Hussein’s Way: Attacking Your Opponents’ Fists With Your Chin : Iraq: After a period of compliance, the Iraqi leader aimed to draw fire. He may even blunder into getting what he wants--no sanctions.

Saddam Hussein, the man who should have been buried by one of the 20th Century’s most lopsided military defeats, has returned to haunt an other U.S. Administration. His re cent behavior suggests that he actu ally thrives on strategic blunders. At the very least, he still maintains the capacity to surprise and dismay.

Hussein’s latest stratagem, which not just invited but practically required the United States to attack Iraq, clearly caught Bush Administration officials off balance. They expected Hussein to lay low, at least until they were out of office. He had avoided making provocative moves from late summer through the November elections.

In fact, the Iraqis were going out their way last fall to avoid provoking the President. They said they feared George Bush was looking for some kind of military encounter to boost his election chances. In late October, a senior Iraqi diplomat said Hussein would be especially careful because, “If Bush is defeated, he will be even more dangerous. Then he will be like a wounded animal.”

As it turned out, it was Hussein who was spoiling for a fight. Beginning in December, he stepped up his challenges to U.N. authority. Iraqi jets began to dart in and out of the “no-fly” zones set up by the United Nations. In addition, Iraqi anti-aircraft batteries in the northern and southern parts of the country were “unwrapped.”

Opinion varies on Hussein’s motives. After all, how do you explain a policy that amounts to attacking your opponents’ fists with your chin? One superficially appealing explanation, offered by an Arab ambassador, was that Hussein was merely demonstrating, once again, his fundamental ignorance of the United States. “He thought Bush wouldn’t act because he had run out of power.” The diplomat contended that Hussein has spent only five days of his life outside Iraq--a trip to the former Soviet Union, not exactly good preparation for understanding how power is transferred in a Western democracy.

Others, including analysts at the Central Intelligence Agency, surmised the Iraqi dictator was forced to produce a diversion for an increasingly restive population. They have been charting the deteriorating Iraqi economy, which has been marked since Jordan began tightening the U.N. embargo last summer.

They also said that Hussein timed his provocations to coincide with the final days of the Bush Administration, because in Iraq, Bush is a most plausible villain. Even among Iraqis likely to blame Hussein for their desperate plight, Bush is seen as an implacable, unreasonable foe.

A third opinion, held at the State Department, discounts the impact of Hussein’ domestic audience. Immune to the sufferings of his people, and certain of his iron-fisted control over them, he wanted to appeal beyond his own borders. With the exception of Kuwait, they note, none of America’s Arab friends are enthusiastic about endless confrontations with Iraq.

The Arabs are particularly receptive to the argument that the United States is tough when it comes to acting against supposed Iraqi transgressions but indifferent to the outrages perpetrated by, say, Israelis or Serbs against fellow Muslims. And with the re-emergence of Iran, even some influential Saudis have begun to ask whether it wasn’t time to begin warming up relations with Baghdad.

Also effective with an Arab audience is Hussein’s claim that the allies are violating Iraqi sovereignty. In fact, it’s hard to dispute his contention that Iraqi sovereignty is being undermined when foreign aircraft routinely patrol Iraqi airspace, while U.N. weapon inspectors roam the countryside. Equally galling is the U.N.-sponsored Boundary Commission’s award to Kuwait of nearly one-third of Iraq’s pre-war Persian Gulf coastline.

Beyond the Arab world, Hussein has been able to score points in some new places. The Turks, an important member of the Gulf coalition, are reluctant to be associated with allied strategy this time because of continuing refugee problems stemming from the war. The Russians, too, are ambivalent.

But the most important target may be the United States. Veteran Iraq watchers say some in Baghdad persist in seeing an opportunity to make inroads on the new Administration. State Department analysts say it was no coincidence that Nizar Hamdoun, the architect of the 1980’s U.S.-Iraqi “honeymoon,” was appointed Iraq’s ambassador to the United Nations last fall. They also profess to see the hand of the French behind an expected Iraqi charm offensive. They suspect French Foreign Minister Roland Dumas has been encouraging Hamdoun and other Iraqi diplomats to woo the Clinton team.

For now, State Department officials fear the Iraqis will be able to use the military strikes as a means of getting the United Nations to revisit the question of sanctions. Privately, they admit Hussein is correct to claim that the United States is attacking his sovereignty. The Bush Administration’s unspoken reason for insisting upon rigid enforcement of the U.N. sanctions is to humiliate Hussein.

But if proposals like the latest one from the Russians, which seeks clarification of the mandate to use force, are accepted, Hussein may be able to turn the tables. Explains one veteran State Department analyst, “The first step is to get the United Nations into discussing the details. Then they will begin to hamstring, water down and restrict our ability to move.” Soon, this official warns, Hussein will no longer be the “supine” recipient of U.N. commands but a full-fledged negotiating partner. His prestige will be enhanced.

An even greater achievement would be to negotiate directly with the United States. This explains the huge impact of Clinton’s suggestion in a recent New York Times interview that, “If he (Hussein) wants a better relationship with the United States . . . all he has to do is change his behavior.” Clinton advisers were besieged by phone calls from allied and Arab diplomats. Hamdoun, never one to miss an opening, immediately suggested a dialogue.

But if Clinton’s gaffe shed light on anything beyond his tendency toward glibness, it was overwhelmed by the need to support Americans in combat. Watching Clinton’s furious efforts to backtrack, one bemused Bush appointee commented, “To the extent Clinton wanted to do things differently, Saddam Hussein, by provoking a military confrontation, made it impossible.”

Hussein may be back, but it seems he’s just as dumb as ever.