With World Strife on Rise, U.N. Needs Military Muscle : Security: The U.S. can no longer act as the world’s policeman. Instead, the Security Council must control new peacekeeping forces.

The Clinton Administration must formulate a new strategy for the U.S. role in international security. The end of the Cold War has created a power vacuum filled by territorial disputes, civil wars, ethnic conflicts and tribal struggles. Since the United States has no desire to serve as policeman of these conflicts, there is a compelling need for collective international action through the United Nations. But the United States must take the lead to ensure that the U.N. Security Council has the necessary muscle to enforce its decisions. The impotence of the peacekeeping operations in the former Yugoslavia dramatizes the requirement for a U.N. enforcement capability.

For the Security Council to have the power essential to enforce its decisions, there must be an earmarked military force. This will require a commitment for a significant contribution of forces from the United States, the most powerful member. Action authorized by the Security Council should become an important part of the fabric of American security.

The U.N. Charter provided for the creation of an enforcement mechanism to implement collective measures approved by the Security Council. But the Cold War blocked it because the Soviet Union always opposed such actions. In the United Nations’ 47-year history, only three enforcement operations were conducted under the Security Council’s authority.

In the Korean War (1950-1952), the United Nations provided a thin cover of multilateralism for U.S. military action. This was possible because the Soviet representative had walked out of the Security Council and was not present to cast the veto.

When Belgium decided to withdraw its colonial government in the Congo in 1960, the Security Council authorized a peacekeeping force to maintain order during the transition. Again, this was approved because the Soviet representative had walked out. The operation, under U.N. command, lasted almost four years and involved 93,000 soldiers from 34 nations, none of whom were members of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization or the Soviet bloc.

The only other major military enforcement operation was Operation Desert Storm in 1991, which forced Iraq to leave Kuwait. The United States provided the command and most of the troops. There was no problem of a Russian veto. In fact, since the end of the Cold War, the Russians have become strong proponents of strengthening the U.N. security role.

But the U.N role is rapidly changing. The current humanitarian operation in Somalia is without precedent. U.S. troops--serving as a temporary executive agent of the United Nations--were dispatched to maintain order while food was distributed in a chaotic environment where no government existed. The United Nations intends to replace these U.S. troops with a U.N. force. It is probable that some U.S. non-combat soldiers will remain to serve in the U.N. command. This will be a first.

Through the years, the United Nations has also engaged in more than 20 non-enforcement, or “peacekeeping,” operations. Peacekeeping wasn’t contemplated by the drafters of the U.N. charter. These operations have been improvised on a case-by-case basis to provide monitors of cease-fire agreements; impartial observers for border disputes, troop withdrawals and elections, and security for transport of food and supplies to war victims. There are currently 13 peacekeeping operations.

Most have made important contributions to maintaining the peace. But they have always had a perilous fragility, because the United Nations is not adequately staffed to manage them, has insufficient financial support and has no authority for enforcement. The predicament of the U.N. forces in the former Yugoslavia and in Cambodia provides the most recent evidence of this serious handicap.

The U.N. charter calls for the creation of a standby army made up of forces earmarked for U.N. service by the member-nations. The United Nations could become a potent deterrent to aggression if such a force existed. The situation in the former Yugoslavia, Cambodia and Angola would be far different today if such a force had been available. U.S. intervention in Somalia would not have been necessary.

The United States could earmark a standby force at no additional cost by using existing resources. This would require a long overdue adjustment, because most of the U.S. defense Establishment is still based on Cold War contingencies. The Pentagon currently projects a defense budget of about $270 billion a year through 1997. Add $13 billion a year for the nuclear-weapons programs of the Department of Energy and about $30 billion a year for various intelligence programs. Although President Bill Clinton has pledged to cut $12 billion to $20 billion a year, that still leaves a huge defense budget. There’s no threat to justify these costs. There may be future Desert Storms--when the United States desires the command and provides most of the troops--but, for the most part, it is likely that Washington will want to support collective measures through the United Nations.

U.N. budget assessments are calculated on each nation’s share of the world’s gross product. The U.S. share is 25%. If the United States earmarked a force valued at $25 billion a year and the other major military powers contributed their share, the U.N. Security Council would have a stand-by military Establishment worth $100 billion.

That would provide real teeth at no extra cost to the contributors, because the forces would be taken from existing resources. The earmarked units should include rapid-deployment forces, combat planes and helicopters, ground, sea and air transport, sophisticated intelligence and all necessary logistics.

Washington should lead in persuading other major powers to earmark forces for this U.N. service. For example, the Russians, despite their ravaged economy, have well-trained and equipped combat forces. High priority also should be given to extending permanent membership on the Security Council to Germany, Japan and India to reflect changes in world power since the United Nations was founded.

Critics claim that the United States should not commit such forces because this would risk involvement in fighting Washington might oppose. But this will never occur because the United States could veto any U.N. operation it opposes. Actually, even without the veto, no nation is obligated to use its earmarked forces if it opposed a particular operation. Since the end of the Cold War, no vetoes have been cast to block peacekeeping operations. Even China abstained rather than use its veto, because considerations of trade and security outweighed any objections the Chinese might have had.

In an effort to strengthen the U.N. security capability, the Pentagon should assign top personnel to the planning and management of the U.S. military role at the level of the Joint Chiefs. On the civilian side, the offices responsible for U.N. security affairs in both the Defense and State Departments should be elevated to the under-secretary level. There should also be a new office for U.N. security affairs on the National Security Council staff.

Madeleine Albright, U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, and her staff should be greatly strengthened for these purposes. Washington should also support the expansion of the staff of the U.N. Security Council and offices of the secretary general. All this will require the support and leadership of the Congress--especially the Senate and House Armed Services Committees and the Senate Foreign Relations and House Foreign Affairs committees.

Throughout most of its history, the United Nations has been belittled as an extravagant debating society. But now, if Washington reconsiders its security priorities, that reputation should change dramatically in the next few years.