LOS ANGELES TIMES INTERVIEW : Cyril Ramaphosa : Point Man in Negotiations for the African National Congress

Back when Cyril Ramaphosa was a powerful union boss, hammering out agreements for black mine workers, he was a favorite target of local editorial cartoons. One memorable drawing showed Ramaphosa trying to ride a horse, labeled “the economy,” that he had just shot dead. “That’ll teach you,” the bearded union leader is saying. “Now, giddyap!”

The most revealing feature of that cartoon, though, is that its target, Ramaphosa, keeps a framed copy hanging on his office wall at African National Congress headquarters.

It is a reminder that realism and compromise are the hallmarks of successful negotiations--a lesson Ramaphosa seems to have learned well. During his first 15 months as ANC secretary general, Ramaphosa has shown considerable skill as a leader and negotiator. The 39-year-old lawyer, a likely successor to 74-year-old Nelson Mandela, is often described as the second black president in a future South Africa.

Ramaphosa narrowly escaped death last month when he led a march on the nominally independent black homeland of Ciskei and troops opened fire on the marchers, killing 28.

But, after three weeks of talks with President Frederik W. de Klerk’s government, he exacted significant concessions that led the ANC to end its three-month suspension of constitutional talks.

In the process, Ramaphosa strengthened his position in the ANC. But he also earned the respect of whites who have come to see him as one of the bright lights in an organization they have sharply criticized.

Unlike most members of the ANC hierarchy, who emerged from prison or exile, Ramaphosa came from the grass-roots anti-apartheid movement. He was first drawn into the liberation struggle by the late “black consciousness” leader Steve Biko. Later, he was detained twice, for 11 months and then for 6 months.

The grandson of a migrant diamond-mine worker, he became involved in the fledgling black union movement in the early 1980s. He founded the National Union of Mineworkers and, in 1987, led 330,000 blacks in an unprecedented 21-day strike that shut down the country’s mines. The union buckled in the face of massive dismissals of strikers, but the strike gave black unions a new respect in the country’s white boardrooms.

Although the stakes today are far higher, Ramaphosa remains an independent and introspective man known for practical solutions and an absence of hidebound revolutionary rhetoric. He and his wife, who works with an association of lawyers, recently moved from Soweto to a formerly white suburb of Johannesburg. And his passions outside the office include trout fishing and fast cars.

Question: You led the march in the Ciskei homeland that resulted in the massacre of 28 of your supporters. Looking back, what lessons can you and the ANC draw from that?

Answer: There are many lessons. The first is that the march, in my view, could have been a lot more successful if the United Nations people had been there; we could have waited until the U.N. people were there to observe it. . . . The other lesson, of course, is that we underestimated (Ciskei leader Oupa) Gqozo’s capacity to destroy life. . . . We thought that he wouldn’t shoot.

But our people showed enormous courage by marching in their tens of thousands to demonstrate that there is no free political activity in Ciskei and that Gqozo is unwanted and totally rejected by the people.

*

Q: The ANC seems to protest against some homelands, like Ciskei, while leaving others, whose leaders support the ANC, alone. What is the current ANC policy on the homelands?

A: Our policy has always been that they are the creations of the South African government. They were meant to divide and rule over our people. We are not calling for the removal of every homeland leader. But those who act as tin-pot dictators and who deny our organization the right to free political activity, and who are basically riding roughshod over our people and trampling human rights, we insist that they should go. Because they are making the lives of our people a misery.

There are homeland leaders we have an alliance with, in a way, because, like us, they want a speedy end to apartheid. They have not taken it upon themselves to oppress our people, and we cannot insist that they should go. That does not mean we lend support to the system itself. We are in transition and . . . they have a role to play. But Gqozo and those like him have no role to play.

*

Q: Who are those like him?

A: (Bophuthatswana President Lucas) Mangope. (Kwazulu Chief Minister Mangosuthu Gatsha) Buthelezi.

*

Q: Doesn’t Buthelezi, as leader of the Inkatha Freedom Party, have a role to play?

A: If he is a leader who is going to make sure that every political organization has the right to organize (in the Kwazulu homeland), then he and his party have a role to play. . . . But his role, at this point in time, is very destructive. It is actually a very dangerous game that he is playing.

*

Q: What game is that?

A: He is promoting ethnicity much more than promoting a South African nationhood. He is out of step with the feelings of the people generally and with the aspirations of all South Africans.

*

Q: But can the country ignore him?

A: No. You can’t ignore him, I mean, he does have support. But he is . . . misdirecting his followers and becoming politically disruptive by threatening civil war if he does not get his way. And in that respect, he can’t be ignored. We’ve got to find effective ways of countering the type of move that he keeps making.

*

Q: How do you do that?

A: There are various ways. You could obviously appeal over his head to his followers. Not all of them support what Buthelezi is doing. And we can raise the issues prominently, so that even his membership can see that he’s acting as a dictator. You can appeal to sensible people, even within Inkatha.

*

Q: That’s easier to say, here in ANC headquarters, than it is among your supporters in Buthelezi’s home base of Natal.

A: People are angry on the ground. And they can be forgiven if they lack objectivity, because they have to confront the reality of what Buthelezi and his organization are doing to them. You find that they are justifiably angry, so angry, or impatient, that they find that the only way of dealing with Buthelezi is to completely ignore him.

But we still feel that there could well be a chance of having an impact on the followers of Inkatha.

*

Q: Is it difficult to balance the anger of your supporters with the need to continue negotiations with this government?

A: Leaders are meant to lead from the front but at the same time they are also meant to listen to what their followers are saying.

There are times when leadership needs to take a bold move forward. And there are times when the leadership needs to act on the basis of what the grass roots say. You need to have your political thermometer constantly in the political waters to know when to give leadership in what way. We’re pleased, as an organization, that we’ve mastered the art of keeping a balance between the two.

*

Q: Many of your supporters say it’s too early to return to the bargaining table with the government. How do you respond?

A: We say, yes, the government cannot be trusted. They have demonstrated that over and over again. But the fact of the matter is: This conflict has to be settled through talking to them. It would be wrong to think that we will settle this conflict through investing a lot of trust in them. We’ve got to go out there, negotiate the best deal that we can for our people and exert enormous pressure on a continuous basis on the government.

In the end, you’ve got to make them give up power. The agreement we reached at the summit with them is an abundant demonstration that, much as the government cannot be trusted, it can be dragged screaming and kicking and shouting to sign agreements; agreements that will put us in a much better position to be able to achieve the ultimate goal that we want to achieve.

*

Q: The recent agreement emerged after the ANC pulled out of talks over the massacre of 40 people at Boipatong in June. Are the chances of another Boipatong less today?

A: To a large extent, yes, they’re much less--if they stick to their agreements. You can never really tell, because you’ve got all these killers roaming around. But if the police execute their responsibilities, we can do it.

*

Q: What’s the most important part of that agreement?

A: Their agreement that the constitution of the country will be drafted by a one-chambered body. That is a key issue. And the others are also important: that the constitution-making body should be democratically elected and function democratically, that there should be deadlock-breaking mechanisms if we cannot finally draft the constitution and that there will be time limits.

It basically means that there is a recognition on their side that we are in a hurry, the entire country is in a hurry, to have a new constitution. Now, that is a major victory.

*

Q: So the gap between the government and the ANC seems to be closing?

A: Well, I wouldn’t say completely. But I think we will be able to find each other. There are some outstanding issues. For instance, the powers that regions ought to have. That is an important matter that still needs to be resolved.

*

Q: And Buthelezi? Whose responsibility is it to get him back into negotiations?

A: Buthelezi is the government’s creation and it is their responsibility and their duty to make sure that those who are allied to them are brought in to become part of the deal. . . . But it’s generally recognized that the ANC and the government are the two major parties. Buthelezi clearly wants to be regarded as a major party, too, but he lacks the support base.

*

Q: Can you tell me a little about your negotiations with the government constitutional minister, Roelf Meyer? You spent most of the last month with him. What was the tone of those talks?

A: Professional and businesslike. There were very tense moments--at times quite acrimonious but at times also fairly cordial. They were your typical negotiations. We reached crucial moments when the entire agreement could have fallen apart. But we also realized that we had responsibilities that went beyond the style of the two of us, because it was the future of the country that was at stake, and we always had to bear that in mind.

*

Q: Was there a particular point when you thought it was going to fall apart?

A: On the question of the prisoners. They continued to want to link a general amnesty (for state officials) with the release of political prisoners. And there was a time when we thought that we would not have an agreement. The whole agreement almost fell apart because of their refusal to release those prisoners. They were tough negotiations. But they were successful.

*

Q: Does the government now have more of a commitment to relinquish power?

A: I don’t trust them. They’ve held on to power for far too long and I think holding on to power is very sweet to them. And they don’t want to let go of what they regard as a good thing.

They want to relinquish power without losing power. They want to ensure that they hold on to as much power as they can after relinquishing it. We’re going to have to compel them to give up that power.

*

Q: When do you foresee the first multiracial elections in South Africa?

A: I would say June or July.

*

Q: You wouldn’t have said that a month ago, though.

A: No, I wouldn’t have said that a month ago. But once negotiations resume, I see no reason why we can’t move with speed to elections. All that our people now want to know is the date for elections. And we are in a great hurry to set that date, so that we can stop the uncertainty, the anxiety in the country.