PERSPECTIVE ON BOSNIA : Keep Your Powder Dry as They Die : An entire people can still be massacred with impunity, simply because only the powerful can save the powerless.

Military interventions are easiest launched as impulsive reactions to sudden crises. For that reason alone, the Bosnian people never had a chance. By the time they needed an army to rescue them, the hazards of an intervention had been studied too well.

The specific threats by Serb and Croat leaders foretold the violence to come as early as 1990. The Yugoslav civil war did not begin until the summer of 1991, and did not spread to Bosnia until this year. The politicians and military leaders of Europe had ample time to study Bosnia’s fragmented terrain and intermingled populations, as well as the uneven balance of strength that favors the Serbs. It could thus have been calculated well in advance that to shield the Bosnians from expulsions and massacre, a European army would have to deploy a platoon in every hamlet, a company in every village, a battalion in every town and at least a division in Sarajevo alone.

There was, to be sure, no European army in 1990 or 1991, as there still is not. But the end of the Cold War has left unemployed troops all over Europe. Given the will, a sufficient force could have been mustered from professional and volunteer units to avoid sending conscripts to Bosnia. The disintegration of Yugoslavia might thus have been the opportunity to integrate the European Community through the creation of a European army, which would in turn have required a joint political and military command. By sending their joint forces to protect the Bosnians, the Europeans could have gained a much-needed sense of solidarity and a common idealistic purpose in the service of a pressing humanitarian cause.

But there was no inclination whatever to exploit the opportunity, or to confront the humanitarian challenge. In each European country where action was even briefly contemplated, it was quickly agreed by politicians and soldiers alike that the venture would be profitless. True, there was little risk of serious fighting with significant casualties. Contrary to the legend endlessly repeated, German occupiers in World War II suffered few casualties at the hands of Tito’s guerrillas, and today’s militias are even less tough.

While Serbian regular forces are heavily armed, their leaders in Belgrade have every reason to avoid all-out war. In the absence of any tangible benefit, however, all political, military and budgetary calculations went against intervention. Of course, the saving of innocent Bosnian men, women and children was not computed as a benefit. They are, after all, foreigners, and mostly Muslims to boot. The scenes relayed by TV news were admittedly unpleasant, but viewers could always switch to other channels.

Alternatively, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization might have organized a rescue force, though only with American leadership. But of that there was no prospect, because no U.S. President would risk putting U.S. troops in harm’s way during an election year against expressed military advice to the contrary. And Gen. Colin Powell, chairman of the Joint Chiefs, insists that the United States should send its forces into danger only if there is a perfectly clear-cut combat goal and overwhelming force to achieve it. The aim is to guarantee a quick victory with very few casualties, so as to safeguard the armed forces from any possible controversy.

What would happen if other public servants were allowed to enforce similar rules? Teachers might accept only straight-A students, to assure a 100% success rate that would spare them all criticism from parents or school boards. Emergency-room doctors might avoid all malpractice lawsuits by refusing to treat patients whose full, prompt, and painless recovery cannot be assured. And police officers might refuse to respond to 911 calls unless they first receive exact orders on what they are to do and permission to use maximum force.

These analogies are imperfect, but then the Powell doctrine is an extreme case of bureaucratic self-protection. It calls for a degree of precision in defining military tasks that is rarely possible in this imperfect world, and for a guarantee of unfailingly quick and painless victories that is beyond the command of mere mortals. It is most revealing that Powell’s pronouncements have evoked much approval in the media and no public criticism at all.

With both the European Community and NATO (that is, the United States) unwilling to act, only the United Nations remains--but the United Nations has no fighting forces at its command, only ineffectual “peacekeeping” units, which cannot shield the Bosnians from their tormentors, only prolong their agony.

It is still argued that the Jews were abandoned to massacre in World War II because widespread if milder forms of anti-Semitism induced a tacit acceptance of the murderous Nazi variety. But Bosnia shows that no such explanation is necessary. An entire people can still be tortured and massacred with impunity even if there is no ancient prejudice against them, simply because only the powerful can save the powerless. For that to happen, politicians must lead and soldiers must act, and the rest of us must compel them to do so if they hesitate. Instead, we simply change channels.