--were both ousted after Deng turned against them. Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s first two heirs apparent--Liu Shao-chi and Lin Piao--died in unusual circumstances after splits with Mao. Mao’s deathbed third choice, Hua Guofeng, failed to consolidate power before Deng swept him aside.

Beijing is filled with rumors that Deng now has lost confidence in both Jiang and Li but dares not oust them immediately for fear of upsetting China’s political balance.

Some observers believe that Deng has decided to whittle away the authority of Jiang and Li by surrounding them with more competent and reformist figures.

Qiao--believed to have some reformist sympathies despite his role as security chief--is a leading figure in this scenario.

Some foreign diplomats and scholars consider it likely that the congress will create two vice general secretary positions, giving one to Qiao and the other to current Politburo Standing Committee member Li Ruihuan, a reformist in charge of ideological matters. Such a restructuring would drastically dilute Jiang’s authority.

“Qiao Shi is a very powerful man,” Shambaugh commented. “If he gets elevated to vice general secretary, he’s really a de facto ruler.”